tTbe Sagamore Series 



The Works of 

Theodore Roosevelt 

In 15 volumes, each containing frontispiece 
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I- American Ideals. 

2. Administration— Civil Service^ 

3. The Wilderness Hunter. 

4. Hunting the Grisly. 

5. Hunting Trips of a Ranchman. 

6. Hunting Trips on the Plains and in the Mountains 

7. The Rough Riders.* 

8. The Winning of the West. Part I. 

9. The Winning of the West. Part II. 

10. The Winning of the West. Part IIL 

11. The Winning of the West. Part IV., 
13. The Winning of the West. Part V. 

13. The Winning of the West. Part VI. 

14. The Naval War of 1812, Part I.— Events of 1812-13. 

15. The Naval War of 1812. Part II.— Events of 1814-15. 
* Published under arrangement with Messrs. Charles Scribner's Sons. 



G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 

New York and London 






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BOMBARDMENT OF FORT M'HENRY. 



The 
Naval War of 1812 

or the 

History of the United States Navy during 
the Last War with Great Britain 

to which is appended an account of 

The Battle of New Orleans 

By 

Theodore Roosevelt 

Author of " American Ideals," " The Wilderness Hunter," 
'* Hunting Trips of a Ranchman," etc. 

Part II. 






G. P. Putnam's Sons 

New York and London 
1900 



EI 3 (oQ 



c 



^ 



so 



ISio 



Copyright, 1882 

BY 

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 



* • 



• < 



• '• • • 



••• ••• 






CONTENTS, 



PART II. 

CHAPTER I. 
1814. 

ON THE OCEAN. 

Strictness of the blockade— Cruise of Rodgers— 
Cruise of the Constitution — Qhased into Marblehead — 
Attempt to cut-out the Alligator — The Essex captured 
after engagement with Phcebe and C/ieriib — The Frolic 
captured — The Peacock captures the Epervier — Com- 
modore Barney's flotilla afloat — The British in the 
Chesapeake — Capture of Washington, and burning of 
the public buildings — The Wasp captures the Reindeer 
— The IVasp sinks the Avon — Cruise and loss of the 
Adams — The privateer General Armstrong — The priva- 
teer Prince de Neufchatel — Loss of the gunboats on 
Lake Borgne — Fighting near New Orleans — Sum- 
mary 7 

CHAPTER II. 
1S14. 

ON THE LAKES. 

Ontario — The contest one of ship-building merely 
— Statistics of the two squadrons — Serious sickness 
among the Americans — Extreme caution of the com- 
manders, verging on timidity — Yeo takes Oswego and 
blockades Sackett's Harbor — British gunboats cap- 
tured — Chauncy blockades Kingston. — Erie — Captain 
Sinclair burns St. Joseph — Makes unsuccessful expedi- 
tion against Mackinaw — Daring and successful cutting- 

3 



4 COiXTEArrS. 

out expeditions of the British — Capture of the Ohio 
and Somers. — Champlain — Macdonough's and Dow- 
nie's squadrons — James' erroneous statements concern- 
ing them — Gallant engagement and splendid victory of 
Macdonough — Macdonough one of the greatest of 
American sea-captains 84 

CHAPTER III. 

1815. 

COXCLUDING OPERATIONS. 

The P}'esident captured by Captain Hayes' squadron 
— Successful cutting-out expedition of the Americans — 
American Privateer Chassai7- captures St. Lazvrence — 
The C onstitution engages the Cyane and the Levant 
and captures both — Escapes from a British squadron 
— The Hornet captures the Penguin and escapes from 
pursuit of the Cornwallis — The Peacock^s wanton at- 
tack on the Naulihis — Wanton attack on American 
gunboat after treaty of peace — Summary of events in 
181 5 — Remarks on the war — Tables of comparative 
loss, etc. — Compared with results of Anglo-French 
struggle 1 36 

CHAPTER IV. 

1815. 

THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS. 

The war on land generally disastrous — British send 
great expedition against New Orleans — Jackson pre- 
pares for the defence of the city — Night attack on the 
British advance guard — Artillery duels — Great Battle 
of Jan. 8th, 181 5 — Slaughtering repulse of the main at- 
tack — Rout of the Americans on the right bank of the 
river — Final retreat of the British — Observations on 
the character of the troops and commanders en- 
gaged 198 

Appendix . 245 



AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO IN CHAP. IV. 

Alison, Sir A. History of Europe. Ninth edition. 
20 vols. London, 1852. Pages 472, 477, 483, 485. 

Butler, Adjutant-General Robert. Official Report 
for the Morning of Jan. 8, 181 5, Page 476. 

Codrington, Admiral Sir Edward. Memoir of, by 
lady Bourchier. London, 1873. Pages 472, 475, 476, 
484. 

Cole, John William. Memoirs of British Generals 
Distinguished during the Peninsular War. London, 
1856. Pages 476, 490. 

Court of Inquiry on Conduct of General Morgan. 
Official Report. Page 484. 

Gleig, Ensign H. R. Narrative of the Campaigns of 
the British Army at Washington, Baltimore, and New 
Orleans. Philadelphia, 1821. Pages 466, 469, 470, 471, 

472, 473' 477. 4S8. 

Jackson, Andrew. As a Public Man. A sketch by 
W. G. Sumner. Boston, 1882. Page 490. 

Jackson, General Andrew. Official Letters. Pages 
465, 487. 

James, William. Military Occurrences of the Late 
War. 2 vols. London, ibi8. Pages 464, 471, 476, 
484,490. 

Keane, Major-General John. Letter, December 26, 
18 1 4. Pages 460, 466, 468. 

Lambert, General. Letters, January 10 and 28, 181 5. 
Pages 485, 487. 

Latour, Major A. Lacarriex. Historical Memoir of 
the War in West Florida and Louisiana. Translated 
from the French by H. P. Nugent. Philadelphia, 1816. 
Pages 461, 462, 469, 470, 471, 477, 478, 479, 483. 

Lossing, Benson J. Field-Book of the War of 1812. 
New York, 1859. Page 470. 

Patterson, Com. Daniel G. Letters, Dec. 20, 1814, 
and Jan. 13, 181 5. Pages 462, 485. 

5 



g AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO 

Monroe, James. Sketch of his Life, by Daniel C. 
Gilman. i6mo. Boston, 1883. Page 456. 

Napier, Maj.-Gen. Sir W. F. P. History of the War 
in the Peninsula. 5 vols. New York, 1882. Pages 

459. 464. 474. 475' 480, 490. , , . 

Scott, Lieut.-Gen. W. Memoirs, by himself. 2 vols. 
New York, 1864. Page 456. 

Thornton, Col. W. Letter, Jan. 8, 181 5. Page 485 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 



PART II. 



CHAPTER I. 
1814. 

ON THE OCEAN. 

Strictness of the blockade— Cruise of Rodgers — 
Cruise of the Constitution —ri^x unsuccessful chase of 
La Fiq lie— Ati2Lck on the Alligator— T\i& Essex c^y>^- 
ured— The Frolic captured— The Peacock captures the 
Epervier — Commodore Barney's flotilla — The British 
in the Chesapeake— The Wasp captures the Reindeer 
and sinks the Avon — Cruise and loss of the Adams — 
The privateer General Armstrong — The privateer 
Prince de Neufchatel—l^os?, of the gunboats in Lake 
Borgne — Fighting near New Orleans — Summary. 

DURING this year the blockade of the 
American coast was kept up with ever 
increasing rigor. The British frigates hovered 
like hawks off every seaport that was known 
to harbor any fighting craft ; they almost in- 
variably went in couples, to support one an- 
other and to lighten, as far as was possible, 
the severity of their work. On the northern 
coasts in particular, the intense cold of the 
furious winter gales rendered it no easy task 

7 



8 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

to keep the assigned stations ; the ropes were 
turned into stiff and brittle bars, the hulls were 
coated with ice, and many, both of men and 
officers, were frost-bitten and crippled. But 
no stress of weather could long keep the stub- 
born and hardy British from their posts. 
With ceaseless vigilance they traversed contin- 
ually the allotted cruising grounds, capturing 
the privateers, harrying the coasters, and 
keeping the more powerful ships confined to 
port ; " no American frigate could proceed 
singly to sea without imminent risk of being 
crushed by the superior force of the numerous 
British squadrons." ' But the sloops of war, 
commanded by officers as skilful as they were 
daring, and manned by as hardy seamen as 
ever sailed salt water, could often slip out ; 
generally on some dark night, when a heavy 
gale was blowing, they would make the attempt 
under storm canvas, and with almost invari- 
able success. The harder the weather, the 
better was their chance ; once clear of the 
coast the greatest danger ceased, though 
throughout the cruise the most untiring vigi- 
lance was needed. The new sloops that I have 
mentioned as being built proved themselves 
the best possible vessels for this kind of work ; 
they were fast enough to escape from most 
cruisers of superior force, and were over- 
matches for any British flush-decked ship, that 
is, for anything below the rank of the frigate- 
built corvettes of the Cyaiie's class. The 
danger of recapture was too great to permit of 

^ Captain Broke's letter of challenge to Captain 
Lawrence. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 9 

the prizes being sent in, so they were gener- 
ally destroyed as soon as captured ; and as the 
cruising grounds were chosen right in the track 
of commerce, the damage done and consterna- 
tion caused were very great. 

Besides the numerous frigates cruising along 
the coast in couples or small squadrons, there 
were two or three places that were blockaded 
by a heavier force. One of these was New 
London, before which cruised a squadron un- 
der the direction of Sir Thomas Hardy, in 
the 74 gun-ship Ramillies. Most of the other 
cruising squadrons off the coast contained 
razees or two-deckers. The boats of the 
Uogue, 74, took part in the destruction of 
some coasters and fishing-boats at Pettipauge 
in April ; and those of the Superb, 74, shared 
in a similar expedition against VVareham in 
June.' The command on the coast of North 
America was now given to Vice-Admiral Sir 
Alexander Cochrane. The main British force 
continued to lie in the Chesapeake, where 
about 50 sail were collected. During the first 
part of this year these were under the com- 
mand of Sir Robert Barrie, but in May he was 
relieved by Rear-Admiral Cockburn." 

The President, 44, Commodore Rodgers, at 
the beginning of 18 14 was still out, cruising 
among the Barbadoes and West Indies, only 
making a few prizes of not much value. She 
then turned toward ♦jhe American coast, strik- 
ing soundings near St. Augustine, and thence 
proceeding north along the coast to Sandy 
Hook, which was reached on Feb. i8th. The 

1 James, vi, 474. - James, vi, 437. 



lo NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

light was passed in the night, and shortly af- 
terward several sail were made out, when the 
F?'esidetit was at once cleared for action.* 
One of these strange sail was the Loire, ^^ 
(British), Capt. Thomas Brown, which ran 
down to close the President, unaware of her 
force ; but on discovering her to be a 44, 
hauled to the wind and made off.^ The 
President did not pursue, another frigate and 
a gun-brig being in sight.' This rencontre 
gave rise to nonsensical boastings on both 
sides ; one American writer calls the Loire 
the Plaiitagenet, 74 ; James, on the other hand, 
states that the President Avas afraid to engage 
the 38-gun frigate, and that the only reason 
the latter declined the combat was because 
she was short of men. The best answer to 
this is a quotation from his own work (vol. vi, 
p. 402), that " the admiralty had issued an 
order that no i8-pounder frigate was volun- 
tarily to engage one of the 24-pounder frigates 
of America." Coupling this order with the 
results of the combats that had already taken 
place between frigates of these classes, it can 
always be safely set down as sheer bravado 
when any talk is made of an American 44 
refusing to give battle to a British 38 ; and it 
is even more absurd to say that a British line- 
of-battle ship would hesitate for a minute 
about engaging any frigate. 

On Jan. ist, the Co7istitution, which had 
been lying in Boston harbor undergoing com- 

1 Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Feb. 20, 1814. 

2 James, vi, 412. 

3 " Naval Monument," p. 235. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1Z12. 11 

plete repairs, put out to sea under the com- 
mand of Capt. Charles Stewart. The British 
38-gun frigate Nymphe had been lying before 
the port, but she disappeared long before the 
ConstitiitioJi was in condition, in obedience to 
the order already mentioned. Capt. Stewart 
ran down toward the Barbadoes, and on the 
14th of February captured and destroyed the 
British 14-gun schooner P/V/c?/, with a crew of 
75 men. After making a few other prizes 
and reaching the coast of Guiana she turned 
homeward, and on the 23d of the same month 
fell in, at the entrance to the Mona passage, 
with the British 36-gun frigate Fique (late 
French Fal/as), Captain Maitland. The 
Constitutio7i at once made sail for the Pique ^ 
steering free ; ' the latter at first hauled to 
the wind and waited for her antagonist, but 
when the latter was still 3 miles distant she 
made out her force and immediately made all 
sail to escape ; the Constitution, however, 
gained steadily till 8 p. m., when the night 
and thick squally weather caused her to lose 
sight of the chase. Captain Maitland had on 
board the prohibitory order issued by the ad- 
miralty," and acted correctly. His ship was 
altogether too light for his antagonist. James, 
however, is not satisfied with this, and wishes 
to prove that both ships were desirous of avoid- 
ing the combat. He says that Capt. Stewart 
came near enough to count "13 ports and a 
bridle on the Pique's main-deck," and " saw 
at once that she was of a class inferior to the 

1 Letter of Capt. Stewart, April 8, 1814. 
- James, vi, 477. 



12 JVAVAL WAR (?/'' i8l2. 

Guerriere ox Java, '^ but " thought the Pirjue's 
i8's were 24 's, and therefore did not make an 
effort to bring her to action." He portrays 
very picturesquely the grief of the Pique's 
crew when they find they are not going to 
engage ; how they come aft and request to be 
taken into action ; how Captain Maitland 
reads them his instructions, but " fails to per- 
suade them that there had been any necessity 
of issuing them " ; and, finally, how the sailors, 
overcome by woe and indignation, refuse to 
take their supper-time grog, — which was cer- 
tainly remarkable. As the Cojistitutioji had 
twice captured iiritish frigates " with im- 
punity," according- to James himself, is it 
likely that she would now shrink from an en- 
counter with a ship which she " saw at once 
was of an inferior class" to those already 
conquered ? Even such abject cowards as 
James' Americans would not be guilty of so 
stupid an action. Of course neither Capt. 
Stewart nor any one else supposed for an in- 
stant that a 36-gun frigate was armed with 
24-pounders. 

It is worth while mentioning as an instance 
of how utterly untrustworthy James is in deal- 
ing with American affairs, that he says (p. 
476) the Constiiuiion had now "what the 
Americans would call a bad crew," whereas, 
in her previous battles, all her men had been 
" picked." Curiously enough, this is the ex- 
act reverse of the truth. Jn no case was an 
American ship manned with a " picked " crew, 
but the nearest approach to such was the 
crew the Constitution carried in this and the 



NAVAL V/AR OF iSl2. 



13 



next cruise, when '• she probably possessed as 
fine a crev/ as ever manned a frigate. They 
were principally New England men, and it 
has been said of them that they were almost 
qualified to fight the ship without her oflfi- 
cers." ' The statement that such men, com- 
manded by one of the bravest and most skil- 
ful captains of our navy, would shrink from 
attacking a greatly inferior foe, is hardly 
v/orth while denying: and, fortunately, such 
denial is needless, Captain Stewart's account 
being fully corroborated in the " Memoir of 
Admiral Durham,'' written by his nephew, 
Captain Murray, London, 1846. 

The Omstifutioii arrived off the port of 
Marblehead on April ^d., and at 7 a. m. fell in 
with the two Jiritish 38-gun frigates Junon^ 
Captain Upton, and Ihiedos, Captain Parker. 
*'The American frigate was standing to the 
westward v.ith the v/ind about north by v.est 
and bore from the two British frigates about 
northwest by west. The Jujiofi and Vhiedos 
quickly hauled up in the chase, and the Co7t- 
stitution crowded sail in the direction of 
Marblehead. At 9.30, finding the Tenalos 
rather gaining upon her, the Constitution 
started her water and threw overboard a 
quantity of provisions and other articles. At 
11.30 she hoisted her colors, and the two 
British frigates, who were now dropping 
slowly in the chase, did the same. At 1.30 
p. M. the Constitution anchored in the harbor 
of Marblehead. Captain Parker was anxious 
to follov/ her into the port, v.hich had no 

^ Cooper, ii, 463. 



14 NAVAL WAR OF \Z\2, 

defences ; but the Teiiedos was recalled by a 
signal from the Junony " Shortly afterward 
the Co7istitiction again put out, and reached 
Boston unmolested. 

On Jan. 29, 18 14, the small U. S. coasting 
schooner Alligator, of 4 guns and 40 men, 
Sailing-master R. Basset, was lying at anchor 
in the mouth of Stone River, S. C, when a 
frigate and a brig were perceived close inshore 
near the breakers. Judging from their mo- 
tions that they would attempt to cut him out 
when it was dark, Mr. Basset made his prep- 
arations accordingly.^ At half-past seven 
six boats were observed approaching cautious- 
ly under cover of the marsh, with muffled 
oars ; on being hailed they cheered and opened 
with boat carronades and musketry, coming on 
at full speed ; wdiereupon the Alligaioi' cut her 
cable and made sail, the wind being light from 
the southwest ; while the crew opened such a 
heavy fire on the assailants, who were then 
not thirty yards off, that they stopped the 
advance and fell astern. At this moment the 
Alllgalor grounded, but the enemy had suffered 
so severely that they made no attempt to 
renew the attack, rowing off down stream. 
On board the Alligator two men were killed 
and two wounded, including the pilot, who 
was struck down by a grape-shot while stand- 
ing at the helm ; and her sails and rigging 
were much cut. The extent of the enemy's 
loss was never known ; next day one of the 
cutters was picked up at North Edisto, much 

1 James, ^^, 479. 

2 Letter of Sailing-master Basset, Jan, 31, 1814. 



NAVAL WAR OF i^\2. 15 

injured and containing the bodies of an officer 
and a seaman.' For his skill and gallantry 
Mr. Basset was promoted to a lieutenancy, 
and for a time his exploit put a complete stop 
to the cutting-out expeditions along that part 
of the coast. The Alligator herself sank in a 
squall on July ist, but was afterward raised 
and refitted. 

It is much to be regretted that it is almost 
impossible to get at the British account of 
any of these expeditions which ended success- 
fully for the Americans ; all such cases are 
generally ignored by the British historians ; 
so that I am obliged to rely solely upon the 
accounts of the victors, who with the best 
intentions in the world, could hardly be per- 
fectly accurate. 

At the close of 1813 Captain Porter was 
still cruising in the Pacific. 

Early in January the Essex, now with 255 
men aboard, made the South American coast, 
and on the 12th of that month anchored in the 
harbor of Valparaiso. She had in company 
a prize, re-christened the Essex Junior, with a 
crew of 60 men, and 20 guns, 10 long sixes 
and 10 eighteen-pound carronades. Of course 
she could not be used in a combat with regular 
cruisers. 

On Feb. 8th, the British frigate Phoebe, t,(), 
Captain James Hilyar, accompanied by the 
Cherub, 18, Captain Thomas Tudor Tucker, 
the former carrying 300 and the latter 140 
men,^ made their appearance, and apparently 

1 Letter from Commander J. H. Dent, Feb. 21, 1814. 

2 They afterward took on board enough men from 



l6 JVAVAL JVA/^ OF 1S12. 

proposed to take the Essex by a coup de main. 
They hauled into the harbor on a wind, the 
Che7-ub falling to leeward ; while the Phabe 
made the port quarters of the Essex, and then, 
putting her helm down, luffed up on her 
starboard bow, but 10 or 15 feet distant. 
Porter's crew were all at quarters, the powder- 
boys with slow matches ready to discharge the 
guns, the boarders standing by, cutlass in 
hand, to board in the smoke ; everything 
was cleared for action on both frigates. 
Captain Hilyar now probably saw that there 
was no chance of carrying the Essex by sur- 
prise, and, standing on the after-gun, he 
inquired after Captain Porter's health ; the 
latter returned the inquiry, but warned Hilyar 
not to fall foul. The British captain then 
braced back his yards, remarking that if he 
did fall aboard it would be purely accidental. 
"Well," said Porter, "you have no business 
where you are ; if you touch a rope-yarn of 
this ship I shall board instantly.'" The 
Phoebe, in her then position, was completely at 
the mercy of the American ships, and Hilyar, 
greatly agitated, assured Porter that he meant 
nothing hostile ; and the Phcebe backed down, 
her yards passing over those of the Essex 
without touching a rope, and anchored half a 
mile astern. Shortly afterward the two captains 
met on shore, when Hilyar thanked Porter for 
his behavior, and, on his inquiry, assured him 
that after thus owing his safety to the latter's 

British merchant-vessels to raise their complements 
respectively to 320 and iSo. 
1 " Life of Farragut," p. 33. 



NAVAL V/AR OF \^\2. 17 

forbearance, Porter need be under no appre- 
hension as to his breaking the neutrality. 

The British ships now began a blockade of 
the port. On Feb. 27th, the Phoibe being 
hove to close off the port, and the Cherub a 
league to leeward, the former fired a weather 
gun ; the Essex interpreting this as a challenge, 
took the crew of the Essex Junior aboard and 
went out to attack the British frigate. But 
the latter did not await the combat ; she bore 
up, set her studding-sails, and ran down to 
the Cherub. The American officers were in- 
tensely irritated over this, and American 
writers have sneered much at '' a British 36 
refusing combat with an American 32." But 
the armaments of the two frigates were so 
wholly dissimilar that it is hard to make com- 
parison. When the fight really took place, 
the Essex was so crippled and the water so 
smooth that the British ships fought at their 
own distance ; and as they had long guns to 
oppose to Porter's carronades, this really 
made the Cherub more nearly suited to con- 
tend with the Essex than the latter was to 
fight the Phoebe. But when the Essex in fairly 
heavy weather, with the crew of the Essex 
Junior aboard, was to windward, the circum- 
stances were very different; she carried as 
many men and guns as the Phoebe, and in close 
combat, or in a hand-to-hand struggle, could 
probably have taken her. Still, Hilyar's 
conduct in avoiding Porter except when the 
Cherub was in company was certainly over- 
cautious, and very difficult to explain in a 
man of his tried courage. 



l8 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

On March 27th Porter decided to run out 
of the harbor on the first opportunity, so as to 
draw away his two antagonists in chase, and 
let the Essex Jimioresc^i^a . This plan had to 
be tried sooner than was expected. The two 
vessels were always ready, the Essex only 
having her proper complement of 255 men 
aboard. On the next day, the 28th, it came 
on to blow from the south, when the Essex 
parted her port cable and dragged the star- 
board anchor to leeward, so she got under 
way, and made sail ; by several trials it had 
been found that she was faster than the 
Phoebe, and that the Cherub was very slow 
indeed, so Porter had little anxiety about his 
own ship, only fearing for his consort. The 
British vessels were close in with the weather- 
most point of the bay, but Porter thought he 
could weather them, and hauled up for that 
purpose. Just as he was rounding the outer- 
most point, which, if accomplished, would 
have secured his safety, a heavy squall struck 
the Essex, and when she was nearly gunwale 
under, the main-top-mast went by the board. 
She now wore and stood in for the harbor, 
but the wind had shifted, and on account of 
her crippled condition she could not gain it ; 
so she bore up and anchored in a small bay, 
three miles from Valparaiso, and half a mile 
from a detached Chilian battery of one gun, 
the Essex being within pistol-shot of the 
shore.' The Phoebe and Cherub now bore 
down upon her, covered with ensigns, union- 
jacks, and motto flags ; and it became evident 

1 Letter of Captain David Porter, July 3, 1814. 



JVAVAL V/AI^ OF iSi2. J^ 

that Hilyar did not intend to keep his word, 
as soon as he saw that Porter was disabled. 
So the £ssex prepared for action, though 
there could be no chance whatever of success. 
Her flags were flying from every mast, and 
everything was made ready as far as was 
possible. The attack was made before springs 
could be got on her cables. She was an- 
chored so near the shore as to preclude the 
possibility of Captain Hilyar's passing ahead 
of her ' ; so his two ships came cautiously 
down, the Cherub taking her position on the 
starboard bow of the Essex, and the Fhoibe 
under the latter's stern. The attack began at 
4 p. M.^ Some of the bow-guns of the Amer- 
ican frigate bore upon the Cherub, and, as 
soon as she found this out, the sloop ran down 
and stationed herself near the Fhoebe. The 
latter had opened with her broadside of long 
i8's, from a position in which not one of 
Porter's guns could reach her. Three times 
springs were got on the cables of the Essex, 
in order to bring her round till her broadside 
bore ; but in each instance they were shot 
away, as soon as they were hauled taut. 
Three long 12's were got out of the stern- 
ports, and with these an animated fire was 
kept up on the two British ships, the aim 
being especially to cripple their rigging. ^ A 
good many of Porter's crew were killed during 

1 Letter of Captain James Hilyar, March 30, 1814. 

2 Mean time. Porter says 3.54; Hilyar, a few min- 
utes past 4. The former says the first attack lasted 
half an hour ; the latter, but 10 minutes. I accordingly 
make it 20. 



20 NAVAL WAR OF 1^12. 

the first five minutes, before he could bring 
any guns to bear ; but afterward he did not 
suffer much, and at 4.20, after a quarter of an 
hour's fight between the three long 12'sof the 
Mssex, and the whole 36 broadside guns of 
the Phoebe and Cherub^ the latter were actually 
driven off. They wore, and again began with 
their long guns ; but, these producing no 
visible effect, both of the British ships hauled 
out of the fight at 4.30. " Having lost the 
use of main-sail, jib, and m.ain-stay, appear- 
ances looked a little inauspicious," writes 
Captain Hilyar. But the damages were soon 
repaired, and his two ships stood back for the 
crippled foe. Both stationed themselves on 
her port-quarter, the Phoebe at anchor, with a 
spring, firing her broadside, while the Cherub 
kept under way, using her long bov/-chasers. 
Their fire was very destructive, for they w^ere 
out of reach of the Essex's carronades, and 
not one of her long guns could be brought to 
bear on them. Porter now cut his cable, at 
5.20, and tried to close with his antagonists. 
After many ineffectual efforts sail was made. 
The flying-jib halyards were the only serv- 
iceable ropes uncut. That sail was hoisted, 
and the foretop-sail and foresail let fall, 
though the want of sheets and tacks rendered 
them almost useless. Still the Essex drove 
down on her assailants, and for the first time 
got near enough to use her carronades ; for a 
minute or two the firing was tremendous, but 
after the first broadside the Cherub hauled out 
of the fight in great haste, and during the 
remainder of the action confined herself to 



NAVAL WAR OF 1^12. 21 

usins: her bow-2:uns from a distance. Im- 
mediately afterward the FhcEbe also edged off. 
and by her superiority of sailing, her foe 
being now almost helpless, was enabled to 
choose her own distance, and again opened 
from her long i8's, out of range of Porter's 
carronades.' The carnage on board the Essex 
had now made her decks look like shambles. 
One gun was manned three times, fifteen men 
being slain at it ; its captain alone escaped 
without a wound. There were but one or two 
instances of flinching ; the w^ounded, many of 
whom were killed by flying splinters while 
under the hands of the doctors, cheered on 
their comrades, and themselves worked at the 
guns like fiends as long as they could stand. 
At one of the bow-guns was stationed a young 
Scotchman, named Bissly, who had one leg 
shot off close by the groin. Using his hand- 
kerchief as a tourniquet, he said, turning to 
his American shipmates : " I left my own 
country and adopted the United States, to 
fight for her. I hope I have this day proved 
myself worthy of the country of my adoption. 
I am no longer of any use to you or to her, so 
good-by ! " With these words he leaned on 
the sill of the port, and threw himself over- 

^ American writers often sneer at Hilyar for keeping 
away from the Essex, and out of reach of her short guns ; 
but his conduct was eminently proper in this respect. 
It was no part of his duty to fight the Essex at the dis- 
tance which best suited her ; but, on the contrary, at 
that which least suited her. He, of course, wished to 
win the victory with the least possible loss to himself, 
and acted accordingly. His conduct in the action itself 
could not be improved upon. 



22 NAVAL WAR OF jSi2. 

board.' Among the very few men who 
flinched was one named William Roach ; 
Porter sent one of his midshipmen to shoot 
him, but he was not to be found. He was 
discovered by a man named William Call, 
whose leg had been shot off and was hanging 
by the skin, and who dragged the shattered 
stump all round the bag-house, pistol in hand, 
trying to get a shot at him. Lieut. J. G. 
Cowell had his leq; shot off above the knee, 
and his life might have been saved had it been 
amputated at once ; but the surgeons already 
had rows of wounded men waiting for them, 
and wdien it was proposed to him that he 
should be attended to out of order, he replied : 
"No, doctor, none of that; fair play's a 
jewel. One man's life is as dear as another's ; 
I would not cheat any poor fellow out of his 
turn." So he stayed at his post, and died 
from loss of blood. 

Finding it hopeless to try to close, the Essex 
stood for the land. Porter intending to run her 
ashore and burn her. But when she had 
drifted close to the bluffs the wind suddenly 
shifted, took her flat aback and paid her head 
off shore, exposing her to a raking fire. At 
this moment Lieutenant Downes, commanding 
\\\Q Junior, pulled out in a boat, through all 
the fire, to see if he could do anything. 
Three of the men with him, including an old 
boatswain's mate, named Kingsbury, had come 
out expressly " to share the fate of their old 
ship ; " so they remained aboard, and, in their 

^ This and most of the anecdotes are taken from the 
invaluable " Life of Farragut," pp. 37-46. 



NAVAL WAR C/^ 1812. 23 

places, Lieutenant Dowries took some of the 
^vvouncled ashore, while the Cherub kept up a 
tremendous fire upon him. The shift of the 
wind gave Porter a faint hope of closing; 
and once more the riddled hulk of the little 
American frigate was headed for her foes. 
But Hilyar put his helm up to avoid close 
quarters ; the battle was his already, and the 
cool old captain was too good an officer to 
leave anything to chance. Seeing he could 
not close, Porter had a hawser bent on the 
sheet-anchor and let go. This brought the 
ship's head round, keeping her stationary; 
and from such of her guns as were not dis- 
mounted and had men enough left to man 
them, a broadside was fired at the PhiEbe. 
The wind was now very light, and the Fhcebe, 
whose main- and mizzen-masts and main-yard 
were rather seriously wounded, and who had 
suffered a great loss of canvas and cordage 
aloft, besides receiving a number of shot be- 
tween wind and water,^ and was thus a good 
deal crippled, began to drift slov;ly to lee- 
ward. It was hoped that she would drift out 
of gunshot, but this last chance was lost by 
the parting of the hawser, which left the Es- 
sex at the mercy of the British vessels. Their 
fire was deliberate and destructive, and could 
only be occasionally replied to by a shot from 

1 Captain Hilyar's letter. James says the P/io;be had 
7 shot between wind and v.-ater, and one below the 
water-line. Porter says she had t8 12-pound shot be- 
low the water-line. The latter statement must have 
been an exaggeration ; and James is probably farther 
wrong still. 



24 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

one of the long 12's of the Essex. The ship 
caught fire, and the flames came bursting up 
the hatchway, and a quantity of powder ex- 
ploded below. Many of the crew were 
knocked overboard by shot, and drowned ; 
others leaped into the water, thinking the ship 
was about to blow up, and tried to swim to 
the land. Some succeeded ; among them was 
one man w^ho had sixteen or eighteen pieces 
of iron in his leg, scales from the muzzle of 
his gun. The frigate had been shattered to 
pieces above the v/ater-line, although from the 
smoothness of the sea she was not harmed 
enough below^ it to reduce her to a sinking 
condition. ' The carpenter reported that he 
alone of his crew was fit for duty ; the others 
were dead or disabled. Lieutenant Wilmer 
was knocked overboard by a splinter, and 
drowned ; his little negro boy, " Ruff," came 
up on deck, and, hearing of the disaster, de- 
liberately leaped into the sea and shared his 
master's fate. Lieutenant Odenheimer was 
also knocked overboard, but afterward re- 
gained the ship. A shot, glancing upward, 
killed four of the men who were standing bv 
a gun, strikmg the last one in the head and 
scattering his brains over his comrades. The 
only commissioned ofiicer left on duty w^as 
Lieutenant Decatur McKnight. The sailing- 
master, Barnwell, when terribly wounded, 
remained at his post till he fainted from 
loss of blood. Of the 255 men aboard the 
Essex when the battle began, 58 had been 

^ An exactly analogous case to that of the British 
sloop Reindeer. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 25 

killed, 66 wounded, and 31 drowned ("miss- 
ing"), while 24 had succeeded in reaching 
shore. But 76 men were left un wounded, 
and many of these had been bruised or other- 
wise injured. Porter himself was knocked 
down by the windage of a passing shot. 
While the young midshipman, Farragut, was 
on the ward-room ladder, going below for 
gun-primers, the captain of the gun directly 
opposite the hatchway was struck full in the 
face by an 18-pound shot, and tumbled back 
on him. They fell down the hatch together, 
Farragut being stunned for some minutes. 
Later, while standing by the man at the wheel, 
an old quartermaster named Francis Bland, 
a shot coming over the fore-yard took off the 
quartermaster's right leg, carrying away at 
the same time one of Farrasfut's coat tails. 
The old fellow was helped below, but he died 
for lack of a tourniquet, before he could be 
attended to. 

Nothing remained to be done, and at 6.20 
the Essex surrendered and was taken posses- 
sion of. The Phoebe had lost 4 men killed, 
including her first lieutenant, William Ingram, 
and 7 wounded ; the Cherub^ i killed, and 3, 
including Captain Tucker, wounded. Total, 
5 killed and 10 wounded.^ The difference in 

1 James says that most of the loss was occasioned 
by the first three broadsides of the Essex ; this is not 
surprising, as in all she hardly fired half a dozen, and 
the last were discharged when half of the guns had 
been disabled, and there were scarcely men enough to 
man the remainder. Most of the time her resistance 
was limited to firing such of her six long guns as would 
bear. 



26 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

loss was natural, as, owing to their having 
long guns and the choice of position, the 
British had been able to fire ten shot to the 
Americans' one. 

The conduct of the two English captains in 
attacking Porter as soon as he was disabled, 
in neutral waters, while they had been very 
careful to abstain from breaking the neutrality 
while he was in good condition, does not look 
well; at the best it shows that Hilyar had 
only been withheld hitherto from the attack 
by timidity, and it looks all the w^orse when it 
is remembered that Hilyar owed his ship's 
previous escape entirely to Porter's forbear- 
ance on a former occasion v;hen the British 
frioate was entirelv at his mercv, and that the 
British captain had afterward expressly said 
that he would not break the neutrality. Still, 
the British in this war did not act very differ- 
ently from the way we ourselves did on one 
or two occasions in the Civil War, — witness 
the capture of the Florida. And after the 
battle was once begun the sneers which most 
of our historians, as well as the participators 
in the fight, have showered upon the British 
captains for not foregoing the advantages 
which their entire masts and better artillery 
gave them by coming to close quarters, are 
decidedly foolish. Hilyar's conduct during 
the battle, as well as his treatment of the 
prisoners afterward, was perfect, and as a 
minor matter it mav be mentioned that his 
official letter is singularly just and fair-minded. 
Savs Lord Howard DouMass : " The action 

^ " Naval Gunnery," p. 149. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 27 

displayed all that can reflect honor on the 
science and admirable conduct of Captain 
Hilyar and his crew, which, without the as- 
sistance of the Cherub, would have insured 
the same termination. Captain Porter's sneers 
at the respectful distance the Fhoebe kept 
are in fact acknowledgments of the ability 
with wh-idi Captain Hilyar availed him- 
self of the superiority of hi^ arms ; it was 
a brilliant affair." While endorsing this criti- 
cism, it maybe worth while to compare it with 
some of the author's comments upon the other 
actions, as that between Decatur and the Mace- 
donian. To make ihe odds here as great 
against Carden as they were against Porter, it 
would be necessary to suppose that the Mace- 
do7iia7i had lost her main-top-mast, had but 
six long i8's to oppose to her antagonist's 
24's, and that the latter was assisted by the 
corvette Adams ; so that as a matter of fact 
Porter fought at fully double or treble the dis- 
advantage Carden did, and. instead of sur- 
rendering when he had lost a third of-his crew, 
fought till three-fifths of his men were dead 
or wounded, and, moreover, inflicted greater 
loss and damage on his antagonists than Car- 
den did. If, then, as Lord Douglass says, the 
defence of the Macedonia7i brilliantly upheld 
the character of the British navy for courage, 
how much more did that of the Essex show for 
the American navy ; and if Hilyar's conduct 
was " brilliant," that of Decatur was more so. 
This was an action in which it is difficult to 
tell exactly how to award praise. Captain 
Hilyar deserves it, for the coolness and skill 



2.8 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

with which he made his approaches and took 
his positions so as to destroy his adversary 
with least loss to himself, and also for the 
precision of his fire. The CheruVs behavior 
was more remarkable for extreme caution than 
for anything else. As regards the mere fight, 
Porter certainly did everything a man could 
do to contend successfully with the over- 
whelming force opposed to him, and the few 
guns that were available were served with the 
utmost precision. As an exhibition of dogged 
courage it has never been surpassed since the 
time when the Dutch captain, Klossoon, after 
fighting two long days, blew up his disabled 
ship, devoting himself and all his crew to 
death, rather than surrender to the hereditary 
foes of his race, and was bitterly avenged 
afterward by the grim " sea-beggars " of Hol- 
land ; the days when Drake singed the beard 
of the Catholic king, and the small English 
craft were the dread and scourge of the great 
floating castles of Spain. Any man reading 
Farragut's account is forcibly reminded of 
some of the deeds of " derring do " in that, 
the heroic age of the Teutonic navies. Cap- 
tain Hilyar in his letter says : " The defence 
of the Essex^ taking into consideration our 
superiority of force and the very discouraging 
circumstance of her having lost her main-top- 
mast and being twice on fire, did honor to her 
brave defenders, and most fully evinced the 
courage of Captain Porter and those under 
his command. Her colors were not struck 
until the loss in killed and wounded was so 
awfully great and her shattered condition so 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 29 

seriously bad as to render all further resist- 
ance unavailing." * He also bears very candid 

1 James (p. 419) says : " The Essex, as far as is 
borne out by proof (the only safe way where an Ameri- 
can is concerned), had 24 men killed and 45 wounded. 
But Capt. Porter, thinking by exaggerating his loss to 
prop up his fame, talks of 58 killed and mortally 
wounded, 39 severely, 27 slightly," etc., etc. This 
would be no more worthy of notice than any other of 
his falsifications, were it not followed by various British 
writers. Hilyar states that he has 161 prisoners, has 
found 23 dead, that 3 wounded were taken off, be- 
tween 20 and 30 reached the shore, and that the *' re- 
mainder are either killed or wounded." It is by wil- 
fully preserving silence about this last sentence that 
James makes out his case. It will be observed that 
Hilyar enumerates 161+23+3+25 (say) or 212, and 
says the remainder were either killed or wounded ; 
Porter having 255 men at first, this remainder was 43. 
Hilyar stating that of his 161 prisoners, 42 were 
wounded, his account thus gives the Americans in 
killed and wounded. James' silence about Hilyar's 
last sentence enables him to make the loss but 69, and 
his wilful omission is quite on a par with the other 
meannesses and falsehoods which utterly destroy the 
reliability of his work. By Hilyar's own letter it is 
thus seen that Porter's loss in killed and wounded was 
certainly in, perhaps 116, or if Porter had, as James 
says, 265 men, 126. There still remain some discrep- 
ancies between the official accounts, which can be com- 
pared in tabular form : 

Hilyar. Porter. 

Prisoners unwounded, iig 75 prisoners unwounded 

" wounded, 42 27 " slightly wounded. 

Taken away wounded, 3 39 " severely " 

Those who reached shore, 25 58 killed. 

Remainder killed or wounded, 43 31 missing. 

Killed 23 25 reached shore. 

255 255 

The explanation probably is that Hilyar's " wound- 
ed" do not include Porter's " 27 slightly wounded," 
and that his " 161 prisoners " include Porter's " 25 who 



30 NA VAL WAR OF 1S12. 

testimony to the defence of the Essex having 
been effective enough to at one time render 
the result doubtful, saying : " Our first attack 
* * =* produced no visible effect. Our 
second * * =* was not more successful ; 
and having lost the use of our main-sail, jib, 
and main-stay, appearances looked a little 
inauspicious." Throughout the war no ship 
was so desperately defended as the Essex, 
taking into account the frightful odds against 
which she fought, which always enhances the 
merit of a defence. The Lawrence^ which 
suffered even more, was backed by a fleet ; the 
EroHc was overcome by an equal foe ; and 
the Reindeer fought at far less of a disadvan- 
tage, and suffered less. None of the frigates, 
British or American, were defended with any- 
thing like the resolution she displayed. 

But it is perhaps permissible to inquire 
v/hether Porter's course, after the accident to 
his top-mast occurred, was altogether the best 
that could have been taken. On such a ques- 
tion no opinion could have been better than 

reached shore," aiid his *' 25 who reached shore " comes 
under Porter's " 31 missing." This would make the 
accounts nearly tally. At any rate in Porter's book are 
to be found the names of all his killed, wounded, and 
missing ; and their relatives received pensions from the 
American government, which, if the returns were false, 
would certainly have been a most elaborate piece of de- 
ception. It is far more likely that Hilyar was mistaken ; 
or he may have counted in the Essex Junior's crew, 
which would entirely account for the discrepancies. In 
any event it must be remembered that he makes the 
American killed and wounded 11 1 (Porter, 124), and 
not 69, as James says. The latter's statement is wil- 
fully false, as he haa seen Hilyar's letter. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 31 

Farragut's, although of course his judgment 
was ex post facto, as he was very young at the 
time of the fight. 

" In the first place, I consider our original 
and greatest error was in attempting to regain 
the anchorage ; being greatly superior in sail- 
ing powers we should have borne up and run 
before the wind. If we had come in contact 
with the Pha^he we should have carried her by 
boarding ; if she avoided us, as she might 
have done by her greater ability to manoeuvre^ 
then we should have taken her fire and passed 
on, leaving both vessels behind until we had 
replaced our top-mast, by which time they 
would have been separated, as unless they did 
so it would have been no chase, the Cherub 
being a dull sailer. 

" Secondly, when it was apparent to every- 
body that we had no chance of success under 
the circumstances, the ship should have been 
run ashore, throwing her broadside to the 
beach to prevent raking, and fought as long 
as was consistent with humanity, and then set 
on fire. But having determined upon anchor- 
ing we should have bent a spring on to the 
ring of the anchor, instead of to the cable, 
where it was exposed, and could be shot away 
as fast as put on." 

But it must be remembered that when Porter 
decided to anchor near shore, in neutral water, 
he could not anticipate Hilyar's deliberate 
and treacherous breach of faith. I do not 
allude to the mere disregard of neutrality. 
Whatever international moralists may say, 
such disregard is a mere question of expe- 



32 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

diency. If the benefits to be gained by at- 
tacking a hostile ship in neutral waters are 
such as to counterbalance the risk of incurring 
the enmity of the neutral power, why then the 
attack ought to be made. Had Hilyar, when 
he first made his appearance off Valparaiso, 
sailed in with his two ships, the men at quar- 
ters and guns out, and at once attacked Porter, 
considering the destruction of the Essex as 
outweighing the insult to Chili, why his be- 
havior would have been perfectly justifiable. 
In fact this is unquestionably what he intended 
to do ; but he suddenly found himself in such 
a position, that in the event of hostilities, his 
ship would be the captured one, and he owed 
his escape purely to Porter's over-forbearance, 
under great provocation. Then he gave his 
word to Porter that he would not infringe on 
the neutrality ; and he never dared to break 
it, until he saw Porter was disabled and almost 
helpless ! This may seem strong language to 
use about a British officer, but it is justly strong. 
Exactly as any outsider must consider War- 
rington's attack on the British brig Nautilus 
in 18 1 5 as a piece of needless cruelty ; so any 
outsider must consider Hilyar as having most 
treacherously broken faith with Porter. 

After the fight Hilyar behaved most kindly 
and courteously to the prisoners ; and, as 
already said, he fought his ship most ably, for 
it would have been quixotic to a degree to 
forego his advantages. But previous to the 
battle his conduct had been over-cautious. 
It was to be expected that the Essex would 
make her escape as soon as practicable, and 



NAVAL WAR OF 1^12. 2>Z 

SO he should have used every effort to bring 
her to action. Instead of this he always 
declined the fight when alone ; and he owed 
his ultimate success to the fact that the Essex 
instead of escaping, as she could several times 
have done, stayed, hoping to bring the P/icebe 
to action single-handed. It must be remem- 
bered that the Essex was almost as weak 
compared to the Phoebe as the Cherub was 
compared to the Essex. The latter was just 
about midway between the British ships, as 
may be seen by the following comparison. 
In the action the Essex fought all six of her 
long 12's, and the Cherub both her long 9's, 
instead of the corresponding broadside car- 
ronades which the ships regularly used. This 
gives the Essex a better armament than she 
would have had fighting her guns as they were 
regularly used ; but it can be seen how great 
the inequality still was. It must also be kept 
in mind, that while in the battles between the 
American 44's and British 38's, the short 
weight 24-pounders of the former had in real- 
ity no greater range or accuracy than the full 
weight i8's of their opponents, in this case 
the Phoebe s full weight i8's had a very much 
greater range and accuracy than the short 
weight 12's of the Essex. 



Total. 

(255) 
(242) 







COMPARATIVE 


FORCE 




Men, 


Broadside Guns. 


Weight. 


Phoebe, 


320 


13 long iS's 
I " 12 

I " 9 

7 short 32's 
1 " 18 


234 lbs. 
12 " 

9 " 
224 " 

18 " 






23 ffiins, 


497 lbs. 



18 



34 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 



Men. 
Cherub, 180 



Broadside Guns. 

2 long g's 
2 short i8's 
9 " 32's 288 



Weight, 

18 lbs. 
36 " 



Total. 
(18) 

(324) 



13 guns, 



500 men, 36 guns, 



342 Ibo. 

839 lbs., metal. 
j 273 long. ) 
t. f 



\ 566 short. 



Essex, 255 



6 long 12's 
17 short 32's 



66 lbs. 

504 



' Taking 7 per cent. 
I off for short 
weight. 



255 men, 23 guns, 



570 lbs. 



All accounts agree as to the armament of 
the Essex. I have taken that of the Fhahe 
and Cherub from James ; but Captain Por- 
ter's official letter, and all the other American 
accounts make the Fhoebe's broadside 15 long 
i8's and 8 short 32's, and give the Cherub, in 
all, 18 short 32's, 8 short 24's, and two long 
nines. This would make their broadside 904 
lbs., 288 long, 616 short. I would have no 
doubt that the American accounts were right 
if the question rested solely on James' verac- 
ity ; but he probably took his figures from 
official sources. At any rate, remembering 
the difference between long guns and carron- 
ades, it appears that the Essex was really 
nearly intermediate in force between the 
Fhcebe and the Cherub. The battle being 
fought, with a very trifling exception, at long 
range, it was in reality a conflict between a 
crippled ship throwing a broadside of 66 lbs. 
of metal, and two ships throwing 273 lbs., 
who by their ability to manoeuvre could 
choose positions where they could act with 
full effect, while their antagonist could not 



NAVAL WAR OF iSi2. 35 

return a shot. Contemporary history does 
not afford a single instance of so determined 
a defence against such frightful odds. 

The official letters of Captains Hilyar and 
Porter agree substantially in all respects ; the 
details of the fight, as seen in the Essex, are 
found in the " Life of Farragut." But, al- 
though the British captain does full justice to 
his foe, British historians have universally 
tried to belittle Porter's conduct. It is much 
to be regretted that we have no British account 
worth paying attention to of the proceedings 
before the fight, when the Phoebe declined 
single combat with the Essex. James, of 
course, states that the Phoebe did not decline 
it, but he gives no authority, and his unsup- 
ported assertion would be valueless even if 
uncontradicted. His account of the action is 
grossly inaccurate as he has inexcusably 
garbled Hilyar's report. One instance of this 
I have already mentioned, as regards Hilyar's 
account of Porter's loss. Again, Hilyar dis- 
tinctly states that the Essex was twice on fire, 
yet James (p. 418) utterly denies this, thereby 
impliedly accusing the British captain of false- 
hood. There is really no need of the corrob- 
oration of Porter's letter, but he has it most 
fully in the "Life of Farragut," p. 37 : " The 
men came rushing up from below, many with 
their clothes burning, which were torn from 
them as quickly as possible, and those for 
whom this could not be done were told to jump 
overboard and quench the flames. * * * 
One man swam to shore with scarcely a 
square inch of his body which had not been 



36 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

burned, and, although he was deranged for 
some days, he ultimately recovered, and after- 
ward served with me in the West Indies." 
The third unfounded statement in James' 
account is that buckets of spirits were found 
in all parts of the main deck of the Essex, 
and that most of the prisoners were drunk. 
No authority is cited for this, and there is not 
a shadow of truth in it. He ends by stating 
that " few even in his own country will ven- 
ture to speak well of Captain David Porter." 
After these various paragraphs we are cer- 
tainly justified in rejecting James' account Z7i 
toto. An occasional mistake is perfectly ex- 
cusable, and gross ignorance of a good many 
facts does not invalidate a man's testimony 
with regard to some others with which he is 
acquainted ; but a wilful and systematic per- 
version of the truth in a number of cases 
throws a very strong doubt on a historian's 
remaining statements, unless they are sup- 
ported by unquestionable authority. 

But if British historians have generally 
given Porter much less than his due, by omit- 
ting all reference to the inferiority of his guns, 
his lost top-mast, etc., it is no worse than 
Americans have done in similar cases. The 
latter, for example, will make great allowances 
in the case of the Essex for her having car- 
ronades only, but utterly fail to allude to the 
Cya?ie and Levajit as having suffered under 
the same disadvantage. They should remem- 
ber that the rules cut both ways. 

The Essex having suffered chiefly above the 
water-line, she was repaired sufficiently in Val* 



ISTAVAL IVAR OF id>i2. 37 

paraiso to enable her to make the voyage to 
England, where she was added to the British 
navy. The Essex Jtmior was disarmed and 
the American prisoners embarked in her for 
New York, on parole. But Lieutenant Mc- 
Knight, Chaplain Adams, Midshipman Lyman, 
and II seamen were exchanged on the spot 
for some of the British prisoners on board the 
Essex Junior. McKnight and Lyman accom- 
panied the Phoebe to Rio Janeiro, where they 
embarked on a Swedish vessel, were taken 
out of her by the Wasp, Captain Blakely, and 
were lost with the rest of the crew of that 
vessel. The others reached New York in 
safety. Of the prizes made by the Essex, 
some were burnt or sunk by the Americans, 
and some retaken by the British. And so, 
after nearly two years' uninterrupted success, 
the career of the Essex terminated amid disas- 
ters of all kinds. But at least her officers and 
crew could reflect that they had afforded an 
example of courage in adversity that it would 
be difficult to match elsewhere. 

The first of the new heavy sloops of war 
that got to sea was the Frolic, Master Com- 
mandant Joseph Bainbridge, which put out 
early in February, Shortly afterward she 
encountered a large Carthagenian privateer, 
which refused to surrender and was sunk by 
a broadside, nearly a hundred of her crew be- 
ing drowned. Before daylight on the 20th of 
April, lat. 24^ 12' N., long. 81^25' W., she fell 
in with the British 36-gun frigate Orpheus, 
Capt. Pigot, and the 12-gun schooner Shel- 



38 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

hurne, Lieut. Hope, both to leeward. The 
schooner soon weathered the Frolic, but of 
course was afraid to close, and the American 
sloop continued beating to windward, in the 
effort to escape, for nearly 13 hours ; the water 
was started, the anchors cut away, and finally 
the guns thrown overboard — a measure by 
means of which both the Hornet, the Rattle- 
snake, and the AdaiJis succeeded in escaping 
under similar circumstances, — but all w^as of 
no avail, and she was finally captured. The 
court of inquiry honorably acquitted both of- 
ficers and crew. As was to be expected James 
considers the surrender a disgraceful one, 
because the guns were thrown overboard. As 
I have said, this was a measure which had 
proved successful in several cases of a like 
nature ; the criticism is a piece of petty mean- 
ness. Fortunately we have Admiral Codring- 
ton's dictum on the surrender (" Memoirs," 
vol. I, p. 310), which he evidently considered 
as perfectly honorable. 

A sister ship to the Frolic, the Peacock, Capt. 
Lewis Warrington, sailed from New York on 
March 12th, and cruised southward; on the 
28th of April, at seven in the morning, lat. 17° 
47' N., long. 80° 7' W., several sail were made 
to windward.^ These were a small convoy of 
merchant-men, bound for the Bermudas, under 
the protection of the i8-gun brig-sloop Eper- 
vier, Capt. Wales, 5 days out of Havana, and 
with $1 18,000 in specie on board.- The Eper- 
vier when discovered was steering north by 

1 Official letter of Capt, Warrington, April 29, 1814. 

2 James, vi, 424. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1^12. 39 



o\ 



east, the wind being from the eastward ; soon 
afterward the wind veered gradually round to 
the southward, and the Epervier hauled up close 
on the port tack, while the convoy made ail 
sail away, and the Peacock came down with 

N psActfcr 






JiLBW 



/ffJff / 




liSM 



I 



the wind on her starboard quarter. At 10 a. m.. 
the vessels were within gunshot, and the Pea- 
cock edged away to get in a raking boardside, 
but the Epervier frustrated this by putting her 
helm up until close on her adversary's bow, 
when she rounded to and fired her starboard 



40 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

guns, receiving in return the starboard broad- 
side of the Peacock at 10.20 a.m. These first 
broadsides took effect aloft, the brig being 
partially dismantled, while the Peacocks fore- 
yard was totally disabled by two round shot 
in the starboard quarter, which deprived the 
ship of the use of her fore-sail and fore-top- 
sail, and compelled her to run large. How- 
ever, the Ppenne?' ediS^d. away ^ when abaft her 
foe's beam, and ran off alongside of her (using 
her port guns, while the American still had 
the starboard battery engaged) at 10.35. The 
Peacock's fire was now very hot, and directed 
chiefly at her adversary's hull, on which it 
told heavily, while she did not suffer at all in 
return. The Epervier covixm^ up into the wind, 
owing somewhat to the loss of head-sail, Capt. 
Wales called his crew aft to try boarding, but 
they refused, saying " she's too heavy for us,"^ 
and then, at 1 1 .05 the colors were hauled down. 
Except the injury to her fore-yard, the Pea- 
cock's damages were confined to the loss of a 
few top-mast and top-gallant backstays, and 
some shot-holes through her sails. Of her 
crew, consisting, all told, of 166 men and boys,^ 
only two were wounded, both slightly. The 
Epervier^ on the other hand, had 45 shot-holes 
in her hull, 5 feet of water in her hold, main- 
top-mast over the side, main-mast nearly in 

^ According to some accounts she at this time tacked. 

2 James, " Naval Occurrences," p. 243. 

^ " Niles' Register," vi, 196, says only 160 ; the above 
is taken from Warrington's letter of June ist, preserved 
with the other manuscript letters in the Naval Archives. 
The crew contained about 10 boys, was not composed 
of picked men, and did not number 185 — vide James. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1^12. 41 

two, main-boom shot away, bowsprit wounded 
severely, and most of the fore-rigging and stays 
shot away ; and of her crew of 128 men (ac- 
cording to the list of prisoners given by Cap- 
tain Warrington ; James says 118, but he is 
not backed up by any official report) 9 were 
killed and mortally wounded, and 14 severely 
and slightly wounded. Instead of two long 
sixes for bow-chasers and a shifting carronade, 
she had two 18-pound carronades (according 
to the American prize-lists ; ^ Capt. Warring- 
ton says 32's). Otherwise she was armed as 
usual. She was, like the rest of her kind, very 
** tubby," being as broad as the Peacock, though 
10 feet shorter on deck. Allowing as usual, 
7 per cent, for short weight of the American 
shot, we get the 

COMPARATIVE FORCE. 

No. Broadside 





Tons. 


Guns. 


Weight Metal. 


Crew. 


Loss. 


Peacock 


509 


II 


315 


166 


2 


Epervier 


477 


9 


274 


128 


23 



That is, the relative force being as 12 is to 10, 
the relative execution done was as 12 is to i, 
and the Epervier surrendered before she had 
lost a fifth of her crew. The case of the Eper- 
vier closely resembles that of the Argus, In 
both cases the officers behaved finely ; in both 
cases, too, the victorious foe was heavier, in 
about the same proportion, while neither the 
crew of the Argus, nor the crew of the Eper- 
vier fought with the determined bravery dis- 
played by the combatants in almost every other 
1 American State Papers, vol. xiv, p, 427. 



42 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

struggle of the war. But it must be added 
that the Epervier did worse than the Argus, 
and the Peacock (American) better than the 
Pelican. The gunnery of the Epervier was'^ex- 
traordinarily poor ; " the most disgraceful part 
of the affair was that our ship was cut to pieces 
and the enemy hardly scratched." ^ James 
states that after the first two or three broadsides 
several carronades became unshipped, and that 
the others were dismounted by the fire of the 
Peacock; that the men had not been exercised 
at the guns ; and, most important of all, that 
the crew (which contained " several foreigners," 
but was chiefly British ; as the Argus^ was 
chiefly American) v;as disgracefully bad. The 
Peacock, on the contrary, showed skilful sea- 
manship as well as excellent gunnery. In 45 
minutes after the fight was over the fore-yard 
had been sent down and fished, the fore-sail 
set up, and every thing in complete order 
again ; '^ the prize was got in sailing order by 
dark, though great exertions had to be made 
to prevent her sinking. Mr. Nicholson, first 
of the Peacock, was put in charge as prize- 
master. The next day the two vessels were 
abreast of Amelia Island, when two frigates 
were discovered in the north, to leeward. 
Capt. Warrington at once directed the prize 
to proceed to St. Mary's, while he separated 
and made sail on a wind to the south, intend- 
ing to draw the frigates after him, as he was 
confident that the Peacock, a very fast vessel, 



1 " Memoirs of Admiral Codrington," i, 322. 

2 Letter of Capt. Warrington, April 29, 1814. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1Z12. 43 

could outsail them/ The plan succeeded 
perfectly, the brig reaching Savannah on the 
first of May, and the ship three days after- 
ward. The Epej-vier was purchased for the 
U. S. navy, under the same name and rate. 
The Peacock sailed again on June 4th,^ going 
first northward to the Grand Banks, then to 
the Azores : then she stationed herself in the 
mouth of the Irish Channel, and afterward 
cruised off Cork, the mouth of the Shannon, 
and the north of Ireland, capturing several 
very valuable prizes and creating great con- 
sternation. She then changed her station, to 
elude the numerous vessels that had been sent 
after her, and sailed southward, off Cape Orte- 
ga], Cape Finisterre, and finally among the 
Barbadoes, reaching New York, Oct. 29th. 
During this cruise she encountered no war 
vessel smaller than a frigate ; but captured 14 
sail of merchant-men, some containing valu- 
able cargoes, and manned by 148 men. 

On April 29th, H.M.S. schooner Ballahou, 
6, Lieut. King, while cruising off the Amer- 
ican coast was captured by the Ferry, pri- 
vateer, a much heavier vessel, after an action 
of 10 minutes' duration. 

The general peace prevailing in Europe 
allowed the British to turn their energies 
altogether to America ; and in no place was 
this increased vigor so much felt as in Ches- 
apeake Bay, where a great number of line-of- 
battle ships, frigates, sloops, and transports 

^ Letter of Capt. Warrington, May 4, 1814. 
2 Letter of Capt. Warrington, Oct. 30, 1814. 



44 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

had assembled, in preparation for the assault 
on Washington and Baltimore. The defence 
of these waters was confided to Capt. Joshua 
Barney/ with a flotilla of gunboats. These 
consisted of three or four sloops and schoon- 
ers, but mainly of barges, which were often 
smaller than the ship's boats that were sent 
against them. These gunboats were manned 
by from 20 to 40 men each, and each carried, 
according to its size, one or two long 24-, 18-, 
or i2-pounders. They were bad craft at 
best ; and, in addition, it is difficult to believe 
that they were handled to the fullest advan- 
tage. 

On June ist Commodore Barney, with the 
block sloop Scorpion and 14 smaller "gun- 
boats," chiefly row gallies, passed the mouth 
of the Patuxent, and chased the British 
schooner St. Lawrence and seven boats, under 
Captain Barrie, until they took refuge with 
the Dragon^ 74, which in turn chased Barney's 
flotilla into the Patuxent, where she block- 
aded it in company with the Albion, 74. They 
were afterward joined by the Loire, 38, Nar- 
cissus, 32, and Jasseiir, 18, and Commodore 
Barney moved two miles up St. Leonard's 
Creek, while the frigates and sloop blockaded 
its mouth. A deadlock now ensued; the 
gunboats were afraid to attack the ships, and 
the ships' boats were just as afraid of the gun- 
boats. On the 8th, 9th, and nth skirmishes 

1 He was born at Baltimore, July 6, 1759; James, 
with habitual accuracy, calls him an Irishman. He 
makes Decatur, by the way, commit the geographical 
solecism of being born in " Maryland, Virginia." 



NAVAL WAR OF i2>i2. 45 

occurred ; on each occasion the British boats 
came up till they caught sight of Barney's 
flotilla, and were promptly chased off by the 
latter, which, however, took good care not to 
meddle with the larger vessels. Finally, 
Colonel Wadsworth, of the artillery, with two 
long i8-pounders, assisted by the marines, 
under Captain Miller, and a few regulars, of- 
fered to cooperate from the shore while Barney 
assailed the two frigates with the flotilla. On 
the 26th the joint attack took place most suc- 
cessfully ; the Z^/>-^and Narcissus were driven 
off, although not much damaged, and the 
flotilla rowed out in triumph, with a loss of 
but 4 killed and 7 wounded. But in spite of 
this small success, which was mainly due to 
Colonel Wadsworth, Commodore Barney made 
no more attempts with his gunboats. The 
bravery and skill which the flotilla men 
showed at Bladensburg prove conclusively 
that their ill success on the water was due to 
the craft they were in, and not to any failing 
of the men. At the same period the French 
gunboats were even more unsuccessful, but 
the Danes certainly did very well with theirs. 
Barney's flotilla in the Patuxent remained 
quiet until August 22d, and then was burned 
when the British advanced on Washington. 
The history of this advance, as well as of the 
unsuccessful one on Baltimore, concerns less 
the American than the British navy, and will 
be but briefly alluded to here. On August 
20th Major-General Ross and Rear-Admiral 
Cockburn, with about 5,000 soldiers and 
marines, moved on Washington by land ; 



46 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

while a squadron, composed of the Seahorse^ 
38, Euryalus, 36, bombs Devastatioti, ^ina^ 
and Meteor, and rocket-ship Erebus, under 
/^Captain James Alexander Gordon, moved up 
the Potomac to attack Fort Washington, near 
Alexandria; and Sir Peter Parker, in the 
Menelaus, 38, was sent " to create a diversion " 
above Baltimore. Sir Peter's "diversion" 
turned out most unfortunately for him : for, 
having landed to attack 120 Maryland militia, 
under Colonel Reade, he lost his own life, 
while fifty of his followers were placed hors 
de combat and the remainder chased back to 
the ship by the victors, who had but three 
wounded. 

The American army, which was to oppose 
Ross and Cockburn, consisted of some seven 
thousand militia, who fled so quickly that only 
about 1,500 British had time to become en- 
gaged. The fight was really between these 
' 1,500 British regulars and the American 
' flotilla men. These consisted of 78 marines, 
■ under Captain Miller, and 370 sailors, some of 
' whom served under Captain Barney, who had 
a battery of two i8's and three 12's, while 
the others were armed with muskets and pikes 
and acted with the marines. Both sailors and 
marines did nobly, inflicting most of the loss 
the British suffered, which amounted to 256 
men, and in return lost over a hundred of their 
own men, including the two captains, who 
were wounded and captured, with the guns.' 

1 The optimistic Cooper thinks that two regular regi- 
ments would have given the Americans this battle — 
which is open to doubt. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 47 

' Ross took Washington and burned the public 
buildings ; and the panic-struck Americans 
foolishly burned the Columbia^ 44, and Argus, 
18, which were nearly ready for service. 

Captain Gordon's attack on Fort Wash- 
ington was conducted with great skill and 
success. Fort Washington was abandoned as 
soon as fired upon, and the city of Alexandria 
^ ' surrendered upon most humiliating conditions. 
Captain Gordon was now joined by the /^(X^'ry, 
18, Captain Baker, who brought him orders to 
return from Vice- Admiral Cochrane ; and the 
squadron began to work down the river, which 
was very difficult to navigate. Commodore 
Rodgers, with some of the crew of the two 
44's, Guerriere and Java, tried to bar their 
progress, but had not sufficient means. On 
September ist an attempt was made to destroy 
the Devastatio?i by fire-ships, but it failed ; on 
the 4th the attempt was repeated by Com- 
modore Rodgers, with a party of some forty 
men, but they were driven off and attacked by 
the British boats, under Captain Baker, who 
in turn was repulsed with the loss of his 
second lieutenant killed, and some twenty-five 
men killed or wounded. The squadron also 
had to pass and silence a battery of light 
field-pieces on the 5th, where they suffered 
enough to raise their total loss to seven killed 
and thirty-five wounded. Gordon's inland 
expedition was thus concluded most success- 
fully, at a very trivial cost ; it was a most 
venturesome feat, reflecting great honor on the 
captains and crews engaged in it. 

Baltimore was threatened actively by sea 



48 NAVAL WAR OF i2,i2. 

and land early in September. On the 13th an 
indecisive conflict took place between the 
British regulars and American militia, in which 
the former came off with the honor, and the 
latter with the profit. The regulars held the 
field, losing 350 men, including General Ross ; 
the militia retreated in fair order with a loss 
of but 200. The water attack was also un- 
successful. At 5 A. M. on the 13th the bomb 
vessels Meieor, y^tna, Terror, Volca?to, and 
Devastation, the rocket-ship Erebus, and the 
frigates Severn, Euryalus, Havantiah, and 
Hehrtis opened on Fort McHenry, some of 
the other fortifications being occasionally 
fired at. A furious but harmless cannonade 
was kept up between the forts and ships until 
7 A. M. on the 14th, when the British fleet and 
army retired. 

I have related these events out of their 
natural order because they really had very 
little to do with our navy, and yet it is neces- 
sary to mention them in order to give an idea 
of the course of events. The British and Amer- 
ican accounts of the various gunboat attacks 
differ widely ; but it is very certain that the 
gunboats accomplished little or nothing of 
importance. On the other hand, their loss 
amounted to nothing, for many of those that 
were sunk were afterward raised, and the total 
tonnage of those destroyed would not much 
exceed that of the British barges captured by 
them from time to time or destroyed by the 
land batteries. 

The purchased brig Rattlesnake, 16, had 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 



49 



been cruising in the Atlantic with a good deal 
of success ; but in lat. 40° N., long. 2,3° W., 
was chased by a frigate from which Lieutenant 
Renshaw, the brig's commander, managed to 
escape only by throwing overboard all his 
guns except two long nines ; and on June 22d 
he was captured by the Leander, 50, Captain 
Sir George Ralph Collier, K. C. B. 

The third of the new sloops to get to sea 
was the Wasp, 22, Captain Johnston Blakely, 
which left Portsmouth on May first, with a 
very fine crew of 173 men, almost exclusively 
New Englanders ; there was said not to have 
been a single foreign seaman on board. It is, 
at all events, certain that during the whole 
war no vessel was ever better manned and 
commanded than this daring and resolute 
cruiser. The Wasp slipped unperceived 
through the blockading frigates, and ran into 
the mouth of the English Channel, right in the 
thick of the English cruisers ; here she re- 
mained several weeks, burning and scuttling 
many ships. Finally, on June 28th, at 4 a. m., 
in lat. 48° 'i>^' N., long. 11° 15' W.,* while in 
chase of two merchant-men, a sail was made 
on the weather-beam. This was the British 
brig-sloop Reindeer, 18, Captain William Man- 
ners,^ with a crew of 118, as brave men as 
ever sailed or fought on the narrow seas. 
Like the Peacock (British) the Reindeer was 
only armed with 24-pounders, and Captain 
Manners must have known well that he was 
to do battle with a foe heavier than himself ; 

1 Letter of Captain Blakely, July 8, 1814. 
, 2 James, vi, 429. 

4 



50 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

but there was no more gallant seaman in the 
whole British navy, fertile as it was in men 
who cared but little for odds of size or strength. 
As the day broke, the Reiiideer made sail for 
the Wasp, then lying in the west-southwest. 

The sky was overcast with clouds, and the 
smoothness of the sea was hardly disturbed by 
the light breeze that blew out of the northeast. 
Captain Blakely hauled up and stood for his 
antagonist, as the latter came slowly down 
with the wind nearly aft, and so light was the 
weather that the vessels kept almost on even 
keels. It was not till quarter past one that 
the Wasp's drum rolled out its loud challenge 
as it beat to quarters, and a few minutes 
afterward the ship put about and stood for the 
foe, thinking to weather him ; but at 1.50 the 
brig also tacked and stood away, each of the 
cool and skilful captains being bent on keep- 
ing the weather-gage. At half past two the 
Reijideer again tacked, and, taking in her stay- 
sails, stood for the Wasp, who furled her 
royals ; and, seeing that she would be weath- 
ered, at 2.50 put about in her turn and ran off, 
with the wind a little forward the port beam, 
brailing up the mizzen, while the Reindeer 
hoisted her flying-jib, to close, and gradually 
came up on the Wasp^s weather-quarter. At 
17 minutes past three, when the vessels were 
not sixty yards apart, the British opened the 
conflict, firing the shifting 1 2-pound carronade, 
loaded with round and grape. To this the 
Americans could make no return, and it was 
again loaded and fired, with the utmost delib- 
eration ; this was repeated five times, and 



NAVAL WAR OF i2>i2. 51 

would have been a trying ordeal to a crew less 
perfectly disciplined than the Wasp^s. At 
3.26 Captain Blakely, finding his enemy did 
not get on his beam, put his helm a-lee and 
luffed up, firing his guns from aft forward as 
they bore. For ten minutes the ship and the 
brig lay abreast, not twenty yards apart, while 
the cannonade was terribly destructive. The 
concussion of the explosions almost deadened 
what little way the vessels had on, and the 
smoke hung over them like a pall. The men 
worked at the guns with desperate energy, 
but the odds in weight of metal (3 to 2) were 
too great against the Reindeer, where both 
sides played their parts so manfully. Cap- 
tain Manners stood at his post, as resolute as 
ever, though wounded again and again. A 
grape-shot passed through both his thighs, 
bringing him to the deck ; but, maimed and 
bleeding to death, he sprang to his feet, cheer- 
ing on the seamen. The vessels were now al- 
most touching, and putting his helm aweather, 
he ran the Wasp aboard on her port ^ quarter, 
while the boarders gathered forward, to try it 
with the steel. But the Carolina captain had 
prepared for this with cool confidence ; the 
marines came aft ; close under the bulwarks 
crouched the boarders, grasping in their hands 
the naked cutlasses, while behind them were 
drawn up the pikemen. As the vessels came 
grinding together the men hacked and thrust 
at one another through the open port-holes, 

^ Letter of Captain Blakely, July 8, 1814. Cooper 
says starboard ; it is a point of little importance ; all 
accounts agree as to the relative positions of the craft. 



52 NAVAL WAR OF 1^12. 

while the black smoke curled up from between 
the hulls. Then through the smoke appeared 
the grim faces of the British seadogs, and the 
fighting was bloody enough ; for the stubborn 
, English stood well in the hard hand play. 
But those who escaped the deadly fire of the 
top-men, escaped only to be riddled through 
by the long Yankee pikes ; so, avenged by 
their own hands, the foremost of the assailants 
died, and the others gave back. The attack 
was foiled, though the Reindeer's marines kept 
answering well the American fire. Then the 
English captain, already mortally wounded, 
but with the indomitable courage that nothing 
but death could conquer, cheering and rally- 
ing his men, himself sprang, sword in hand, 
into the rigging, to lead them on ; and they 
followed him with a will. At that instant a 
ball from the JVasp's main-top crashed through 
his skull, and, still clenching in his right hand 
the sword he had shown he could wear so 
worthily, with his face to the foe, he fell back 
on his own deck dead, while above him yet 
floated the flag for which he had given his life. 
No Norse Viking, slain over shield, ever died 
better. As the British leader fell and his men 
recoiled. Captain Blakely passed the word to 
board ; with wild hurrahs the boarders swarm- 
ed over the hammock nettings, there was a 
moment's furious struggle, the surviving Brit- 
ish were slain or driven below, and the cap- 
tain's clerk, f/te highest officer left, surrendered 
the brig, at 3.44, just 27 minutes after the 
Rei?tdeer h?id fired the first gun, and just 18 
after the Wasp had responded. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 53 

Both ships had suffered severely in the short 
struggle ; but, as with the Shaiinoii and Chesa- 
peake, the injuries were much less severe aloft 
than in the hulls. All the spars were in their 
places. The Wasp's hull had received 6 
round, and many grape ; a 24-pound shot had 
passed through the foremast ; and of her 




s^a 



,«••- > 



msp.^ •-^^.. -^"^^ 

crew of 173, II were killed or mortally 
wounded, and 15 wounded severely or slightly. 
The Rei7ideer was completely cut to pieces in 
a line with her ports ; her upper works, boats, 
and spare spars being one entire wreck. Of 
her crew of 118 men, 33 were killed outright 
or died later, and 34 were wounded, nearly all 
severely. 

COMPARATIVE FORCE. 

Broadside Weight No 

Tons. Guns. Metal. Men. Loss. 

Wasp, 509 II 315 173 26 

Reindeer, 477 10 210 118 67 

It is thus seen that the Reindeer fought at a 
greater disadvantage than any other of the 



54 NAVAL WAR OF id>i2. 

various British sloops that were captured in 
single action during the war ; and yet she 
made a better fight than any of them (though 
the Frolic, and the Frolic only, was defended 
with the same desperate courage) ; a pretty 
sure proof that heavy metal is not the only 
factor to be considered in accounting for the 
American victories. " It is difficult to say 
which vessel behaved the best in this short 
but gallant combat." ^ I doubt if the war 
produced two better single-ship commanders 
than Captain Blakely and Captain Manners ; 
and an equal meed of praise attaches to both 
crews. The British could rightly say that 
they yielded purely to heavy odds in men and 
metal ; and the Americans, that the difference 
in execution was fully proportioned to the 
difference in force. It is difficult to know 
which to admire most, the warv skill with 
which each captain manoeuvred before the 
fight, the perfect training and discipline that 
their crews showed, the decision and prompt- 
itude with which Captain Manners tried to 
retrieve the day by boarding, and the desper- 
ate bravery with which the attempt was made ; 
or the readiness with which Captain Blakely 
made his preparations, and the cool courage 
with which the assault was foiled. All people 
of the English stock, no matter on which side 
of the Atlantic they live, if they have any 
pride in the many feats of fierce prowess done 
by the men of their blood and race, should 
never forget this fight ; although we cannot 
but feel grieved to find that such men — men 
^ Cooper, ii, 287. 



NAVAL WAJ^ OF i^\2. 55 

of one race and one speech ; brothers in 
blood, as well as in bravery — should ever have 
had to turn their weapons against one an- 
other. 

The day after the conflict the prize's fore- 
mast went by the board, and, as she was much 
damaged by shot, Captain Blakely burned her, 
put a portion of his wounded prisoners on 
board a neutral, and with the remainder pro- 
ceeded to France, reaching I'Orient on the 
8th day of July. 

On July 4th Sailing-master Percival and 30 
volunteers of the New York flotilla ^ concealed 
themselves on board a fishing-smack, and car- 
ried by surprise the Eagle tender, which con- 
tained a 32-pound howitzer and 14 men, 4 of 
whom were wounded. 

On July 1 2th, while off the west coast of 
South Africa, the American brig Syren was 
captured after a chase of ir hours by the 
Medway, 74, Capt. Brine. The chase was to 
windward during the whole time, and made 
every effort to escape, throwing overboard all 
her boats, anchors, cables, and spare spars. ^ 
Her commander. Captain Parker, had died, 
and she was in charge of Lieut. N. J. Nichol- 
son. By a curious coincidence, on the same 
day, July 12th, H. M. cutter Landrail^ 4,^ of 
20 men, Lieut. Lancaster, was captured by 
the American privateer Sy?'en, a schooner 

1 Letter of Com. J. Lewis, July 6, 1814. 

2 Letter of Capt. Brine to Vice-Admiral Tyler, July 
12, 1814. 

^ James, vi, 436 ; his statement is wrong as regards 
the privateer. 



56 NAVAL WAR 6>i^' 1812. 

mounting i long heavy gun, with a crew of 
70 men ; the La7idrail had 7, and the Syren 3 
men wounded. 

On July 14th Gunboa4: No. Z%, Sailing- 
master George Clement, captured after a short '" 
skirmish the tender of the Tejiedos frigate, 
with her second lieutenant, 2 midshipmen, and 
10 seamen.^ 

The Wasp stayed in I'Orient till she was 
thoroughly refitted, and had filled, in part, the 
gaps in her crew, from the American privateers 
in_ port. On Aug. 27th, Captain Blakely 
sailed again, making two prizes during the 
next three days. On Sept. ist she came up 
to a convoy of 10 sail under the protection of 
the Ar?nada, 74, all bound for Gibraltar ; the 
swift cruiser hovered round the merchant-men 
like a hawk, and though chased off again and 
again by the line-of-battle ship, always re- 
turned the instant the pursuit stopped, and 
finally actually succeeded in cutting off and 
capturing one ship, laden with iron and brass 
cannon, muskets, and other military stores of 
great value. At half-past six on the evening 
of the same day, in lat. 47° 30' N., long. 11° 
W., while running almost free, four sail, two 
on the starboard bow, and two on the port, 
rather more to leeward, were made out.'^ 
Capt. Blakely at once made sail for the most 
weatherly of the four ships in sight, though 
well aware that more than one of them might 
prove to be hostile cruisers, and they were all 
of unknown force. But the determined 

1 Letter of Capt. Isaac Hull, Tuly 15, 1814. 

2 Official letter of Capt. Blake'ly, Sept. 8, 1814. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 57 

Carolinian was not one to be troubled by such 
considerations. He probably had several 
men less under his command than in the 
former action, but had profited by his ex- 
perience with the Reindeer in one point, hav- 
ing taken aboard her 12-pounder boat car- 
ronade, of whose efficacy he had had very 
practical proof. 

The chase, the British brig-sloop Avo?t^ 18, 
Captain the Honorable James Arbuthnot,^ 
was steering almost southwest ; the wind, 
which was blowing fresh from the southeast, 
being a little abaft the port beam. At 7.00 
the Avon began making night signals with the 
lanterns, but the Wasp, disregarding these, 
came steadily on; at 8.38 the Avo?i ^xtd a 
shot from her stern-chaser,'' and shortly after- 
ward another from one of her lee or starboard 
guns. At 20 minutes past 9, the Wasp was 
on the port or weather-quarter of the Avon, 
and the vessels interchanged several hails ; 
one of the American officers then came for- 
ward on the forecastle and ordered the brig 
to heave to, which the latter declined doing, 
and set her port foretop-mast studding sail. 
The Wasp then, at 9.29, fired the 12-pound 
carronade into her, to which the Avoft re- 
sponded with her stern-chaser and the after- 
most port guns. Capt. Blakely then put his 
helm up, for fear his adversary would try to 
escape, and ran to leeward of her, and then 
ranged up alongside, having poured a broad- 
side into her quarter. A close and furious 
engagement began, at such short range that 
1 James, vi, 432. 2 James, vi, 432. 



58 NAVAL WAR OF iZi2. 

the only one of the Wasp^s crew who was 
wounded, was hit by a wad ; four round shot 
struck her hull, killing two men, and she 
suffered a good deal in her rigging. The men 
on board did not know the name of their an- 
tagonist ; but they could see through the 
smoke and the gloom of the night, as her 
black hull surged through the water, that she 
was a large brig ; and aloft, against the sky, 






t 



10.00 



the sailors could be discerned, clustering in 
the tops/ In spite of the darkness the IVasp's 
fire was directed with deadly precision ; the 
Avon's gaff was shot away at almost the first 
broadside, and most of her main-rigging and 
spars followed suit. She was hulled again 
and again, often below water-line ; some of 
her carronades were dismounted, and finally 

* Captain Blakely's letter. 



NAVAL WAR OF iSi.2. 



59 



the main-mast went by the board. At lo.oo, 
after 31 minutes of combat, her fire had been 
completely silenced and Captain Blakely 
hailed to know if she had struck. No answer 
being received, and the brig firing a few 
random shot, the action recommenced ; but at 
10.12 the Avon was again hailed, and this time 
answered that she had struck. While lower- 
ing away a boat to take possession, another 
sail (H. B. M. brig-sloop Casfilia7i, 18, Cap- 
tain Braimer) was seen astern. The men 
Vv'ere again called to quarters, and everything 
put in readiness as rapidly as possible ; but 
at 10.36 two more sail were seen (one of which 
was H. B. M. Tartarus, 20'). The braces 
being cut away, the Wasp was put before the 
wind until new ones could be rove. The 
Castilian pursued till she came up close, when 
she fired her lee guns into, or rather over, the 
weather-quarter of the Wasp, cutting her rig- 
ging slightly. Repeated signals of distress 
having now been made by the Avon (which 
had lost 10 men killed and 32 wounded), the 
Castilian tacked and stood for her, and on 
closing found out she was sinking. Hardly 
had her crew being taken out when she went 
down. 

Counting the Wasp's complement as full 
(though it was probably two or three short), 
taking James' statement of the crew of the 
Avon as true, including the boat carronades 
of both vessels, and considering the Avon's 
stern-chaser to have been a six-pounder, we 
get the 

1 " Niles' Register," vi, 216, 



6 O NA VA.L WA R of \Z\2. 

COMPARATIVE FORCE. 

Weight 
Tons. No. Guns. Metal. No. Men. Loss. 

Wasp, 509 12 327 160 3 

Avon, 477 II 280 117 42 

It is self-evident that in the case of this 
action the odds, 14 to 11, are neither enough 
to account for the loss inflicted being as 14 to 
T, nor for the rapidity with which, during a 
night encounter, the Avon was placed in a 
sinking condition. " The gallantry of the 
Avon^s officers and crew cannot for a moment 
be questioned ; but the gunnery of the latter 
appears to have been not one whit better than, 
to the discredit of the British navy, had fre- 
quently before been displayed in combats of 
this kipd. Nor, judging from the specimen 
given by the Castilia?i, is it likely that she 
would have performed any better." ^ On the 
other hand, '' Capt. Blakely's conduct on this 
occasion had all the merit shown in the pre- 
vious action, with the additional claim of en- 
gaging an enemy under circumstances which 
led him to believe that her consorts were in 
the immediate vicinity. The steady, officer- 
like way in which the Avo?z was destroyed, 
and the coolness with which he prepared to 
engage the Castilian within ten minutes after 
his first antagonist had struck, are the best 
encomiums on this officer's character and 
spirit, as well as on the school in which he 
had been trained." ^ 

The Wasp now cruised to the southward 

1 James, vi, 435. 2 Cooper, ii, 291. 



NA VAL WAR OF \Zl2. 6 1 

and westward, taking and scuttling one or 
two prizes. On Sept. 21st, lat. TyT^"" 12' N., 
long. i4°56'W. , she captured the brig y^/a- 
lantciy 8, with 19 men, which proved a valua- 
ble prize, and was sent in with one of the 
midshipmen, Mr. Geisinger, aboard, as prize- 
master, who reached Savannah in safety on 
Nov. 4th. Meanwhile the Wasp kept on 
toward the southeast. On Oct. 9th, in lat. iS'^ 
35' N., long. 30° 10' W., she spoke and 
boarded the Swedish brig Adonis, and took 
out of her Lieut. McKnight and Mr. Lyman, 
a master's mate, both late of the Essex, on 
their way to England from Brazil. 

This was the last that was ever heard of 
the gallant but ill-fated Wasp. How she 
perished none ever knew ; all that is certain 
is that she was never seen again. She was 
as good a ship, as well manned, and as ably 
commanded as any vessel in our little navy ; 
and it may be doubted if there was at that 
time any foreign sloop of war of her size and 
strength that could have stood against her in 
fair fight. 

As I have said, the Wasp was manned 
almost exclusively by Americans. James 
says they v/ere mostly Irish ; the reason he 
gives for the assertion being that Capt. 
Blakely spent the first 16 months of his life 
in Dublin. This argument is quite on a par 
with another piece of logic which I cannot re- 
sist noticing. The point he wishes to prove 
is that Americans are cowards. Accordingly, 
on p. 475 : *' On her capstan the Cojistitution 
now mounted a piece resembling 7 musket 



(62 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

barrels, fixed together with iron bands. It 
was discharged by one lock, and each barrel 
threw 25 balls. * ^ * What could have 
impelled the Americans to invent such ex- 
traordinary implements of war but fear, down- 
right fear ? " Then a little further on : " The 
men were provided with leather boarding-caps, 
fitted with bands of iron, ~* * ^ another 
strong symptom of fear ! " Now, such a piece 
of writing as this is simply evidence of an 
unsound mind ; it is not so much malicious 
as idiotic. I only reproduce it to help prove 
what I have all along insisted on, that any of 
James' unsupported statements about the 
Americans, whether respecting the tonnage of 
the ships or the courage of the crews, are not 
worth the paper they are written on ; on all 
points connected purely with the British navy, 
or which can be checked o££ by official docu- 
ments or ships' logs, or where there would be 
no particular object in falsifying, James is an 
invaluable assistant, from the diligence and 
painstaking care he shows, and the thorough- 
ness and minuteness with which he goes into 

details. 

A fair-minded and interesting English 
critic,' whose remarks are generally very just, 
seems to me to have erred somewhat in com- 
menting on this last sloop action. He says 
that the Avon was first crippled by disman- 
tWng shot irom long guns. Now, the JVasJ> h3.d 
but one long gun on the side engaged, and, 
moreover, began the action with the shortest 

1 Lord Howard Douglass, " Treatise on Naval Gun- 
nery," p, 416. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1S12. 63 

and lightest of her carronades. Then he con- 
tinues that the Avon, like the Peacock, ' ' was 
hulled so low that the shot-holes could not be 
got at, and yielded to this fatal circumstance 
only." It certainly cannot be said when a 
brig has been dismasted, has had a third of 
her crew placed /lors de C07?ibat, and has been 
rendered an unmanageable hulk, that she 
yields 07ily because she has received a few 
shot below the water-line. These shot-holes 
undoubtedly hastened the result, but both the 
Peacock and the Avon would have surrendered 
even if they had remained absolutely water- 
tight. 

The Ada7ns, 28, had been cut down to a 
sloop of war at Washington, and then length- 
ened into a flush-decked, heavy corvette, 
mounting on each side 13 medium i8's, or 
columbiads, and i long 12, with a crew of 220 
men, under the command of Capt. Charles 
Morris, late first lieut. of the Constittitio7i} 
She slipped out of the Potomac and past the 
blockaders on Jan. 18th, and cruised eastward 
to the African coast and along it from Cape 
Mount to Cape Palmas, thence to the Cana- 
ries and Cape de Verd. She returned very 
nearly along the Equator, thence going toward 
the West Indies. The cruise was unlucky, 
but a few small prizes, laden with palm-oil and 
ivory, being made. In hazy weather, on 
March 25th, a large Indiaman (the Wood- 
bridge) was captured ; but while taking pos- 

1 " Autobiography of Commodore Morris," Anna* 
polis, 1880, p. 172. 



64 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

session the weather cleared up, and Capt. 
Morris found himself to leeward of 25 sail, 
two of which, a two-decker and a frigate, were 
making for him, and it took him till the next 
day to shake them off. He entered Savannah 
on May ist and sailed again on the 8th, stand- 
ing in to the Gulf Stream, between INIakanilla 
and Florida, to look out for the Jamaica fleet. 
He found this fleet on the 24th, but the dis- 
covery failed to do him much good, as the 
ships were under the convoy of a 74, two 
frigates, and three brigs. The Adams hov- 
ered on their skirts for a couple of days, but 
nothing could be done with them, for the 
merchant-men sailed in the closest possible 
order and the six war vessels exercised the 
greatest vigilance. So the corvette passed 
northward to the Newfoundland Banks, where 
she met with nothing but fogs and floating 
ice, and then turned her prow toward Ireland. 
On July 4th she made out and chased two 
sail, who escaped into the mouth of the Shan- 
non. After this the Adams, heartily tired of 
fogs and cold, stood to the southward and 
made a few prizes ; then, in lat. 44° N., long. 
10° VV., on July 15th, she stumbled across the 
i8-pounder 36-gun frigate Tigris^ Capt. Hen- 
derson. The frigate was to leeward, and a 
hard chase ensued. It was only by dint of 
cutting away her anchors and throwing over- 
board some^of her guns that the Ada7?is held 
her own till sunset, when it fell calm. Capt. 
Morris and his first lieutenant, Mr. Wads- 
worth, had been the first and second lieuten- 
ants of Old Ironsides in Hull's famous cruise, 



NAVAL WAR OF 1S12. 65 

and they proved that they had not forgotten 
their early experience, for they got out the 
boats to tow, and employed their time so well 
that by sunrise the frigate was two leagues 
astern. After 18 hours' more chase the Adai7is 
dropped her. But in a day or two she ran 
across a couple more, one of which, an old 
blu£[-bows, was soon thrown out ; but the 
other was very fast, and kept close on the 
corvette's heels. As before, the frigate was 
to leeward. The Adams had been built by 
contract ; one side was let to a sub-contractor 
of economical instincts, and accordingly turned 
out rather shorter than the other; the result 
was, the ship sailed a good deal faster on 
one tack than on the other. In this chase 
she finally got on her good tack in the night, 
and so escaped.' Capt. Morris now turned 
homeward. During his two cruises he had 
made but 10 prizes (manned by 161 men), 
none of very great value. His luck grew 
worse and worse. The continual cold and 
damp produced scurvy, and soon half of his 
crew were prostrated by the disease ; and the 
weather kept on foggy as ever. Ofithe Maine 
coast a brig-sloop (the Rifleman, Capt. Pearce) 
was discovered and chased, but it escaped in 
the thick weather. The fog grew heavier, and 
early on the morning of Aug. 17th the Adains 
struck land — literally struck it, too, for she 
grounded on the Isle- of Haute, and had to 

1 This statement is somewhat traditional ; I have 
also seen it made about the Jo/ui Adams. But some 
old officers have told me positively that it occurred to 
the Adams on this cruise. 



66 NAVAL WAR (9/^ 1812. 

throw over provisions, spare spars, etc., before 
she could be got off. Then she entered the 
Penobscot, and sailed 27 miles up it to Hamp- 
den. The Rijie7iiaii meanwhile conve3^ed in- 
telligence of her whereabouts to a British 
fleet, consisting of two line-of-battle ships, 
three frigates, three sloops, and ten troop 
transports, under the joint command of Rear- 
Admiral Griffeth and Lieutenant-General 
Sherbrooke.* 

This expedition accordingly went into the 
Penobscot and anchored off Castine. Cap- 
tain Morris made every preparation he could 
to defend his ship, but his means were very 
limited ; seventy of his men were dead or dis- 
abled by the scurvy ; the remainder, many of 
them also diseased, were mustered out, to the 
number of 130 officers and seamen (without 
muskets) and 20 marines. He was joined, 
however, by 30 regulars, and later by over 300 
militia armed with squirrel guns, ducking, and 
fowling-pieces, etc., — in all between 500 and 
550 men,2 only 180 of whom, with 50 muskets 
among them, could be depended upon. On 
Sept. 3d the British advanced by land and 
water, the land-force being under the direction 
of Lieutenant-Colonel John, and consisting of 
600 troops, 80 marines, and 80 seamen.^ The 

1 James, vi, 479. 

2 " Autobiography of Commodore Morris." 

^ James, \\, 48 1. Vv^henever militia are concerned 
James has not much fear of official documents and lets 
his imagination run riot ; he here says the Americans 
had 1,400 men, which is as accurate as he generally is in 
writing about this species of force. His aim being to 
overestimate the number of the Americans in the vari- 



A^AVAL WAR OF i8i2. 67 

flotilla was composed of barges, launches, and 
rocket-boats, under the command of Captain 
Barry of the Dragoji^ 74. In all there were 
over 1,500 men. The seamen of the Adams, 
from the wharf, opened fire on the flotilla, 
which returned it with rockets and carronades ; 
but the advance was checked. Meanwhile 
the British land-forces attacked the militia, 
who acted up to the traditional militia stand- 
ard, and retreated with the utmost promptitude 
and celerity, omitting the empty formality of 
firing. This left Captain ]\Iorris surrounded 
by eight times his number, and there was 
nothing to do but set fire to the corvette and 
retreat. The seamen, marines, and regulars 
behaved well, and no attempt was made to 
molest them. None of Captain Morris' men 
were hit ; his loss v/as confined to one sailor 
and one marine who were too much weakened 
by scurvy to retreat with the others, who 
marched to Portland, 200 miles off. The 
British lost ten men killed or wounded. 



On Sept. 9th Gunboats No. 160 and 151, 
commanded by Mr. Thomas M. Pendleton, 
captured off Sapoleo Bar, Ga., the British 
privateer Fortune of War, armed with two 
heavy pivot guns, and 35 men. She made a 
brief resistance, losing two of her men.^ 

On Sept. 15th the British 20-gun ship-sloops 
Hermes and Cai-ron, and 18-gun brig-sloops 

ous engagements, he always supplies militia ad libitum. 
to make up any possible deficiency. 

1 Letter from Commodore H. E. Campbell, St. 
Mary's, Sept. 12, 1814. 



68 NAVAL WAR OF 1^12. 

Sophie and Childeis, and a force of 200 men 
on shore/ attacked Fort Bowyer, on Mobile 
Point, but were repulsed without being able 
to do any damage whatever to the Americans. 
The Hermes was sunk and the assailants lost 
about 80 men. 

On the 26th of September, while the priva- 
teer-schooner General Ar??istro?ig, of New 
York, Captain Samuel C. Reid, of one long 
24, eight long 9's, and 90 men, was lying at an- 
chor in the road of Fayal, a British squadron, 
composed of the Phnitageiiet^ 74, Captain 
Robert Floyd, Rota^ 2)^, Captain Philip Somer- 
ville, and Car?iatio?i, 18, Captain George Ben- 
tham, hove in sight. ^ One or more boats 
were sent in by the British, to reconnoitre the 
schooner, as they asserted, or, according to 
the American accounts, to carry her by a 
coup de main. At any rate, after repeatedly 
warning them off, the privateer fired into them, 
and they withdrew. Captain Reid then an- 
chored, with springs on his cables, nearer 
shore, to await the expected attack, which was 
not long deferred. At 8 p. m. four boats from 
the Flantagenet and three from the Rota, con- 
taining in all 180 men,^ under the command 
of Lieutenant William Matterface, first of the 
Rota^ pulled in toward the road, while the 
Caj'7iation accompanied them to attack the 

1 James, vi, 527. 

2 Letter of Captain S. C. Reid, Oct. 7, 1S14; and of 
John B. Dabney, Consul at Fayal, Oct. 5, 1814. 

^ James, vi, 509: Both American accounts say 12 
boats, with 400 men, and give the British loss as 250. 
According to my usual rule, I take each side's state- 
ment of its own force and loss. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 69 

schooner if she got under way. The boats 
pulled in under cover of a small reef of rocks, 
where they lay for some time, and about mid- 
night made the attack. The Americans opened 
with the pivot gun, and immediately afterward 
with their long 9's, while the boats replied 
with their carronades, and, pulling spiritedly 
on amidst a terrific fire of musketry from both 
sides, laid the schooner aboard on her bow 
and starboard quarter. The struggle was 
savage enough, the British hacking at the net- 
tings and trying to clamber up on deck, while 
the Americans fired their muskets and pistols 
in the faces of their assailants and thrust the 
foremost through with their long pikes. The 
boats on the quarter were driven off ; but on 
the forecastle all three of the American lieu- 
tenants were killed or disabled, and the men 
were giving back when Captain Reid led all 
the after-division up and drove the British 
back into their boats. This put an end to the 
assault. Two boats were sunk, most of the 
wounded being saved as the shore was so near ; 
two others were captured, and but three of the 
scattered fi[otilla returned to the ships. Of 
the Americans, 2 were killed, including the 
second lieutenant, Alexander O. Williams, 
and 7 were wounded, including the first and 
third lieutenants, Frederick A. Worth and 
Robert Johnson. Of the British, 34 were 
killed and 86 were wounded ; among the 
former being the i?^/<^V first and third lieuten- 
ants, William Matterface and Charles R. Nor- 
man, and among the latter her second lieu- 
tenant and first lieutenant of marines, Richard 



yo NAVAL WAR OF \Z\2. 

Rawle and Thomas Park. The schooner's 
long 24 had been knocked off its carriage by 
a carronade shot, but it was replaced and the 
deck cleared for another action. Next day 
the Carnation came in to destroy the privateer, 
but was driven off by the judicious use the 
latter made of her " Long Tom." But affairs 
being now hopeless, the Ge7ieral Armst?'ong 
was scuttled and burned, and the Americans 
retreated to the land. The British squadron 
was bound for New Orleans, and on account 
of the delay and loss that it suffered, it was 
late in arriving, so that this action may be 
said to have helped in saving the Crescent 
City. Few regular commanders could have 
done as well as Captain Reid, 

On October 6th, while Gunboat No. 160 
was convoying some coasters from Savannah, 
it was carried by a British tender and nine 
boats.* The gun-vessel was lying at anchor 
about eight leagues from St. Mary's, and the 
boats approached with muffled oars early in 
the morning. They were not discovered till 
nearly aboard, but the defence though short 
was spirited, the British losing about 20 men. 
Of the gunboat's 30 men but 16 were fit for 
action ; those, under Sailing-master Thomas 
Paine, behaved well. Mr. Paine, especially, 
fought with the greatest gallantry ; his thigh 
was broken by a grape-shot at the very begin- 
ning, but he hobbled up on his other leg to 
resist the boarders, fighting till he was thrust 
through by a pike and had received two sabre 

1 Letter from Commander H. C. Campbell, Oct. 12, 
1814. 



NAVAL WAR OF \Z\2. 71 

cuts. Any one of his wounds would have 
been enough to put an ordinary man Jwrs de 
combat. 

On October nth, another desperate pri- 
vateer battle took place. The brigantine 
Frince-de-Neufchatel^ Captain Ordronaux, of 
New York, was a superbly built vessel of 310 
tons, mounting 17 guns, and originally pos- 
sessing a crew of 150 men.' She had made a 
very successful cruise, having on board goods 
to the amount of $300,000, but had manned 
and sent in so many prizes that only 40 of her 
crew were left on board, while 37 prisoners 
were confined in the hold. One of her prizes 
was in company, but had drifted oif to such a 
distance that she was unable to take part in 
the fight. At mid-day, on the nth of Oc- 
tober, while off Nantucket, the British frigate 
Ejidymion^ 40, Captain Henry Hope, discov- 
ered the privateer and made sail in chase. '^ 
At 8.30 p. M., a calm having come on, the 
frigate despatched 5 boats, containing in 
men,^ under the command of the first lieuten- 
ant, Abel Hawkins, to take the brigantine ; 
while the latter triced up the boarding net- 
tings, loaded the guns with grape and bullets, 
and prepared herself in every way for the 
coming encounter. She opened fire on the 

1 " History of American Privateers," by George 
Coggeshall, p. 241, New York, 1876. 

2 James, vi, p. 527. 

^ According to Captain Ordronaux ; James does not 
give the number, but says 28 were killed, y; wounded, 
and the crew of the launch captured. Ten of the 
latter were unwounded, and 18 wounded. I do not 
know if he included these last among his " i"] wounded." 



72 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

boats as they drew near, but they were soon 
alongside, and a most desperate engagement 
ensued. Some of the British actually cut 
through the nettings, and reached the deck, but 
were killed by the privateersmen ; and in a 
few minutes one boat was sunk, three others 
drifted off, and the launch, which was under 
the brigantine's stern, was taken possession 
of. The slaughter had been frightful, con- 
sidering the number of the combatants. The 
victorious privateersmen had lost 7 killed, 15 
badly and 9 slightly wounded, leaving but 9 un- 
touched ! Of the Endymioji' s men, James says 
28, including the first lieutenant and a mid- 
shipman, were killed, and 37, including the 
second lieutenant and a master's mate, 
wounded ; '' besides which the launch w^as 
captured and the crew made prisoners." I 
do not know if this means 37 wounded, besides 
the wounded in the launch, or not ; ^ of the 
prisoners captured 18 were wounded and 10 
unhurt, so the loss was either 28 killed, 55 
wounded, and 10 unhurt prisoners; or else 
28 killed, 37 wounded, and 10 prisoners ; but 
whether the total was 93 or 75 does not much 
matter. It was a most desperate conflict, 
and, remembering how short-handed the brig- 
antine was, it reflected the highest honor on 
the American captain and his crew. 

After their repulse before Baltimore the 
British concentrated their forces for an attack 

^ I think James does not include the wounded in the 
launch, as he says 28 wounded were sent aboard the 
Saturn ; this could hardly have included the men who 
had been captured. 



NAVAL IVAR OF \^i2. 73 

upon New Orleans. Accordingly a great fleet 
or iine-of-battle ships, frigates, and smaller 
vessels, under Vice-Admiral Cochrane, con- 
voying a still larger number of store-ships and 
transports, containing the army of General 
Packenham, appeared off the Chandeleur 
Islands on Dec. 8th. The American navy in 
these parts consisted of the ship Louisiana 
and schooner Carolina in the Mississippi river, 
and in the shallow bayous a few gunboats, of 
course without quarters, low in the water, and 
perfectly easy of entrance. There were also 
a few tenders and small boats. The British 
frigates and sloops anchored off the broad, 
shallow inlet called Lake Borgne on the 12th ; 
on this inlet there were 5 gunboats and 2 
small tenders, under the command of Lieut. 
Thomas Catesby Jones. It was impossible 
for the British to transport their troops across 
Lake Borgne, as contemplated, until this 
flotilla was destroyed. Accordingly, on the 
night of the 12th, 42 launches, armed with 24-, 
18-, and i2-pounder carronades, and 3 un- 
armed gigs, carrying 980 seamen and marines, 
under the orders of Capt. Lockyer/ pushed 
off from the Armide, 38, in three divisions; 
the first under the command of Capt. Lockyer, 
the second under Capt. Montresor, and the 
third under Capt. Roberts.' Lieut. Jones was 
at anchor with his boats at the Malheureux 
Islands, when he discovered, on the 13th, the 
British flotilla advancing toward Port Chris- 

1 James, vi, 521. 

2 Letter of Capt. Lockyer to Vice- Admiral Cochrane, 
Dec. 18, 1814. 



74 ATAVAL WAR OF i?>i2. 

tian. He at once despatched the Seahorse of 
one 6-pounder and 14 men, under Sailing- 
master William Johnston, to destroy the stores 
at Bay St. Louis. She moored herself under 
the bank, where she was assisted by two 
6-pounders. There the British attacked her 
with seven of their smaller boats, which were 
repulsed after sustaining for nearly half an 
hour a very destructive fire.^ However, Mr. 
Johnston had to burn his boat to prevent it 
from being taken by a larger force. Mean- 
while Lieut. Jones got under way with the five 
gun-vessels, trying to reach Les Petites 
Coquilles, near a small fort at the mouth of a 
creek. But as the wind was light and baffling, 
and the current very strong, the effort was 
given up, and the vessels came to anchor off 
Malheureux Island passage at i a. m. on the 
14th. ^ The other tender, the Alligator, Sail- 
ing-master Sheppard, of one 4-pounder and 
8 men, was discovered next morning trying to 
get to her consorts, and taken with a rush by 
Capt. Roberts and his division. At daybreak 
Lieut. Jones saw the British boats about nine 
miles to the eastward, and moored his 5-gun 
vessel abreast in the channel, with their 
boarding nettings triced up, and everything 
in readiness ; but the force of the current 
drifted two of them, Nos. 156 and 163, a hun- 
dred yards down the pass and out of line, 
No. 156 being the headmost of all. Their 
exact force was as follows: No. 156, Lieut. 
Jones, 41 men and 5 guns (i long 24 and 4 

^ James, vi, 521. 

2 Official letter of Lieut. Jones, March 12, 181 5. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 75 

12-pound carronades) ; No. 163, Sailing- 
master Geo. Ulrick, 21 men, 3 guns (i long 
24 and 2 12-pound carronades) ; No. 162, 
Lieut. Robert Speddes, 35 men, 5 guns (i 
long 24 and 4 light sixes); No. 5, Sailing- 
master John D. Ferris, 36 men, 5 guns (i long 
24,4 12-pound carronades); No. 23, Lieut. 
Isaac McKeever, 39 men and 5 guns (i long 
32 and 4 light sixes). There were thus, in 
all, 182 men and a broadside of 14 guns, 
throwing 212 pounds of shot. The British 
forces amounted, as I have said, to 980 men, 
and (supposing they had equal numbers of 
24's, i8's, and 12's), the flotilla threw seven 
hundred and fifty-eight pounds of shot. The 
odds of course were not as much against the 
Americans as these figures would make them, 
for they were stationary, had some long, heavy 
guns and boarding nettings ; on the other 
hand the fact that two of their vessels had 
drifted out of line was a very serious mis- 
fortune. At any rate, the odds were great 
enough, considering that he had British sailors 
to deal with, to make it anything but a cheer- 
ful look-out for Lieut. Jones ; but nowise 
daunted by the almost certain prospect of 
defeat the American officers and seamen pre- 
pared very coolly for the fight. In this con- 
nection it should be remembered that simply 
•to run the boats on shore would have per- 
mitted the men to escape, if they had chosen 
to do so. 

Captain Lockyer acted as coolly as his 
antagonist. When he had reached a point 
just out of gunshot, he brought the boats to 



76 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

a grapnel, to let the sailors eat breakfast and 
get a little rest after the fatigue of their long 
row. When his men were rested and in good 
trim he formed the boats in open order, and 
they pulled gallantly on against the strong 
current. At 10.50 the Americans opened fire 
from their long guns, and in about 15 minutes 
the cannonade became general on both sides. 
At 11.50^ Captain Lockyer's barge was laid 
alongside No. 156, and a very obstinate 
struggle ensued, " in which the greater part 
of the officers and crew of the barge were 
killed or wounded,'"^ including among the 
latter the gallant captain himself, severely, 
and his equally gallant first lieutenant, Mr. 
Pratt, of the Seaho7'se frigate, mortally. At 
the same time Lieut. Tatnall (of the To?mant) 
also laid his barge aboard the gunboat, only 
to have it sunk ; another shared the same 
fate ; and the assailants were for the moment 
repulsed. But at this time Lieut. Jones, who 
had shown as much personal bravery during 
the assault, as forethought in preparing for it, 
received a dangerous and disabling wound, 
while many of his men received the same fate ; 
the boarding nettings, too, had all been cut or 
shot away. Several more barges at once as- 
sailed the boats, the command of which had 
devolved on a young midshipman, Mr. George 
Parker ; the latter, fighting as bravely as his 
commander, was like him severely wounded, 
whereupon the boat was carried at 12.10. Its 
guns were turned on No. 163, and this, the 
smallest of the gunboats, was soon taken ; 
^ Lieut. Jones' letter. ^ Captain Lockyer's letter. 



NAVAL WAR OF i8i2. 77 

then the British dashed at No. 162 and carried 
it, after a very gallant defence, in which Lieut. 
Speddes was badly wounded. No. 5 had her 
long 24 dismounted by the recoil, and was 
next carried ; finally. No. 23, being left entirely 
alone, hauled down her flag at 12.30.^ The 
Americans had lost 6 killed and 35 wounded; 
the British 17 killed and 77 (many mortally) 
wounded. The greater part of the loss on 
both sides occurred in boarding No. 156, and 
also the next two gunboats. 

I have in this case, as usual, taken each 
commander's account of his own force and 
loss. Lieut. Jones states the British force to 
have been 1,000, which tallies almost exactly 
with their own account ; but believes that 
they lost 300 in killed and wounded. Captain 
Lockyer, on the other hand, gives the Amer- 
icans 225 men and three additional light guns. 
But on the main points the two accounts agree 
perfectly. The victors certainly deserve great 
credit for the perseverance, gallantry, and 
dash they displayed ; but still more belongs 
to the vanquished for the cool skill and ob- 
stinate courage with which they fought, al- 
though with the certainty of ultimate defeat 
before them, — which is always the severest 
test of bravery. No comment is needed to 
prove the effectiveness of their resistance. 
Even James says that the Americans made an 
obstinate struggle, that Lieut. Jones displayed 
great personal bravery, and that the British 
loss was very severe. 

1 Minutes of the Court of Inquiry, held May 15, 
1851. 



78 NAVAL WAR OF i8i2. 

On the night of Dec. 23d Gen. Jackson beat 
■up the quarters of the British encamped on 
the bank of the Mississippi. The attack was 
opened by Capt. Patterson in the schooner 
Carolina^ 14 ; she was manned by 70 men, 
mounted on each side six 12-pound carronades 
and one long 12. Dropping down the stream 
unobserved, till opposite the bivouac of the 
troops and so close to the shore that his first 
command to fire was plainly heard by the foe, 
Patterson opened a slaughtering cannonade 
on the flank of the British, and kept it up 
without suffering any loss in return, as long 
as the attack lasted. But on the 27th the 
British had their revenge, attacking the little 
schooner as she lay at anchor, unable to as- 
cend the current on account of the rapid cur- 
rent and a strong head-wind. The assailants 
had a battery of 5 guns, throwing hot shot and 
shell, while the only gun of the schooner's 
that would reach was the long 12. After half 
an hour's fighting the schooner was set on fire 
and blown up ; the crew escaped to the shore 
with the loss of 7 men killed and wounded. 
The only remaining vessel, exclusive of some 
small, unarmed row-boats, was the Louisiana^ 
16, carrying on each side eight long 24's. 
She was of great assistance in the battle of 
the 28th, throwing during the course of the 
cannonade over 800 shot, and suffering very 
little in return.* Afterward the American 
seamen and marines played a most gallant 
part in all the engagements on shore ; they 
made very efficient artillerists, 
^ Cooper, ii. p. 320. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 



79 



SUMMARY. 

The following vessels were got ready for sea during 

this year : ^ 



Name. 


Rig. 


Where Built. 


Cost. 




3 



n 


Remarks 


Wasp, 


Ship 


Newburyport 


$77,459.60 


160 


22 


509 


Built 


Frolic, 


<( 


Boston 


72,094.82 


«( 


(( 


a 


« 


Peacock, 


<( 


New York 


75,644.36 


<( 


(( 


(( 


<( 


Ontario, 


tt 


Baltimore 


59,343.69 


(C 


(< 


(C 


" 


Erie, 


(< 


<c 


56,174.36 


<< 


u 


<< 


<< 


Tom Bowline, 


Sch'ner 


PordBmouth 


13,000,00 


90 


12 


260 


Purch'd 


Lynx, 


(C 


Washington 




50 


6 




Btult 


Epervier, 


Brig 


England 


50,000.00 


130 


18 


477 


Capt'r'd 


Flamheau, 


K 


Baltimore 


14,000.00 


90 


H 


300 


Purch'd 




'Spark, 


<( 


<( 


17,389.00 


<( 


<( 


(( 


K 




Firefly, 


It 


<i 


^7.435 00 


a 


(( 


333 


« 


- 


Torch, 


Sch'ner 


tt 


13,000.00 


60 


12 


260 


«( 




Spitfire, 


(( 


<c 


20,000.00 


<( 


<( 


286 


« 




^Eagle, 


(( 


N. 0. 




(< 


n 


270 


U 




' Prometheus 


(1 


Philadelphia 


20,000.00 


(C 


(( 


290 


l( 




Chippeway, 


Brig 


R.I. 


52,000.00 


90 


14 


390 


(( 


^ 


Saranac, 


(( 


Middleton 


26,000.00 


<< 


'' 


360 


l( 




^Boxer, 


K 


(( 


26,000.00 


(( 


<( 


370 


tt 


Despatch, 


Sch'ner 






23 


2 


52 





1 Am. State Papers, xiv, p. 828 j also Emmons* 
statistical " History." 



8o 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 



The first 5 small vessels that are bracketed 
were to cruise under Commodore Porter ; the 
next 4 under Commodore Perry; but the news 
of peace arrived before either squadron put to 
sea. Some of the vessels under this catalogue 
were really almost ready for sea at the end of 
1813 ; and some that I have included in the 
catalogue of 18 15 were almost completely fitted 
at the end of 18 14, — but this arrangement is 
practically the best. 



LIST OF VESSELS LOST TO THE BRITISH. 

I. DESTROYED BY BRITISH ARMIES, /?/^ 



Name. 
Columbia, 
Adams, 
Argus, 
Carolina^ 



Tons. 

1,508 

760 

230 



Guns. 
52 ") Destroyed to prevent 
28 > them falling into hands 
22 ) of enemy. 
14 Destroyed by battery. 



116 



Name. Tons. 


Guns. 




Essex, 860 


46 C 


apt 


Frolic, 509 


22 


(( 


Rattlesnake, 258 


16 


i( 


Syren, 250 


16 


(( 



2. CAPTURED, ETC., BY BRITISH NAVY ON OCEAN. 

juns. 

46 Captured by frigate and corvette. 

by frigate and schooner. 

by frigate. 

by seventy-four. 

1,877 100 
Total, 4,884 tons. 216 guns. 

There were also a good many gunboats, 
which I do not count, because, as already said, 
they were often not as large as the barges that 
were sunk and taken in attacking them, as at 
Craney Island, etc. 



NAVAL IVAR OF 1812. 



81 



LIST OF VESSELS TAKEN FROM BRITISH. 



> 



I. CAPTURED BY THE AMERICAN PRIVATEERS. / 3 

Name. Tons. Guns. 

Ballahouy 86 4 

Landrail, 76 4 

2. CAPTURED, ETC., BY AMERICAN NAVY ON OCEAN. 



captured by sloop Peacock. 

sunk " " Wasp. 
(( « (( (( 

captured by frigate. 



3. SUNK IN ATTACKING FORT. 

Hermes, 500 22 



/4 



Name. 


Tons. 


Guns 


Epervier, 


477 


18 


Avofi, 


477 


20 


Reindeer, 


477 


19 


Pictou, 


300 


14 



2,393 



lOI 



Taking into account the losses on the lakes, 
there was not very much difference in the 
amount of damage done to each combatant 
by the other ; but both as regards the material 
results and the moral effects, the balance in- 
clined largely to the Americans. The chief 
damage done to our navy was by the British 
land-forces, and consisted mainly in forcing 
us to burn an unfinished frigate and sloop. 
On the ocean our three sloops were captured 
in each case by an overwhelming force, against 
which no resistance could be made, and the 
same was true of the captured British schooner. 
The Essex certainly gained as much honor as 
her opponents. There were but three single 
ship actions, in all of which the Americans 
were so superior in force as to give them a 
very great advantage ; nevertheless, in two of 
6 



82 NAVAL WAR OF i8r2. 

them the victory was won with such perfect 
impunity and the difference in the loss and 
damage inflicted was so very great, that I 
doubt if the result would have been affected 
if the odds had been reversed. In the other 
case, that of the Reindee?\ the defeated party 
fought at a still- greater disadvantage, and yet 
came out of the conflict with full as much 
honor as the victor. No man with a particle 
of generosity in his nature can help feeling 
the most honest admiration for the unflinching 
courage and cool skill displayed by Capt. 
Manners and his crew. It is worthy of notice 
(remembering the sneers of so many of the 
British authors at the " wary circumspection " 
of the Americans) that Capt. Manners, who 
has left a more honorable name than any 
other British commander of the war, except- 
ing Capt. Broke, behaved with the greatest 
caution as long as it would serve his purpose, 
while he showed the most splendid personal 
courage afterward. It is this combination of 
courage and skill that made him so dangerous 
an antagonist ; it showed that the traditional 
British bravery was not impaired by refusing 
to adhere to the traditional British tactics of 
rushing into a fight " bull-headed." Needless 
exposure to danger denotes not so much pluck 
as stupidity. Capt. Manners had no intention 
of giving^ his adversary any advantage he 
could prevent No one can help feeling regret 
that he was killed ; but if he was to fall, what 
more glorious death could he meet? It must 
be remembered that while paying all homage 
tk>' Capt Manners,- Capt. Blakely did equally 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 83 

well. It was a case where the victory between 
two combatants, equal in courage and skill, 
was decided by superior weight of metal and 
number of men. 



PRIZES 


MADE, 




Name of ship. 




Number of prizes 


President 




3 


Constittition 




6 


Adams 




10 


Frolic 




2 


Wasp 




15 


Peacock 




n 


Hornet 




1 


Small craft 




35 



<87 



84 NAVAL WAR OF i8l2. 



CHAPTER II. 
1814. 

ON THE LAKES. 

Ontario — The contest one of ship-building merely 
— Extreme caution of the commanders, verging on 
timidity — Yeo takes Oswego, and blockades Sackett's 
Harbor — British gunboats captured — Chauncy block- 
ades Kingston — Erie — Captain Sinclair's unsuccessful 
expedition — Daring and successful cutting-out expedi- 
tions of the British — Champlain — Macdonough's vic- 
tory. 

ONTARIO. 

THE winter was spent by both parties in 
preparing moreformidable fleets for the 
ensuing summer. All the American schooners 
had proved themselves so unfit for service 
that they were converted into transports, ex- 
cept the Sylph, which was brig-rigged and 
armed like the Ofieida. Sackett's Harbor 
possessed but slight fortifications, and the 
Americans were kept constantly on the alert, 
through fear lest the British should cross 
over. Commodore Chauncy and Mr. Eckford 
were as unremitting in their exertions as ever. 
In February two 2 2 -gun brigs, the Jefferson 
2.nd/ones^ and one large frigate of 50 guns, 
the Superior, were laid ; afterward a deserter 
brought in news of the enormous size of one of 
the new British frigates, and the Superior was 



NAVAL WAR OF i2>i2. 85 

enlarged to permit her carrying 62 guns. The 
Je^erso?i was launched on April 7th, th.Q Jones 
on the loth; and the Superior on May 2d, — 
an attempt on the part of the British to blow 
her up having been foiled a few days before. 
Another frigate, the Mohawk, 42, was at once 
begun. Neither guns nor men for the first 
three ships had as yet arrived, but they soon 
began to come in, as the roads got better and 
the streams opened. Chauncy and Eckford, 
besides building ships that were literally laid 
down in the forest, and seeing that they were 
armed with heavy guns, which, as well as all 
their stores, had to be carried overland 
hundreds of miles through the wilderness, 
were obliged to settle quarrels that occurred 
among the men, the most serious being one 
that arose from a sentinel's accidentally kill- 
ing a shipwright, whose companions instantly 
struck work in a body. What was more 
serious, they had to contend with such con- 
stant and virulent sickness that it almost 
assumed the proportions of a plague. During 
the winter it was seldom that two thirds of 
the force were fit for duty, and nearly a sixth 
of the whole number of men in the port died 
before navigation opened.* 

Meanwhile Yeo had been nearly as active 
at Kingston, laying down two frigates and a 
huge line-of-battle ship, but his shipwrights 
did not succeed in getting the latter ready 
much before navigation closed. The Prince 
Megent, 58, and Prificess Charlotte, 42, were 

i Cooper mentions that in five months the Madison 
buried a fifth of her crew. 



86 NAVAL WAR OF \Z\2, 

launched on April 15th. I shall anticipate 
somewhat by giving tabular lists of the com- 
parative forces, after the two British frigates, 
the two American frigates, and the two Ameri- 
can brigs had all been equipped and manned. 
Commodore Yeo's original six cruisers had 
been all renamed, some of them re-armed, and 
both the schooners changed into brigs. The 
Wolfe, Royal George, Melville^ Moira, Beres- 
ford, and Sydjiey Smith, were now named re- 
spectively Mofitreal, Niagara, Star, Charwell, 
Netly, and Magnet, Of the American side 
there had been but slight changes, beyond the 
alteration of the Sylph into a brig armed like 
the Oneida. Of the Superior's 62 guns, 4 
were very shortly sent on shore again. 

CHAUNCY'S SQUADRON. 

Broadside 
Crew. Metal. Armament. 

( 30 long 32's 
500 1,050 lbs. < 2 " 24's 

( 26 short 42's 

i 26 long 24's 
350 554 «• V 2 " i8's 

( 14 short 32's 

3=0 360" J=J'».?«=f,| 

,60 33J " \ " l°ns "\^ 

^^ I 20 short 32's 

160 332 " \ 2 \o^g ";s 

^•^ (20 short 32 s 



Name. 


Rig. 


Tonnage. 


Superior^ 


ship. 


1,580 


Moha-wk, 


« 


i*3So 


Pike, 


« 


87s 


Jdadison, 


c< 


593 


Jones, 


brig, 


500 


Jefferson, 


C( 


500 


Sylph, 


It 


300 


Oneida, 


tt 


243 



100 180 
100 180 



_) 2 Jong I2*S 

\ 14 short 24's 
j 2 long 12's 
I 14 short 24's 



8 vessels, 5,941 1,870 3,552 lbs. 228 guns. 

This is considerably less than James makes 
it, as he includes all the schooners, which 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 



87 



were abandoned as cniisers, and only used as 
transports or gunboats. Similarly Sir James 
had a large number of gunboats, which are 
not included in his cruising force. James 
thus makes Chauncy's force 2,321 men, and a 
broadside of 4,188 lbs. 





YEO'S SQUADRON, 














Broadside 


Kame. 


Rig. 


Tonnage. 


Crew. 


Metal. Armament. 












( 32 long 24's 


Prince Regent, 


ship. 


1.450 


485 


872 


IbsX 4short68's 
1 22 « 32's 
( 26 long 24*s 


Princess Charlotte y " 


1,21s 


31S 


604 


" 1 


, 2 short 68's 












1 


'14 " 32's 


Montreal, 


(( 


637 


220 


258 


" ■ 


i 7 long 24's 
! 18 " i8's 


Niagara, 


(( 


510 


200 


332 


" ■ 


1 2 long 12's 
[ 20 short 32's 


Ckarwell, 


brig, 


279 


110 


236 


" - 


1 2 long 12*5 

' 14 short 32's 


Star, 


M 


262 


110 


236 


" ■ 


\ 2 long 12's 
\ 14 slK)rt 32's 


Netly, 


« 


216 


ICW 


180 


- 


i 2 long 12's 
1 14 short 24's 


Magnet, 


« 


187 


80 


156 
2,874 


" ■ 


1 2 long i2*s 
; 12 short 24's 


8 vessels, 


4,756 


1,620 


lbs. 


2og guns. 



This tallies pretty well with James' state- 
ment, which (on p. 488) is 1,517 men, and a 
broadside of 2,752 lbs. But there are very 
probably errors as regards the armaments 
of the small brigs, which were continually 
changed. At any rate the American fleet 
was certainly the stronger, about in the pro- 
portion of six to five. The disproportion was 
enough to justify Sir James in his determina- 
tion not to hazard a battle, although the odds 
were certainly not such as British commanders 
had been previously accustomed to pay much 



88 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

regard to. Chauncy would have acted exactly 
as his opponent did, had he been similarly 
placed. The odds against the British com- 
modore were too great to be overcome, where 
the combatants were otherwise on a par, al- 
though the refusal to do battle against them 
would certainly preclude Yeo from advancing 
any claims to siiperio7-ity in skill or courage. 
The Princess Charlotte and Niagara were just 
about equal to the Mohawk and Madison^ and 
so were the Charwell and Netly to the Oneida 
and Sylph; but both the Star and Magnet 
together could hardly have matched either 
tlie /ofies or the Jeffersofi, while the main-deck 
32's of the Superior gdiYQ. her a great advan- 
tage over the Prijtce Regejifs 24's, where the 
crews were so equal ; and the Pike was cer- 
tainly too heavy for the Montreal. A decided 
superiority in the effectiveness of both crews 
and captains could alone have warranted Sir 
James Lucas Yeo in engaging, and this supe- 
riority he certainly did not possess. 

This year the British architects outstripped 
ours in the race for supremacy, and Commo- 
dore Yeo put out of port with his eight vessels 
long before the Americans were ready. His 
first attempt was a successful attack on Os- 
wego. This town is situated some 60 miles 
distant from Sackett's Harbor, and is the first 
port on the lake which the stores, sent from 
the seaboard to Chauncy, reached. Accord- 
ingly it was a place of some little importance, 
but was very much neglected by the American 
authorities. It was insufficiently garrisoned, 
and was defended only by an entirely ruined 



NAVAL WAR OF j2>i2. 89 

fort of 6 guns, two of them dismounted. 
Commodore Yeo sailed from Kingston to 
attack it on the 3d of May, having on board 
his ships a detachment of 1,080 troops. Os- 
wego was garrisoned by less than 300 men,^ 
chiefly belonging to a light artillery regiment, 
with a score or two of militia ; they were 
under the command of Colonel Mitchell. 
The recaptured schooner Growler was in 
port, with 7 guns destined for the Harbor ; 
she was sunk by her commander, but after- 
ward raised and carried oif by the foe. 

On the 5th Yeo appeared off Oswego and 
sent in Captain Collier and 13 gunboats to 
draw the fort's fire ; after some firing between 
them and the four guns mounted in the fort 
(two long 24's, one long 12, and one long 
6), the gunboats retired. The next day the 
attack was seriously made. The Princess 
Charlotte^ Montreal^ and Niagara engaged the 
batteries, while the Charwell and »S/<7r scoured 
the woods with grape to clear them of the 
militia.'* The debarkation of the troops was 
superintended by Captain O'Connor, and until 
it was accomplished the Montreal sustained 
almost the whole fire of the fort, being set on 
fire three times, and much cut up in hull, 
masts, and rigging."* Under this fire 800 
British troops were landed, under Lieutenant- 
Colonel Fischer, assisted by 200 seamen, 
armed with long pikes, under Captain Mul- 

1 General order of Gen. Jacob Brown, by R. Jones, 
Asst. Adj.-General, May 12, 1814. 

2 Letter of General Gordon Drummond, May 7, 1814. 

3 Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo, May 17, 1814. 



9© NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

caster.. They moved gallantly up the hill,, 
under a heavy fire, and carried the fort by 
assault ; Mitchell then fell back unmolested 
to the Falls, about 12 miles above the town, 
where there was a large quantity of stores* 
But he was not again attacked. The Ameri- 
cans lost 6 men killed, including Lieutenant 
Blaeny, 38 wounded, and 25 missing, both of 
these last falling into the enemy's hands. 
The British lost 22 soldiers, marines, and 
seamen (including Captain Hollaway) killed, 
and 73 (including the gallant Captain Mul- 
caster da-ngerously, and Captain Popham 
slightly) wounded,^ the total loss being 95 — 
nearly a third of the American force engaged. 
General Drummond, in his official letter, re- 
ports that " the fort being everywhere almost 
open, the whole of the garrison * * * 
effected their escape, except about 60 men> 
half of them wounded." No doubt the fort's 
being "everywhere almost open" afforded 
excellent opportunities for retreat ; but it was 
not much of a recommendation of it as a 
structure intended for defence. 

The British destroyed the four guns in the 
battery, and raised the Growler and carried 
her off, with her valuable cargo of seven long 
guns. They also carried off a small quantity 
of ordnance stores and some flour, and 
burned the barracks ; otherwise but little 

1 Letter of Lieut.-Col. V. Fischer, May 17, 1814. 
James says " r8 killed and 64 wounded," why, I do not 
know ; the official report of Col. Fischer, as quoted, 
says : " Of the army, 19 killed and 62 wounded ; of the 
navy, 3 killed and 11 wounded." 



NAVAL WAR OF i8i2. 9X 

damage was done, and the Americans reoccu- 
pied the place at once. It certainly showed 
great lack of energy on Commodore Yeo's 
part that he did not strike a really important 
blow by sending an expedition up to destroy 
the quantity of stores and ordnance collected at 
the Falls. But the attack itself was admirably 
managed. The ships were well placed, and 
kept up so heavy a fire on the fort as to 
effectually cover the debarkation of the 
troops, which was very cleverly accomplished ; 
and the soldiers and seamen behaved with 
great gallantry and steadiness, their officers 
leading them, sword in hand, up a long, steep 
hill, under a destructive fire. It was similar 
to Chauncy's attacks on York and Fort 
George, except that in this case the assailants 
sufi[ered a much severer loss compared to that 
inflicted on the assailed. Colonel Mitchell 
managed the defence with skill, doing all he 
could with his insufficient materials. 

After returning to Kingston, Yeo sailed 
with his squadron for Sackett's Harbor^ 
where he appeared on May 19th and began a 
strict blockade. This was especially trouble- 
some because most of the guns and cables for 
the two frigates had not yet arrived, and 
though the lighter pieces and stores could be 
carried over land, the heavier ones could only 
go by water, which route was now made dan- 
gerous by the presence of the blockading 
squadron. The very important duty of con- 
voying these great guns was entrusted to 
Captain Woolsey, an officer of tried merit. 
He decided to take them by water to Stony 



92 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

Creek, whence they might be carried by land 
to the Harbor, which was but three miles dis- 
tant ; and on the success of his enterprise 
depended Chauncy's chances of regaining 
command of the lake. On the 28th of May, 
at sunset, Woolsey left Oswego, with 19 boats, 
carrying 21 long 32 s, 10 long 24's, three 42- 
pound carronades and 10 cables — one of the 
latter, for the Supe7'io7\ being a huge rope 22 
inches in circumference and weighing 9,600 
pounds. The boats rowed all through the night, 
and at sunrise on the 29th 18 of them found 
themselves off the Big Salmon River, and, as 
it was unsafe to travel by daylight, Woolsey 
ran up into Big Sandy Creek, 8 miles from 
the Harbor. The other boat, containing two 
long 24's and a cable, got out of line, ran into 
the British squadron, and was captured. The 
news she brought induced Sir James Yeo at 
once to send out an expedition to capture the 
others. He accordingly despatched Captains 
Popham and Spilsbury in two gunboats, one 
armed with one 68-pound and one 24-pound 
carronade, and the other with a long 32, ac- 
companied by three cutters and a gig, mount- 
ing between them two long 12's and two brass 
6's, with a total of 180 men.^ They rode up 
to Sandy Creek and lay off its mouth all the 
night, and began ascending it shortly after 
daylight on the 30th. Their force, however, 
was absurdly inadequate for the accomplish- 

1 James, vi, 487 ; while Cooper says 186, James says 
the British loss was 18 killed and 50 wounded ; Major 
Appling says "14 were killed, 28 wounded, and 27 
marines and 106 sailors captured." 



NAVAL WAR OF i8i2. 93 

ment of their object. Captain Woolsey had 
been reinforced by some Oneida Indians, a 
company of light artillery, and some militia, 
so that his only care was, not to repulse, but 
to capture the British party entire, and even 
this did not need any exertion. He accord- 
ingly despatched Major Appling down the 
river with 120 riflemen ' and some Indians to lie 
in ambush.' When going up the creek the 
British marines, under Lieutenant Cox, were 
landed on the left bank, and the small-arm 
men, under Lieutenant Brown, on the right 
bank ; while the two captains rowed up the 
stream between them, throwing grape into the 
bushes to disperse the Indians. Major Ap- 
pling waited until the British were close up, 
when his riflemen opened with so destructive 
a volley as to completely demoralize and 
*' stampede " them, and their whole force was 
captured with hardly any resistance, the 
Americans having only one man slightly 
wounded. The British loss was severe,— 18 
killed and 50 dangerously wounded, accord- 
ing to Captain Popham's report, as quoted by 
James ; or " 14 killed and 28 wounded," ac- 
cording to Major Appling's letter. It was a 
very clever and successful ambush. 

On June 6th Yeo raised the blockade of 
the Harbor, but Chauncy's squadron was not 
in condition to put out till six weeks later, 

1 Letter from Major D. Appling, May 30, 1814. 

2 Letter of Capt. M. T. Woolsey, June i, 1814. 
There were about 60 Indians ; in all the American force 
amounted to 180 men. James adds 30 riflemen, 140 
Indians, and " a large body of militia and cavalry,' — 
none of whom were present. 



94 NAVAL WAR OF r8i2. 

during which time nothing was done by either 
fleet, except that two very gallant cutting-out 
expreditions were successfully attempted by 
Lieutenant Francis H. Gregory, U. S. N. 
On June i6th he left the Harbor, accompanied 
by Sailing-masters Vaughan and Dixon and 
22 seamen, in three gigs, to intercept some of 
the enemy's provision schooners; on the 19th 
he was discovered by the British gunboat 
Black Snake^ of one 18-pound carronade and 
18 men, commanded by Captain H. Landon. 
Lieutenant Gregory dashed at the gunboat 
and carried it without the loss of a man ; he 
■was afterward obliged to burn it, but he 
brought the prisoners, chiefly royal marines, 
safely into port. On the ist of July he again 
started out, with Messrs, Vaughan and Dixon, 
and two gigs. The plucky little party suffered 
greatly from hunger, but on the 5th he made 
a sudden descent on Presque Isle, and burned 
a 14-gun schooner just ready for launching ; 
he was off before the foe could assemble, and 
reached the Harbor in safety next day. 

On July 31st Commodore Chauncy sailed 
with his fleet ; some days previously the larger 
British vessels had retired to Kingston, where 
a loo-gun two-decker was building. Chauncy 
sailed up to the head of the lake where he 
intercepted the small brig Magnet. The Sylph 
was sent in to destroy her, but her crew ran 
her ashore and burned her. The Jefferson, 
Sylphy and Oneida were left to watch some 
other small craft in the Niagara ; the /o?ies 
was kept cruising between the Harbor and 
Oswego, and with the four larger vessels 



NAVAL WAR OF iZi2. 95 

Chauncy blockaded Yeo's four large vessels 
lying in Kingston. The four American ves- 
sels were in the aggregate of 4,398 tons, 
manned by rather more than 1,350 men, a«d 
presenting in broadside 77 guns, throwing 
2,328 lbs. of shot. The four British vessels 
measured in all about 2,,^ 12 tons, manned by 
1,220 men, and presenting in broadside 74 
guns, throwing 2,066 lbs. of shot. The for- 
mer were thus superior by about 15 per cent., 
and Sir James Yeo very properly declined to 
fight with the odds against him — although 
it was a nicer calculation than British com- 
manders had been accustomed to enter into. 
Major-General Brown had written to Com- 
modore Chauncy on July 13th : " I do not 
doubt my ability to meet the enemy in the field 
and to march in any direction over his country, 
your fleet carrying for me the necessary sup- 
plies. We can threaten Forts George and 
Niagara, and carry Burlington Heights and 
York, and proceed direct to Kingston and car- 
ry that place. For God's sake let me see you : 
Sir James will not fight." To which Chauncy 
replied : " I shall afford every assistance in 
my power to co-operate with the army when- 
ever it can be done without losing sight of 
the great object for the attainment of which 
this fleet has been created, — the capture or 
destruction of the enemy's fleet. But that I 
consider the primary object. * * * We 
are intended to seek and fight the enemy's 
fleet, and I shall not be diverted from my 
efforts to effectuate it by any sinister attempt 
to render us subordinate to, or an appendage 



96 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

of, the army.'* That is, by any " sinister at- 
tempt " to make him co-operate intelligently 
in a really well-concerted scheme of invasion. 
In further support of these noble and inde- 
pendent sentiments, he writes to the Secretary 
of the Navy on August loth.' " I told (Gen- 
eral Brown) that I should not visit the head 
of the lake unless the enemy's fleet did so. 
* * * To deprive the enemy of an apology 
for not meeting me I have sent ashore four 
guns from the Siipe?'ior to reduce her armament 
in number to an equality with the Prince Re- 
gent's, yielding the advantage of their 68- 
pounders. The Mohawk mounts two guns 
less than the Princess Charlotte, and the Mo7it- 
real and Niagara are equal to the Pike and 
Madison.'" He here justifies his refusal to 
co-operate with General Brown by saying that 
he was of only equal force with Sir James, and 
that he has deprived the latter of " an apology " 
for not meeting him. This last was not at all 
true. The Mohawk and Madiso?t were just 
about equal to the Princess Charlotte and 
Niagara ; but the Pike was half as strong 
again as the Mo?itreal ; and Chauncy could 
very well afford to " yield the advantage of 
their 68-pounders," when in return Sir James 
had to yield the advantage of Chauncy's long 
32's and 42-pound carronades. The Superior 
was a 32-pounder frigate, and, even without 
her four extra guns, was about a fourth 
heavier than the Prince Rege7it with her 24- 
pounders. Sir James was not acting more 

1 See Niles, vii, 12, and other places (under 
*' Chauncy " in index). 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 



97 



warily than Chauncy had acted during June 
and July, 1813. Then he had a fleet which 
tonned 1,701, was manned by 680 men, and 
threw at a broadside 1,099 lbs. ^^ shot; and 
he declined to go out of port or in any way try 
to check the operation of Yeo's fleet which 
tonned 2,091, was manned by 770 men, and 
threw at a broadside 1,374 lbs. of shot. 
Chauncy then acted perfectly proper, no 
doubt, but he could not afford to sneer at Yeo 
for behaving in the same way. Whatever 
either commander might write, in reality he 
well knew that his officers and crews were, 
man for man, just about on a par with those 
of his antagonists, and so, after the first 
brush or two, he was exceedingly careful to 
see that the odds were not against him. 
Chauncy in his petulant answers to Brown's 
letter ignored the fact that his superiority of 
force would prevent his opponent from giving 
battle, and would, therefore, prevent anything 
more important than a blockade occurring. 

His ideas of the purpose for which his com- 
mand had been created were erroneous and 
very hurtful to the American cause. That 
purpose was not, except incidentally, " the 
destruction of the enemy's fleet " ; and, 
if it was, he entirely failed to accomplish it. 
The real purpose was to enable Canada to be 
successfully invaded, or to assist in repelling 
an invasion of the United States. These serv- 
ices could only be efficiently performed by 
acting in union with the land-forces, for his 
independent action could evidently have little 
effect. The only important services he had 

7 



98 NAVAL WAR OF 1S12. 

performed had been in attacking Ports George 
and York, where he /tad been rendered " sub- 
ordinate to, and an appendage of, the array." 
His only chance of accomplishing anything 
lay in similar acts of co-operation, and he re- 
fused to do these. Had he acted as he ought 
to have done, and assisted Brown to the ut- 
most, he would certainly have accomplished 
much more than he did, and might have 
enabled Brown to assault Kingston, when 
Yeo's fleet would of course have been captured. 
The insubordination, petty stickling for his 
own dignity, and lack of appreciation of the 
necessity of acting in concert that he showed, 
were the very faults which proved most fatal 
to the success of our various land commanders 
in the early part of the war. Even had Chaun- 
cy's assistance availed nothing, he could 
not have accomplished less than he did. He 
remained off Kingston blockading Yeo, being 
once or twice blown off by gales. He sent 
Lieutenant Gregory, accompanied by Midship- 
man Hart and six men, in to reconnoitre on 
August 25th ; the lieutenant ran across two 
barges containing 30 men, and was captured 
after the midshipman had been killed and the 
lieutenant and four men wounded. On Sep- 
tember 2ist he transported General Izard, and 
3,000 men from Sackett's Harbor to the Gene- 
see; and then again blockaded Kingston until 
the two-decker was nearly completed, when 
he promptly retired to the Harbor. 

The equally cautious Yeo did not come out 
•on the lake till Oct. 15th ; he did not indulge 
in the empty and useless formality of blookaS- 



NAVAL WAR OF i2>i2. 



99 



ing his antagonist, but assisted the British, 
army on the Niagara frontier till navigation 
closed, about Nov. 21st. A couple of days 
before, Midshipman McGowan headed an ex- 
pedition to blow up the two-decker (named 
the St Lawrejue) with a torpedo, but was dis- 
covered by two of the enemy's boats, which he 
captured and brought in; the attempt was 
abandoned, because the St. Lawre7ice was 
found not to be lying in Kingston. 

For this year the material loss again fell 
heaviest on the British, amounting to one 14- 
gun brig burned by her crew,, one lo-gun 
schooner burned on the stocks, three gun- 
boats, three cutters, and one gig captured; 
while in return the Americans lost one schooner 
loaded with seven guns, one boat loaded with 
two,, and a gig captured and four guns de- 
stroyed at Oswego. In men the British loss 
was heavier still relatively to that of the Amer- 
icans, being in killed, wounded, and prisoners 
about 300 to 80. But in. spite of this loss and 
damage, which was too trivial to be: of any ac- 
count to either side, the success of the season, 
was with the British, inasmuch as they held 
command over the lake for more than four 
months, during which time they could co- 
operate with their army ; while the Americans 
held it for barely two months and a half. In 
fact the conduct of the two fleets on Lake 
Ontario during the latter part of the war was 
almost farcical. As soon as oneyby building, 
acquired the superiority, the foe at once re- 
tired to port, where he waited until he had 
built another vessel or two, when lie came out, 

LofC. 



lOO NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

and the other went into port in turn. Under 
such circumstances it was hopeless ever to 
finish the contest by a stand-up sea-fight, each 
commander calculating the chances with math- 
ematical exactness. The only hope of de- 
stroying the enemy's fleet was by co-operating 
with the land-forces in a successful attack on 
his main post, when he would be forced to be 
either destroyed or to fight — and this co-opera- 
tion Chauncy refused to give. He seems to 
have been an excellent organizer, but he did 
not use (certainly not in the summer of 1813) 
his materials by any means to the best advan- 
tage. He was hardly equal to his opponent, 
and the latter seems to have been little more 
than an average officer. Yeo blundered sev- 
eral times, as in the attack on Sackett's Har- 
bor, in not following up his advantage at 
Oswego, in showing so little resource in the 
action off the Genesee, etc. , and he was not 
troubled by any excess of daring ; but during 
the period when he was actually cruising 
against Chauncy on the lake he certainly 
showed to better advantage than the Amer- 
ican did. With an inferior force he won a 
partial victory over his opponent off Niagara, 
and then kept him in check for six weeks ; 
while Chauncy, with his superior force, was not 
only partially defeated once, but, when he 
did gain a partial victory, failed to take ad- 
vantage of it. 

In commenting upon the timid and dilatory 
tactics of the two commanders on Ontario, 
however, it must be remembered that the in- 
decisive nature of the results attained had 



NAVAL WAR OF \Z\2. loi 

been often paralleled by the numerous similar 
encounters that took place on the ocean during 
the wars of the preceding century. In the War 
of the American Revolution, the English 
fought some 19 fleet actions with the French, 
Dutch, and Spaniards ; one victory was gained 
over the French, and one over the Spaniards, 
while the 17 others were all indecisive, both 
sides claiming the victory, and neither win- 
ning it. Of course, some of them, though in- 
decisive as regards loss and damages, were 
strategetical victories : thus. Admiral Arbuth- 
not beat back Admiral Barras off the Chesa- 
peake, in March of 1781 ; and near the same 
place in September of the same year the 
French had their revenge in the victory (one 
at least in its results) of the Conte de Grasse 
over Sir Thomas Graves. In the five desperate 
and bloody combats which De Suffrein waged 
with Sir Edward Hughes in the East Indies, 
the laurels were very evenly divided. These 
five conflicts were not rendered indecisive by 
any overwariness in manoeuvring, for De Suf- 
frein's attacks were carried out with as much 
boldness as skill, and his stubborn antagonist 
was never inclined to baulk him of a fair battle ; 
but the two hardy fighters were so evenly 
matched that they would pound one another 
till each was helpless to inflict injury. Very 
different were the three consecutive battles 
that took place in the same waters, on the 25th 
of April, 1758, the 3d of August, 1758, and on 
the loth of September, 1759, between Pocock 
and d'Ache,^ where, by skilful manoeuvring, 
- 1 " La Marine Fran9aise sous le Regne de Louis XV," 



I02 NAVAL WAR OF 1S12. 

the French admiral saved his somewhat in- 
ferior force from capture, and the English 
admiral gained indecisive victories. M. Ri- 
viere, after giving a most just and impartial 
account of the battles, sums up with the 
following excellent criticism.^ 

" It is this battle,, won by Hawke, the 20th 
of November, 1757, ^"^^ ^^^ combats of 
Pocock and d'Ache', from which date two dis- 
tinct schools in the naval affairs of the i8th 
century : one of these was all for promptness 
and audacity, which were regarded as the indis- 
pensable conditions for victory ; the other, on, 
the contrary, praised skilful delays and able 
evolutions, and created success by science 
united to prudence. * * * But these two 
schools were true only according to circum- 
stances, not absolutely. When two fleets of 
equal worth are facing one another, as in the 
War of the American Revolution, then tactics 
should come into play, and audacity would 
often be mere foolhardiness. If it happens, 
on the other hand, as in the Republic, or 
during the last years of Louis XV, that an 
irresolute fleet, without organization, has tor 
contend with a fleet prepared in every way,, 
then, on the part of this last, audacity is wis- 
dom and prudence would be cowardice, 
for it would give an enemy who distrusts 
himself time to become more hardy» The 

par Henri Riviere, Lieutenant de Vaisseau, Chevalier 
de la Legion d' Honneur. (Paris et Toulon, 1859), pip. 
385 and 439. 

* Ibid:,y^. 425. I pay more attention to the sense 
thaa to the letter la my translation. 



NAVAL WAR OJ^ 1812. 103 

only school always true is that one which, 
freed from all routine, produces men whose 
genius will unite in one, in knowing how to 
apply them appropriately, the audacity which 
will carry off victory, and the prudence which 
knows how to obtain it in preparing for it." 

These generalizations are drawn from the 
results of mighty battles, but they apply just 
as well to the campaigns carried on on a small 
scale, or even to single-ship actions. Chauncy, 
as already said, does not deserve the praise 
which most American historians, and especially 
'Cooper, have lavished on him as well as on 
all our other officers of that period. Such 
indiscriminate eulogy entirely detracts from 
the worth of the writer's favorable criticisms. 
Our average commander was, I firmly beUeve, 
.at that time superior to the average com- 
mander of any other nation ; but to get at this 
average we must include Chauncy, Rodgers, 
:and Angus, as well as Hull, Macdonough, 
Perry, Porter, Bainbridge, Biddle, Lawrence, 
and Warrington. 

Sir James Yeo did to the full as well as his 
opponent, and like him was a good organiser ; 
but he did little enough. His campaigns 
must be considered as being conducted well 
•or ill according as he is believed to have 
commanded better men than his opponent, or 
not. If, as many British writers contend, his 
crews were an overmatch for the Americans, 
man for man, even to a slight degree, then 
¥eo's conduct was very cowardly^ if, on the 
•contrary, th.e officers and men of the two 
ileets were on a par, then he acted properly 



I04 NAVAL WAR OF \'^\2. 

and outgeneralled his opponent. It is to be 
regretted that most of the histories written 
on the subject, on either side of the Atlantic, 
should be of the " hurrah " order of literature. 
with no attempt whatever to get at the truth, 
but merely to explain away the defeats or im- 
mensely exaggerate the victories suffered or 
gained by their own side. 

ERIE AND THE UPPER LAKES. 

Hitherto the vessels on these lakes (as well 
as on Ontario) had been under the command 
of Commodore Chauncy ; but they were now 
formed into a separate department, under 
Captain Arthur Sinclair. The Americans 
had, of course, complete supremacy, and no 
attempt was seriously made to contest it with 
them ; but they received a couple of stinging, 
if not very important defeats. It is rather 
singular that here the British, who began with 
a large force, while there was none whatever 
to oppose it, should have had it by degrees 
completely annihilated ; and should have 
then, and not till then, when apparently ren- 
dered harmless, have turned round and par- 
tially revenged themselves by two cutting-out 
expeditions which were as boldly executed as 
they were skilfully planned. 

Captain Sinclair sailed into Lake Huron with 
the JSfiagara, Caledonia, Ariel, Scorpion, and 
Tigress, and on July 20th burnt the fort and 
barracks of St. Joseph, which were abandoned 
by their garrison. On Aug. 4th he arrived off 
the fort of Machilimacinac (Mackinaw), which 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 105 

was situated on such an eminence tliat the 
guns of the vessels could not reach it. Ac- 
cordingly, the troops under Col. Croghan were 
landed, covered by the fire of the schooners, 
very successfully ; but when they tried to 
carry the fort they were driven back with the 
loss of 70 men. Thence Sinclair sailed to the 
Nattagawassa Creek, attacked and destroyed 
a block-house three miles up it, which mounted 
three light guns, and also a schooner called 
the Nancy; but the commander of the 
schooner. Lieutenant Worsely, with his crew, 
escaped up the river. Captain Sinclair then 
departed for Lake Erie, leaving the Sm'pion, 
Lieutenant Turner, and Tigress, Sailing- 
master Champlin, to blockade the Nattaga- 
wassa. News was received by the British 
from a party of Indians that the two Amer- 
ican vessels were five leagues apart, and it 
was at once resolved to attempt their capture. 
On the first of September, in the evening, 
four boats started out, one manned by 20 sea- 
men, under Lieutenant Worsely, the three 
others by 72 soldiers under Lieutenants Bulger, 
Armstrong, and Raderhurst of the army — in 
all 92 men and two guns, a 6 and a 3-pounder. 
A number of Indians accompanied the ex- 
pedition but took no part in the fighting. At 
sunset on the 2d the boats arrived at St. 
Mary's Strait, and spent 24 hours in finding: 
out where the American schooners were. At 
6 p. M. on the 3d, the nearest vessel, the 
Tigress, was made out, six miles off, and they 
pulled for her. It was very dark, and they 
were not discovered till they had come within 



io6 N'A.VAL WAR OF 1812. 

fifty yards, when Champlin at once fired his 
long 24 at them ; before it could be reloaded 
the four boats had dashed up, those of Lieu- 
tenants Worsely and Armstrong placing 
themselves on the starboard, and those of 
Lieutenants Bulger and Raderhurst on the 
port side. There was a short, sharp struggle, 
and the schooner was carried. Of her crew 
of 28 men, 3 were killed and 5, including Mr. 
Champlin, dangerously wounded. The assail- 
ants lost three seamen killed, Lieutenant 
Bulger, seven soldiers and several seamen 
wounded.' " The defence of this vessel," 
writes Lieut. Bulger, "did credit to her 
officers, who were all severely wounded." 
Next day the prisoners were sent on shore ; 
and on the 5th the Scorpion was discovered 
working up to join her consort, entirely igno- 
rant of what had happened. She anchored 
about two miles from the Tigress; and next 
morning at 6 o'clock the latter slipped her 
cable and ran down under the jib and fore- 
^sail, the American ensign and pendant still 
flying. When within 10 yards of the Scorpion^ 
the concealed soldiers jumped up, poured a 
volley into her which killed 2 and wounded 2 
men, and the next moment carried her, her 
•surprised crew of 30 men making ;no resist- 
ance. The whole affair reflected great credit 
on the enterprise and pluck of the British, 
without being discreditable to the Amer- 

1 Letter of Lieutenant A. H. Bulger, Sept. 7, 18 14. 
James says only 3 killed and 8 wounded ; but Lieuten- 
ant Bulger distinctly says, in addition, " and several 
seamen wounded." 



^v 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 107 

icans. It was like Lieut. Elliott's capture of 
the Detroit and Caledoftia. 

Meanwhile a still more daring cutting-out 
expedition had taken place at the foot of Lake 
Erie. The three American schooners, Ohio, 
Somers, and Porcupine, each with 30 men, 
under Lieut. Conkling, were anchored just at 
the outlet of the lake, to cover the flank of the 
works at Fort Erie. On the night of August 
12th. Capt. Dobbs, of the Charwell, and Lieut. 
Radcliffe, of the Netly, with 75 seamen and 
marines from their two vessels, which were 
lying off Fort Erie, resolved to attempt the 
capture of the schooners. The seamen car- 
ried the captain's gig upon their shoulders 
from Queenstown to Frenchman's Creek, a 
distance of 20 miles; thence, by the aid of 
some militia, 5 batteaux as well as the gig 
were carried 8 miles across the woods to Lake 
Erie, and the party (whether with or without 
the militia I do not know) embarked in them. 
Between 11 and 12 the boats were discovered 
a short distance ahead of the Vomers and 
hailed. They answered " provision boats," 
which deceived the officer on deck, as such 
boats had been in the habit of passing and 
repassing continually during the night. Be- 
fore he discovered his mistake the boats 
drifted across his hawse, cut his cables, and 
ran him aboard with a volley of musketry, 
which wounded two of his men, and before 
the others could get on deck the schooner 
was captured. In another moment the Brit- 
ish boats were alongside the Ohio, Lieut. 
Conkling's vessel. Here the people had 



lo8 A'AVAL WAR OF iZi2. 

hurried on deck, and there was a moment's 
sharp struggle, in which the assailants lost 
Lieut. Radcliffe and one seaman killed and 
six seamen and marines wounded ; but on 
board the O/iio Lieut. Conkling and Sailing- 
master M. Cally were shot down, one seaman 
killed, and four wounded, and Captain Dobbs 
carried her, sword in hand. The Porcupine 
was not molested, and made no effort to inter- 
fere with the British in their retreat ; so they 
drifted down the rapids with their two prizes 
and secured them below. The boldness of 
this enterprise will be appreciated when it is 
remembered that but 75 British seamen (un- 
less there were some militia along), with no 
artillery, attacked and captured two out of 
three fine schooners, armed each with a long 
32 or 24, and an aggregate of 90 men ; and 
that this had been done in waters where the 
eie and five batteaux of the victors were the 
only British vessels afloat. 

CHAMPLAIN. 

This lake, which had hitherto played but an 
inconspicuous part, was now to become the 
scene of the greatest naval battle of the war. 
A British army of 11,000 men under Sir 
George Prevost undertook the invasion of 
New York by advancing up the western bank 
of Lake Champlain. This advance was im- 
practicable unless there was a sufficiently 
strong British naval force to drive back the 
American squadron at the same time. Ac- 
cordingly, the British began to construct a 



NAVAL WAH OF 1^12. 109 

frigate, the Coiifia7ice, to be added to their 
already existing force, which consisted of a 
brig, two sloops, and 12 or 14 gunboats. The 
Americans already possessed a heavy cor- 
vette, a schooner, a small sloop, and 10 gun- 
boats or row-galleys / they now began to build 
a large brig, the Eagle, which was launched 
about the i6th of August. Nine days later, 
on the 25th, the Confiance was launched. The 
two squadrons were equally deficient in stores, 
etc. ; the Cojifiaiice having locks to her guns, 
some of which could not be used, while the 
American schooner Ticonde7'oga had to fire her 
guns by means of pistols flashed at the touch- 
holes (like Barclay on Lake Erie). Mac- 
donough and Downie were hurried into action 
before they had time to prepare themselves 
thoroughly ; but it was a disadvantage com- 
mon to both, and arose from the nature of the 
case, which called for immediate action. The 
British army advanced slowly toward Platts- 
burg, which was held by General Macomb 
with less than 2, 000 effective American troops. 
Captain Thomas Macdonough, the American 
commodore, took the lake a day or two before 
his antagonist, and came to anchor in Platts- 
burg harbor. The British fleet, under Cap- 
tain George Downie, moved from Isle-aux- 
Noix, on Sept. 8th, and on the morning of the 
nth sailed into Plattsburg harbor. 

The American force consisted of the ship 
Saratoga^ Captain T. Macdonough, of about 
734 tons,* carrying eight long 24-pounders, 

^ In the Naval Archives (*' Masters'-Commandant 



iio NAVAL WAR OF iB>i2. 

six 42-pound and twelve 32-pound carronades ; 
the brig Eagle, Captain Robert Henly, of 
about 500 tons, carrying eight long i8's and 
twelve 3 2 -pound carronades ; schooner Ticon- 
deroga Lieut.-Com. Stephen Cassin, of about 
350 tons carrying eight long i2-pounders,four 
long i8-pounders, and five 32-pound carron- 
ades ; sloop Freb/e, Lieutenant Charles Budd, 
of about 80 tons, mounting seven long 9's ; 
the row-galleys Borer, Centipede, Nettle, Ane7i^ 
Viper, and Burrows, each of about 70 tons, 
and mounting one long 24- and one short 18- 
pounder ; and the row-galleys Wilmer, Lud- 
low, Aylwin, and Ballard, each of about 40 
tons, and mounting one long 12. James puts 
down the number of men on board the squad- 
ron as 950, — merely a guess, as he gives no 
authority. Cooper says " about 850 men, 
including officers, and a small detachment of 
soldiers to act as marines." Lossing (p. 866, 
note i) says 882 in all. Vol. xiv of the 
"American State Papers " contains on p. 572 
the prize-money list presented by the purser, 
George Beale, Jr. This numbers the men 
(the dead being represented by their heirs or 

Letters," 1814, i, No. 134) is a letter from Macdonough 
in which he states that the Saratoga is intermediate in 
size between the Pike, of 875, and the Madison, of 593 
tons, this would make her 734. The Ea^le was very 
nearly the size of the Laaureiice or Niagat-a, on Lake 
Erie. The Ticondero^a was orginally a small steamer, 
but Commodore Macdonough had her schooner- 
rigged, because he found that her machinery got out 
of order on almost every trip that she took. Her ton- 
nage is only approximately known, but she was of the 
same size as the Lin7iet. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. in 

executors) up to 915, including soldiers and 
seamen, but many of the numbers are omitted, 
probably owing to the fact that their owners, 
though belonging on board, happened to be 
absent on shore, or in the hospital ; so that 
the actual number of names tallies very closely 
with that given by Lossing ; and accordingly 
I shall take that/ The total number of men 
in the galleys (including a number of soldiers, 
as they were not enough sailors) was 350. 
The exact proportions in which this force was 
distributed among the gunboats cannot be 
told, but it may be roughly said to be 41 in 
each large galley, and 26 in each small one. 
The complement of the Saratoga was 210, of 
the Eagle, 130, of the Tkonderoga, 100, and of 
the Preble^ 30 ; but the first three had also a 
few soldiers distributed between them. The 
following list is probably pretty accurate as to 
the aggregate ; but there may have been a 
score or two fewer men on the gunboats, or 
more on the larger vessels. 



1 In the Naval Archives are numerous letters from 
Macdonough, in which he states continually that, as 
fast as they arrive, he substitutes sailors for the soldiers 
with which the vessels were originally manned. Men 
were continually being sent ashore on account of sick- 
ness. In the Bureau of Navigation is the log-book of 
*' sloop-of-war Su7-prise, Captain Robert Henly " {Stir- 
prise was the name the Eagle originally went by). It 
mentions from time to time that men were buried and 
sent ashore to the hospital (five being sent ashore on 
September 2d) ; and finally mentions that the places of 
the absent were partially filled by a draft of 21 soldiers, 
to act as marines. The notes on the day of battle are 
very brief. 



112 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 



MACDONOUGH'S FORCE. 



Name. 
Saratoga, 

Eagle, 

Ticonderoga, 

Preble, 

Six gunboats, 



Tons. 

734 
500 

350 

80 

420 



Four gunboats, 160 



Crew. 
240 

150 

112 

30 

246 

104 



Broadside. 
414 lbs. 

264 " 

180 " 

36 " 

252 " 
48 " 



Metal, from long 
or short guns. 

j long, 96 
I short, 318 

j long, 72 
\ short, 192 

) long, 84 
"( short, 96 

long, 36 

I long, 144 
I short, 108 

iong, 48 



In all, 14 vessels of 2,244 tons ^"d 882 men, 
with 86 guns throwing at a broadside 1,194 
lbs. of shot, 480 from long, and 7 14 from short 
guns. 

The force of the British squadron in guns 
and ships is known accurately, as most of it 
was captured. The Confiaiice rated for years 
in our lists as a frigate of the class of the 
Constellation, Congress, and Macedonian ; she 
was thus of over 1,200 tons. (Cooper says 
more, "• nearly double the tonnage of the 
Saratoga.''^) She carried on her main-deck 
thirty long 24's, fifteen in each broadside. 
She did not have a complete spar-deck ; on 
her poop, which came forward to the mizzen- 
mast, were two 32-pound (or possibly 42- 
pound), carronades and on her spacious top- 
gallant forecastle were four 3 2- (or 42-) pound 
carronades, and a long 24 on a pivot.' She 
had aboard her a furnace for heating shot ; 

^ This is her armament as given by Cooper, on the 
authority of Lieutenant E. A. F. Lavallette, who was 
in charge of her for three months, and went aboard her 
ten minutes after the Linftet struck. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 113 

eight or ten of which heated shot were found 
with the furnace.' This was, of course, a 
perfectly legitimate advantage. The Lifmet, 
Captain Daniel Pring, was a brig of the same 
size as the Ticonderoga^ mounting 16 long 12's. 
The Chubb and Finch, Lieutenants James Mc- 
Ghie and William Hicks, M^ere formerly the 
American sloops Growler and Eagle, of 112 
and no tons respectively. The former 
mounted ten 18-pound carronades and one 
long 6 ; the latter, six 18-pound carronades, 
four long 6's, and one short 18. There were 
twelve gunboats.^ Five of these were large, 
of about 70 tons each ; three mounted a long 
24 and a 32-pound carronade each ; one 
mounted a long 18 and a 32-pound carron- 
ade ; one a long 18 and a short 18. Seven 
were smaller, of about 40 tons each ; three of 
these carried each a long 18, and four carried 
each a 32-pound carronade. There is greater 
difficulty in finding out the number of men in 
the British fleet. American historians are 
unanimous m stating it at from 1,000 to 1,100 ; 
British historians never do anything but copy 
James blindly. Midshipman Lea of the Con- 

^ James stigmatizes the statement of Commodore 
Macdonough about the furnace as " as gross a false- 
hood as ever was uttered " ; but he gives no authority 
for the denial, and it appears to have been merely an 
ebullition of spleen on his part. Every American 
officer who went aboard the Confiance saw the furnace 
and the hot shot. 

2 Letter of General George Prevost, Sept. 11, 1814. 
All the American accounts say 13; the British official 
account had best be taken. James says only ten, but 
gives no authority ; he appears to have been entirely 
ignorant of all things connected with this action. 
8 



114 NAVAL WAR OF iSi2. 

fiance^ in a letter (already quoted) published 
in the " London Naval Chronicle," vol. xxxii, 
p. 292, gives her crew as 300 ; but more than. 
this amount of dead and prisoners were taken 
out of her. The number given her by Com- 
mander Ward in his " Naval Tactics," is prob- 
ably nearest right — 325.^ The Linnet had 
about 125 men, and the Chubb and Fi7uh 
about 50 men each. According to Admiral 
Paulding (given by Lossing, in his " Field 
Book of the War of 18 12," p. 868) their gun- 
boats averaged 50 men each. This is prob- 
ably true, as they were manned largely by 
soldiers, any number of whom could be spared 
from Sir George Prevost's great army ; but it 
may be best to consider the large ones as 
having 41, and the small 26 men, which were 
the complements of the American gunboats 
of the same sizes. 

The following, then, is the force of 

DOWNIE'S SQUADRON. 

From what guns 
Name. Tonnage. Crew. Broadside long or short. 

Cofifiance, 1200 325 480 lbs. "j shof t/56 

Linnet 350 125 96 " long, 96 



Chubby 112 50 96 



,< ( long, 6 

\ short, 90 



Finch, 110 50 84 " j long, 12 

( short, 72 

Five gunboats, 350 205 254 " ] ^J"?!, "2 

Seven gunboats, 280 182 182 " -j g^"|| J* 

In all, 16 vessels, of about 2,402 tons, with 

1 James gives her but 270 men, — without stating his 
authority. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 



115 



937 men,^ and a total of 92 guns, throwing at a 
broadside 1,192 lbs., 660 from long and 532 
from short pieces. 

These are widely different from the figures 
that appear in the pages of most British his- 
torians, from Sir Archibald Alison down and 
up. Thus, in the " History of the British 
Navy," by C. D. Yonge (already quoted), it 
is said that on Lake Champlain "our (the 
British) force was manifestly and vastly in- 
ferior, * * * their (the American) broadside 
outweighing ours in more than the proportion 
of three to two, while the difference in their 
tonnage and in the number of their crews was 
still more in their favor." None of these 
historians, or quasi-historians, have made the 
faintest effort to find out the facts for them- 
selves, following James' figures with blind re- 
liance, and accordingly it is only necessary 
to discuss the latter. This reputable gentle- 
man ends his account (" Naval Occurrences," 
p. 424) by remarking that Macdonough wrote 
as he did because " he knew that nothing 
would stamp a falsehood with currency equal 
to a pious expression, * * ^ his falsehoods 
equalling in number the lines of his letter." 
These remarks are interesting as showing the 
unbiassed and truthful character of the 
author, rather than for any particular weight 
they will have in influencing any one's judg- 
ment on Commodore Macdonough. James 
gives the engaged force of the British as " 8 
vessels, of 1,426 tons, with 537 men, and 
throwing 765 lbs. of shot." To reduce the 
force down to this, he first excludes the Finch. 

1 About ; there were probably more rather than less. 



Ii6 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

because she " grounded opposite an American 
battery before the €?igageme?it comme?iced,^' which 
reads especially well in connection with Capt. 
Pring's officialletter : "Lieut. Hicks, of the 
Finch, had the mortification to strike on a 
reef of rocks to the eastward of Crab Island 
about the middle of the engagement. " ^ What 
James means cannot be imagined ; no stretch 
of language will convert " about the middle 
of " into " before." The Finch struck on the 
reef in consequence of having been disabled 
and rendered helpless by the fire from the 
Ticonderoga. Adding her force to James' 
statement (counting her crew only as he gives 
it), we get 9 vessels, 1,536 tons, 577 men, 849 
lbs. of shot. James also excludes five gun- 
boats, because they ran away almost as soon 
as the action commenced (vol. vi, p. 501). 
This assertion is by no means equivalent to 
the statement in Captain Pring's letter " that 
the flotilla of gunboats had abandoned the 
object assigned to them," and, if it was, it 
would not warrant his excluding the five gun- 
boats. Their flight may have been disgrace- 
ful, but they formed part of the attacking 
force nevertheless ; almost any general could 
say that he had won against superior num- 
bers if he refused to count in any of his own 
men whom he suspected of behaving badly. 
James gives his 10 gunboats 294 men and 13 
guns (two long 24's, five long i8's, six 32- 
pound carronades), and makes them average 

1 The italics are mine. The letter is given in full in 
the " Naval Chronicle." 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 117 

45 tons ; adding on the five he leaves out, we 
get 14 vessels, of 1,761 tons, with 714 men, 
throwing at a broadside 1,025 ^bs. of shot (591 
from long guns, 434 from carronades). But 
Sir George Prevost, in the letter already 
quoted, says there were 12 gunboats, and the 
American accounts say more. Supposing the 
two gunboats James did not include at all to 
be equal respectively to one of the largest and 
one of the smallest of the gunboats as he 
gives them (" Naval Occurrences/' p. 417) ; 
that is, one to have had 35 men, a long 24, 
and a 32-pound carronade, the other, 25 men 
and a 32-pound carronade, we get for Dow- 
nie's force 16 vessels, of 1,851 tons, with 774 
men, throwing at a broadside 1,1 13 lbs. of shot 
(615 from long guns, 498 from carronades). 
It must be remembered that so far I have 
merely corrected James by means of the au- 
thorities from which he draws his account — 
the official letters of the British commanders. 
I have not brought up a single American 
authority against him, but have only made 
such alterations as a writer could with noth- 
ing whatever but the accounts of Sir George 
Prevost and Captain Pring before him to com- 
pare with James. Thus it is seen that accord- 
ing to James himself Downie really had 774 
men to Macdonough's 'iZz, and threw at a 
broadside 1,113 lbs. of shot to Macdonough's 
1,194 lbs. James says (" Naval Occurrences," 
pp. 410, 413) : "Let it be recollected, no 
musketry was employed on either side," and 
" The marines were of no use, as the action 
was fought out of the range of musketry "; 



Ii8 NAVAL WAR OF i8i2. 

the 1 06 additional men on the part of the 
Americans were thus not of much conse- 
quence, the action being fought at anchor, 
and there being men enough to manage the 
guns and perform every other duty. So we 
need only attend to the broadside force. 
Here, then, Downie could present at a 
broadside 615 lbs. of shot from long guns to 
Macdonough's 480, and 498 lbs. from carron- 
ades to Macdonough's 714; or, he threw 135 
lbs. of shot more from his long guns, and 216 
less from his carronades. This is equivalent 
to Downie's having seven long i8's and one 
long 9, and Macdonough's having one 24- 
pound and six 32-pound carronades. A 32- 
pound carronade is not equal to a long 18 ; 
so that even by James' own showing Downie's 
force was slightly the superior. 

Thus far, I may repeat, I have corrected 
James solely by the evidence of his own side ,* 
now I shall bring in some American authori- 
ties. These do not contradict the British 
official letters, for they virtually agree with 
them ; but they do go against James' unsup- 
ported assertions, and, being made by naval 
officers of irreproachable reputation, will cer- 
tainly outweigh them. In the first place, 
James asserts that on the main deck of the 
Confiance but 13 guns w^ere presented in broad- 
side, two 32-pound carronades being thrust 
through the bridle, and two others through 
the stern-ports ; so he excludes two of her 
guns from the broadside. Such guns would 
have been of great use to her at certain stages 
of the combat, and ought to be included in 



NAVAL WAR OF i8i2. 119 

the force. But besides this, the American 
officers positively say that she had a broad^ 
siiie of 15 guns. Adding these two guns, and 
making a trifling change in the arrangement 
of the guns in the row-galleys, we get a broad- 
side of 1,192 lbs., exactly as I have given it 
above. There is no difficulty in accounting 
for the difference of tonnage as given by 
James and by the Americans, for we have 
considered the same subject in reference to 
the battle of Lake Erie. James calculates the 
American tonnage as if for sea-vessels of deep 
holds, while, as regards the British vessels, he 
allows for the shallow holds that all the lake 
craft had ; that is, he gives in one the nomi- 
nal, in the other the real, tonnage. This fully 
accounts for the discrepancy. It only re- 
mains to account for the difference in the 
number of men. From James we can get 772. 
In the first place, we can reason by analogy. 
I have already shown that, as regards the bat- 
tle of Lake Erie, he is convicted (by English, 
not by American, evidence) of having under- 
estimated Barclay's force by about 25 per cent. 
If he did the same thing here, the British force 
was over 1,000 strong, and I have no doubt 
that it was. But we have other proofs. On 
p. 417 of the ''Naval Occurrences" he says 
the complement of the four captured British 
vessels amounted to 420 men, of whom 54 
were killed in action, leaving 366 prisoners, 
including the wounded. But the report of 
prisoners, as given by the American authori- 
ties, gives 369 officers and seamen unhurt 
or but slightly wounded, 57 wounded men 



I20 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

paroled, and other wounded whose number 
was unspecified. Supposing this number to 
have been 82, and adding 54 dead, we would 
get in all 550 men for the four ships, the num- 
ber I have adopted in my list. This would 
make the British wounded 129 instead of 116, 
as James says ; but neither the Americans nor 
the British seem to have enumerated all their 
wounded in this fight. Taking into account 
all these considerations, it will be seen that 
the figures I have given are probably approx- 
imately correct, and, at any rate, indicate 
pretty closely the 7-elative strength of the two 
squadrons. The slight differences in tonnage 
and crews (158 tons and 55 men, in favor of 
the British) are so trivial that they need not 
be taken into account, and we will merely con- 
sider the broadside force. In absolute weight 
of metal the two combatants were evenly 
matched — almost exactly ; — but whereas from 
Downie's broadside of 1,192 lbs. 660 were 
from long and 532 from short guns, of Mac- 
donough's broadside of 1,194 lbs., but 480 
were from long and 714 from short pieces. 
The forces were thus equal, except that 
Downie opposed 180 lbs. from long guns to 
182 from carronades ; as if 10 long i8's were 
opposed to ten 18-pound carronades. This 
would make the odds on their face about 10 
to 9 against the Americans ; in reality they 
were greater, for the possession of the Co7i- 
fiance was a very great advantage. The action 
is, as regards metal, the exact reverse of those 
between Chauncy and Yeo. Take, for exam- 
ple, the fight off Burlington on Sept. 28, 18 13. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 121 

Yeo's broadside was 1,374 lbs. to Chauncy's 
1,288 ; but whereas only 180 of Yeo's was from 
long guns, of Chauncy's but 536 was from 
carronades. Chauncy's fleet was thus much 
the superior. At least we must say this : if 
Macdonough beat merely an equal force, then 
Yeo made a most disgraceful and cowardly 
flight before an inferior foe ; but if we contend 
that Macdonough's force was inferior to that 
of his antagonist, then we must admit t4iat 
Yeo's was in like manner inferior to Chauncy's. 
These rules work both ways. The Conjiaiice 
was a heavier vessel than the Pike^ presenting 
in broadside one long 24- and three 32-pound 
carronades more than the latter. James (vol. 
vi, p. 355) says : "The Pike alone was nearly 
a match for Sir James Yeo's squadron," and 
Brenton says (vol. ii, 503): "The General 
Pike was more than a match for the whole 
British squadron. " Neither of these writers 
means quite as much as he says, for the logi- 
cal result would be that the Co7ifiance alone 
was a match for all of Macdonough's force. 
Still it is safe to say that the Pike gave Chauncy 
a great advantage, and that the Confia7ice 
made Downie's fleet much superior to Mac- 
donough's. 

Macdonough saw that the British would be 
forced to make the attack in order to get the 
control of the waters. On this long, narrow 
lake the winds usually blow pretty nearly 
north or south, and the set of the current is 
of course northward ; all the vessels, being flat 
and shallow, could not beat to windward well, 
so there was little chance of the British mak- 



122 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

ing the attack when there was a southerly 
wind blowing. So late in the season there 
was danger of sudden and furious gales, which 
would make it risky for Downie to wait out- 
side the bay till the wind suited him ; and 
inside the bay the wind was pretty sure to be 
light and baffling. Young Macdonough (then 
but 28 years of age) calculated all these 
chances very coolly and decided to await the 
attack at anchor in Plattsburg Bay, with the 
head of his line so far to the north that it 
could hardly be turned ; and then proceeded 
to make all the other preparations with the 
same foresight. Not only were his vessels 
provided with springs, but also with anchors 
to be used astern in any emergency. The 
Saratoga was further prepared for a change of 
wind, or for the necessity of winding ship, by 
having a kedge planted broad off on each of 
her bows, with a hawser and preventer hawser 
(hanging in bights under water) leading from 
each quarter to the kedge on that side. There 
had not been time to train the men thoroughly 
at the guns ; and to make these produce their 
full effect the constant supervision of the 
officers had to be exerted. The British were 
laboring under this same disadvantage, but 
neither side felt the want very much, as the 
smooth water, stationary position of the ships, 
and fair range, made the fire of both sides 
very destructive. 

Plattsburg Bay is deep and opens to the 
southward ; so that a wind which would enable 
the British to sail up the lake would force 
them to beat when entering the bay. The 



NAVAL WAR OF i8i2. 123 

east side of the mouth of the bay is formed 
by Cumberland Head ; the entrance is about 
a mile and a half across, and the other boun- 
dary, southwest from the Head, is an extensive 
shoal, and a small, low island. This is called 
Crab Island, and on it was a hospital and one 
six-pounder gun, which was to be manned in 
case of necessity by the strongest patients. 
Macdonough had anchored in a north-and- 
south line a little to the south of the outlet of 
the Saranac, and out of range of the shore 
batteries, being two miles from the western 
shore. The head of his line was so near Cum- 
berland Head that an attempt to turn it would 
place the opponent under a very heavy fire, 
while to the south the shoal prevented a flank 
attack. The Eagle lay to the north, flanked 
on each side by a couple of gunboats ; then 
came the Saratoga, with three gunboats be- 
tween her and the Ticonderoga, the next in 
line ; then came three gunboats and the 
Preble, The four large vessels were at anchor ; 
the galleys being under their sweeps and form- 
ing a second line about 40 yards back, some 
of them keeping their places and some not 
doing so. By this arrangement his line could 
not be doubled upon, there was not room to 
anchor on his broadside out of reach of his 
carronades, and the enemy was forced to at- 
tack him by standing in bows on. 

The morning of September nth opened 
with a light breeze from the northeast. 
Downie's fleet weighed anchor at daylight, 
and came down the lake with the wind nearly 
aft, the booms of the two sloops swinging out 



124 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

to starboard. At half-past seven, ^ the people 
in the ships could see their adversaries' upper 
sails across the norrow strip of land ending in 
Cumberland Head, before the British doubled 
the latter. Captain Downie hove to with his 
four large vessels when he had fairly opened 
the Bay, and waited for his galleys to overtake 
him. Then his four vessels filled on the star- 
board tack and headed for the American line, 
going abreast, the Chubb to the north, heading 
well to windward of the Eagle^ for whose bows 
the Linnet was headed, while the Confiance 
was to be laid athwart the hawse of the 
Saratoga ; the Finch was to leeward with the 
twelve gunboats, and was to engage the rear 
of the American line. 

As the English squadron stood bravely in, 
young Macdonough, who feared his foes not 
at all, but his God a great deal, knelt for a 
moment, with his officers, on the quarter-deck ; 
and then ensued a few minutes of perfect 
quiet, the men waiting with grim expectancy 
for the opening of the fight. The Eagle spoke 
first with her long i8's, but to no effect, for 
the shot fell short. Then, as the Zz>//z^/ passed 
the Saratoga^ she fired her broadside of long 
12's, but her shot also fell short, except one 
that struck a hen-coop which happened to be 
aboard the Saratoga. There was a game-cock 

1 The letters of the two commanders conflict a little 
as to time, both absolutely and relatively. Pring says 
the action lasted two hours and three quarters ; the 
American accounts, two hours and twenty minutes. 
Pring says it began at 8.00 ; Macdonough says a few 
minutes before nine, etc. I take the mean time. 



NAVAL WAR OF \%\2, 



125 



inside, and, instead of being frightened at his 
sudden release, he jumped up on a gun-slide, 
clapped his wings, and crowed lustily. The 
men laughed and cheered ; and immediately 
afterward Macdonough himself fired the first 
shot from one of the long guns. The 24- 
pound ball struck the Coti/iance near the 
hawse-hole and ranged the length of her deck, 
killing and wounding several men. All the 
American long guns now opened and were 
replied to by the British galleys. 

The Confiance stood steadily on without re- 
plying. But she was baffled by shifting winds, 
and was soon so cut up, having both her port 
bow-anchors shot away, and suffering much 
loss, that she was obliged to port her helm 
and come to while still nearly a quarter of a 
mile distant from the Saratoga. Captain 
Downie came to anchor in grand style, — se- 
curing everything carefully before he fired a 
gun, and then opening with a terribly de- 
structive broadside. The Chubb and Linnet 
stood farther in, and anchored forward the 
Eaglets beam. Meanwhile the Finch got 
abreast of the Ticonderoga, under her sweeps, 
supported by the gunboats. The main fight- 
ing was thus to take place between the vans, 
where the Eagle^ Saratoga^ and six or seven 
gunboats were engaged with the Chubby 
Linnet^ Confiajice^ and two or three gunboats ; 
while in the rear, the Ticonderoga, the Preble, 
and the other American galleys engaged the 
Finch and the remaining nine or ten English 
galleys. The battle at the foot of the line 
was fought on the part of the Americans to 



126 NAVAL WAR OF 1^12. 

prevent their flank being turned, and on the 
part of the British to effect that object. At 
first the fighting was at long range, but gradu- 
ally the British galleys closed up, firing very 
well. The American galleys at this end of 
the line were chiefly the small ones, armed 
with one 12-pounder apiece, and they by de- 
grees drew back before the heavy fire of their 
opponents. About an hour after the discharge 
of the first gun had been fired the Finch closed 
up toward the Ticonderoga^ and was completely 
crippled by a couple of broadsides from the 
latter. She drifted helplessly down the line 
and grounded near Crab Island ; some of the 
convalescent patients manned the six-pounder 
and fired a shot or two at her, when she struck, 
nearly half of her crew being killed or wounded. 
About the same time the British gunboats 
forced the Preble out of line, whereupon she 
cut her cable and drifted inshore out of the 
fight. Two or three of the British gunboats 
had already been sufficiently damaged by some 
of the shot from the Ticonderoga^ s long guns 
to make them wary; and the contest at this 
part of the line narrowed down to one between 
the American schooner and the remaining 
British gunboats, who combined to make a 
most determined attack upon her. So hastily 
had the squadron been fitted out that many 
of the matches for her guns were at the last 
moment found to be defective. The captain 
of one of the divisions was a midshipman, but 
sixteen years old, Hiram Paulding. When 
he found the matches to be bad he fired the 
guns of his section by having pistols flashed 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 127 

at them, and continued this through the whole 
fight. The Tkonderoga's commander, Lieut. 
Cassin, fought his schooner most nobly. He 
kept walking the taffrail amidst showers of 
musketry and grape, coolly, watching the 
movements of the galleys and directing the 
guns to be loaded with canister and bags of 
bullets, when the enemy tried to board. The 
British galleys were handled with determined 
gallantry, under the command of Lieutenant 
Bell. Had they driven off the Ticonderoga 
they would have won the day for their side, 
and they pushed up till they were not a 
boathook's length distant, to try to carry 
her by boarding; but every attempt was 
repulsed and they were forced to draw off, 
some of them so crippled by the slaughter 
they had suffered that they could hardly man 
the oars. 

Meanwhile the fighting at the head of the 
line had been even fiercer. The first broad- 
side of the Conjiance, fired from 16 long 24's, 
double shotted, coolly sighted, in smooth 
water, at point-blank range, produced the 
most terrible effect on the Saratoga. Her 
hull shivered all over with the shock, and 
when the crash subsided nearly half of her 
people were seen stretched on deck, for many 
had been knocked down who were not seri- 
ously hurt. Among the slain was her first 
lieutenant, Peter Gamble ; he was kneeling 
down to sight the bow-gun, when a shot en- 
tered the port, split the quoin, and drove a 
portion of it against his side, killing him with- 
out breaking the skin. The survivors carried 



128 NAVAL WAR OF i2>i2. 

on the fight with undiminished energy. Mac- 
donough himself worked like a common sailor, 
in pointing and handling a favorite gun. 
While bending over to sight it a round shot 
cut in two the spanker boom, which fell on 
his head and struck him senseless for two or 
three minutes ; he then leaped to his feet and 
continued as before, when a shot took off the 
head of the captain of the gun and drove it in 
his face with such a force as to knock him to 
the other side of the deck. But after the first 
broadside not so much injury was done ; the 
guns of the Confia7ice had been levelled to 
point-blank range, and as the quoins were 
loosened by the successive discharges they 
were not properly replaced, so that her broad- 
sides kept going higher and higher and doing 
less and less damage. Very shortly after the 
beginning of the action her gallant captain 
was slain. He was standing behind one of 
the long guns when a shot from the Saratoga 
struck it and threw it completely off the car- 
riage against his right groin, killing him almost 
instantly. His skin was not broken ; a black 
mark, about the size of a small plate, was the 
only visible injury. His watch was found 
flattened, with its hands pointing to the very 
second at which he received the fatal blow. 
As the contest went on the fire gradually de- 
creased in weight, the guns being disabled. 
The inexperience of both crews partly caused 
this. The American sailors overloaded their 
carronades so as to very much destroy the 
effect of their fire ; when the officers became 
disabled, the men would cram the guns with 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 129 

shot till the last projected from the muzzle. 
Of course, this lessened the execution, and 
also gradually crippled the guns. On board 
the Co7iJiance the confusion was even worse : 
after the battle the charges of the guns were 
drawn, and on the side she had fought one 
was found with a canvas bag containing two 
round of shot rammed home and wadded with- 
out any powder ; another with two cartridges 
and no shot ; and a third with a wad below 
the cartridge. 

At the extreme head of the line the advan- 
tage had been with the British. The Chubb 
and Li7i7iet had begun a brisk engagement 
with the Eagle and American gunboats. In 
a short time the CJmbb had her cable, bow- 
sprit, and main-boom shot away, drifted within 
the American lines, and was taken possession 
of by one of the Saratogas midshipmen. The 
Li7iiiet paid no attention to the American gun- 
boats, directing her whole fire against the 
Eagle, and the latter was, in addition, exposed 
to part of the fire of the Co7ifia7ice. After 
keeping up a heavy fire for a long time her 
springs were shot away, and she came up into 
the wind, hanging so that she could not return 
a shot to the well-directed broadsides of the 
Lin7ief. Henly accordingly cut his cable, 
started home his top-sails, ran down, and 
anchored by the stern between the inshore of 
the Co7ifia7ice and Tico7ideroga, from which 
position he opened on the Co7iJia7ice. The 
Linnet noyN directed her attention to the Amer- 
ican gunboats, which at this end of the line 
were very well fought, but she soon drove 

9 



130 NAVAL WAR OF 18 12. 

them off, and then sprung her broadside so as 
to rake the Saratoga on her bows. 

Macdonough by this time had his hands 
full, and his fire was slackening ; he was bear- 
ing the whole brunt of the action, with the 
frigate on his beam and the brig raking him. 
Twice his ship had been set on fire by the hot 
shot of the Conjiance ; one by one his long 
guns were disabled by shot, and his carronades 
were either treated the same way or else 
rendered useless by excessive overcharging. 
Finally but a single carronade was left in the 
starboard batteries, and on firing it the naval- 
bolt broke, the gun flew off the carriage and 
fell down the main hatch, leaving the Com- 
modore without a single gun to oppose to the 
few the Cojifiance still presented. The battle 
would have been lost had not Macdonough's 
foresight provided the means of retrieving it. 
The anchor suspended astern of the Saratoga 
was let go, and the men hauled in on the 
hawser that led to the starboard quarter, 
bringing the ship's stern up over the kedge. 
The ship now rode by the kedge and by a 
line that had been bent to a bight in the 
stream cable, and she was raked badly by the 
accurate fire of the Linnet. By rousing on 
the line the ship was at length got so far 
round that the aftermost gun of the port broad- 
side bore on the Conjiance. The men had 
been sent forward to keep as much out of 
harm's way as possible, and now some were 
at once called back to man the piece, which 
then opened with effect. The next gun was 



NAVAL WAR OF \Z\2. 



131 



treated in the same manner ; but the ship now 
hung and would go no farther round. The 
hawser leading from the port quarter was then 
got forward under the bows and passed aft to 
the starboard quarter, and a minute afterward 
the ship's whole port battery opened with 
fatal effect. The Conjiance meanwhile had 
also attempted to round. Her springs, like 
those of the Linnet^ were on the starboard side, 
and so of course could not be shot away as 
the Eaglets were ; but, as she had nothing but 
springs to rely on, her efforts did little beyond 
forcing her forward, and she hung with her 
head to the wind. She had lost over half of 
her crew,* most of her guns on the engaged 
side were dismounted, and her stout masts 
had been splintered till they looked like 
bundles of matches ; her sails had been torn 
to rags, and she was forced to strike, about 
two hours after she had fired the first broad- 
side. Without pausing a minute XhQ Saratoga 
again hauled on her starboard hawser still her 
broadside was sprung to bear on the Linnet^ 
and the ship and brig began a brisk fight, 
which the Eagle from her position could take 
no part in, while the llconderoga was just 
finishing up the British galleys. The shattered 
and disabled state of the Lmnefs masts, sails, 
and yards precluded the most distant hope of 
Capt. Pring's effecting his escape by cutting 
his cable ; but he kept up a most gallant fight 

1 Midshipman Lee, in his letter already quoted, says 
" not five men were left unhurt " ; this would of course 
include bruises, etc., as hurts. 



132 NAVAL WAR OF 18 12. 

with his greatly superior foe, in hopes that 
some of the gunboats would come and tow 
him off, and despatched a lieutenant to the 
Conjiance to ascertain her state. The lieu- 
tenant returned with news of Capt. Downie's 
death, while the British gunboats had been 
driven half a mile off; and, after having main- 
tained the fight single-handed for fifteen 
minutes, until, from the number of shot be- 
tween wind and water, the water had risen a 
foot above her lower deck, the plucky little 
brig hauled down her colors, and the fight 
ended, a little over two hours and a half after 
the first gun had been fired. Not one of the 
larger vessels had a mast that would bear 
canvas, and the prizes were in a sinking con- 
dition. The British galleys drifted to leeward, 
none with their colors up ; but as the Sara- 
toga's boarding-officer passed along the deck 
of the Co7ifia7ice he accidentally ran against a 
lock-string of one of her starboard guns,^ and 
it went off. This was apparently understood 
as a signal by the galleys, and they moved 
slowly off, pulling but a very few sweeps, and 
not one of them hoisting an ensign. 

On both sides the ships had been cut up in 
the most extraordinary manner ; the Saratoga 
had 55 shot-holes in her hull, and the Conji- 
afice 105 in hers, and the Eagle and Liiinet 
had suffered in proportion. The number of 
killed and wounded cannot be exactly stated ; 



^ A sufficient commentary, by the way, on James' as- 
sertion that the guns of the Conjiance had to be fired 
by matches, as the gun-locks did not fit ! 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 



^ZZ 



it was probably about 200 on the American 
side, and over 300 on the British.' 

Captain Macdonough at once returned the 
British officers their swords. Captain Bring 

■^ Macdonough returned his loss as follows : 





Killed. 


Wounded 


Saratoga^ 


28 


29 


Eagle, 


13 


20 


Ticonderoga, 





6 


Preble, 


2 




Boxer, 


3 


I 


Cetitlpede, 




I 


Wilfuer, 




I 



A total of 52 killed and 58 wounded ; but the latter 
had apparently only included those who had to go to 
the hospital. Probably about 90 additional were more 
or less slightly wounded. Captain Pring, in his letter 
of Sept. 1 2th, says the Coitfiance had 41 killed and 40 
wounded; the Linnet, 10 killed and 14 wounded; 
the Chubb, 6 killed and 16 wounded; the Finch, 2 
wounded : in all, 57 killed and 72 wounded. But 
he adds " that no opportunity has offered to mus- 
ter * * * tjjjg is the whole as yet ascertained to be 
killed or wounded." The Americans took out 180 
dead and wounded from the Confiance, 50 from the 
Linnet, and 40 from the Chubb and Finch ; in all, 270. 
James (" Naval Occurrences," p. 412) says the Coti- 
fia7ice had 83 wounded. As Captain Pring wrote his 
letter in Plattsburg Bay the day after the action, he of 
course could not give the loss aboard the British gun- 
boats ; so James at once assumed that they suffered 
none. As well as could be found out they had between 
50 and 100 killed and wounded. The total British loss 
was between 300 and 400, as nearly as can be ascer- 
tained. For this action, as already shown, James is of 
no use whatever. Compare his statements, for ex- 
ample, with those of Midshipman Lee, in the " Naval 
Chronicle." The comparative loss, as a means of test- 
ing the competitive prowess of the combatants, is not 
of much consequence in this case, as the weaker party 
in point of force conquered. 



134 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 



writes : " I have much satisfaction in making 
you acquainted with the humane treatment 
the wounded have received from Commodore 
Macdonough ; they were immediately re- 
moved to his own hospital on Crab Island, 
and furnished with every requisite. His gen- 
erous and polite attention to myself, the 
officers, and men, will ever hereafter be grate- 
fully remembered. The effects of the victory 
were immediate and of the highest importance. 
Sir George Prevost and his army at once fled 
in great haste and confusion back to Canada, 
leaving our northern frontier clear for the re- 
mainder of the war ; while the victory had a 
very great effect on the negotiations for peace. 
In this battle the crews on both sides be- 
haved with equal bravery, and left nothing to 
be desired in this respect ; but from their raw- 
ness they of course showed far less skill than 
the crews of most of the American and some 
of the British ocean cruisers, such as the 
Constitution, United States, or Shajinon, the 
Hornet, Wasp, or Reindeer. Lieut. Cassin 
handled the Ticonderoga, and Captain Pring 
the Linnet, with the utmost gallantry and skill, 
and, after Macdonough, they divided the 
honors of the day. But Macdonough in this 
battle won a higher fame than any other com- 
mander of the war, British or American. He 
had a decidedly superior force to contend 
against, the officers and men of the two sides 
being about on a par in every respect ; and it 
was solely owing to his foresight and resource 
that we won the victory. He forced the 
British to engage at a disadvantage by his 



NAVAL WAR OF 1^12. 



135 



excellent choice of position ; and he prepared 
beforehand for every possible contingency. 
His personal prowess had already been shown 
at the cost of the rovers of Tripoli, and in 
this action he helped fight the guns as ably as 
the best sailor. His skill, seamanship, quick ' 
eye, readiness of resource, and indomitable 
pluck, are beyond all praise. Down to the' 
time of the Civil War he is the greatest figure/ 
in our naval history. A thoroughly religious 
man, he was as generous and humane as he 
was skilful and brave ; one of the great- 
est of our sea-captainSj he has left a stainless 
name behind him. 

BRITISH LOSS. 



Name. 


Tons. 


Guns. 


1 


Remarks. 
Burnt by 
Lieut, Gregory. 


Brig, 


100 


10 


Magnet, 


187 


12 


Burnt by her crew, 


Black Snake^ 


30 


I 




Captured. 


Gunboat, 


50 


2 




(( 


(( 


50 


3 




w 


Confiatice^ 


1,200 


37 




u 


Linnety 


350 


16 




u 


Chubby 


112 


II 




u 


Finch 


IIO 


II 
103 




a 


9 vessels, 


2,189 






AMERICAN 


LOSS. 




Name. 


Tons. 


Guns. 




Remarks. 


Growhry 


8i 


7 




Captured. 


Boat, 


50 


2 




a 


Tigress^ 




I 




M 


Scorpion^ 


86 


2 




(( 


Ohio, 


94 


I 




M 


Somers, 


98 


2 




M 



6 vessels, 



505 



15 



136 NAVAL WAR OF i2>i2. 



CHAPTER III. 

1815. 

CONCLUDING OPERATIONS. 

Presideiit captured by Captain Hayes' squadron- 
Successful cutting-out expeditions of the Americans — 
Privateer brig Chassetir captures St. Lawrence schooner 
— ConstitiUio7t captures Cyane and Leva}it — Escapes 
from a British squadron — The Hornet captures the 
Penguin, and escapes from a 74 — The Peacock and the 
Natitihis — Summary — Remarks on the war — Tables of 
comparative loss, etc. — Compared with results of 
Anglo-French struggle. 

THE treaty of peace between the United 
States and Great Britain was signed at 
Ghent, Dec. 24, 18 14, and ratified at Washing- 
ton, Feb. 18, 18 15. But during these first two 
months of 1815, and until the news reached 
the cruisers on the ocean, the warfare went on 
with much the same characteristics as before. 
The blockading squadrons continued standing 
on and off before the ports containing war- 
ships with the same unwearying vigilance ; but 
the ice and cold prevented any attempts at 
harrying the coast except from the few frigates 
scattered along the shores of the Carolinas 
and Georgia. There was no longer any for- 
midable British fleet in the Chesapeake or 
Delaware, while at New Orleans the only 
available naval force of the Americans con- 



NAVAL WAR OF i8l2. 137 

sisted of a few small row-boats, with which 
they harassed the rear of the retreating 
British. The Constitution, Capt. Stewart, was 
already at sea, having put out from Boston on 
the 17th of December, while the blockading 
squadron (composed of the same three frigates 
she subsequently encountered) was tempo- 
rarily absent. 

The Hornet, Capt. Biddle, had left the port 
of New London, running in heavy weather 
through the blockading squadron, and had 
gone into New York, w^here the President^ 
Commodore Decatur, and Peacock, Capt. 
Warrington, with the Tovi Bowline brig were 
already assembled, intending to start on a 
cruise for the East Indies. The blockading 
squadron off the port consisted of the 56-gun 
razee Majestic^ Capt. Hayes, 24-pounder frig- 
ate Endyjnion, Capt. Hope, i8-pounder frigate 
Pomofie, Capt. Lumly, and i8-pounder frigate 
Tenedos^ Capt. Parker.^ On the 14th of Janu- 
ary a severe snow-storm came on and blew 
the squadron off the coast. Next day it 
moderated, and the ships stood off to the 
northwest to get into the track which they 
supposed the Americans would take if they 
attempted to put out in the storm. Singularly 
enough, at the instant of arriving at the in- 
tended point, an hour before daylight on the 
15th, Sandy Hook bearing W. N. W. 15 
leagues, a ship was made out, on the Majesties 
weather-bow, standing S. E.'' This ship was 
the unlucky Presidefif, On the evening of 

1 Letter of Rear-Admiral Hotham, Jan. 23, 181 5. 

2 Letter of Capt. Hayes, Jan. 17, 1815. 



138 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

the 14th she had left her consorts at anchor, 
and put out to sea in the gale. But by a mis- 
take of the pilots who were to place boats to 
beacon the passage the frigate struck on the 
bar, where she beat heavily for an hour and a 
half,^ springing her masts and becoming very 
much hogged and twisted.'^ Owing to the 
severity of her injuries the President would 
have put back to port, but was prevented by 
the westerly gale.^ Accordingly, Decatur 
steered at first along Long Island, then 
shaped his course to the S. E., and in the 
dark ran into the British squadron, which, 
but for his unfortunate accident, he would thus 
have escaped. At daylight, the Fresidenty 
which had hauled up and passed to the north- 
ward of her opponents,* found herself with 
the Majestic 2ir\d Endyjniojt astern, the Fomo?ia 
on the port, and the Te?iedos on the starboard 
quarter.^ The chase now became very inter- 
esting.^ During the early part of the day, 
while the wind was still strong, the Majestic 
led the Endymion and fired occasionally at the 
President, but without effect.' The Pomona 
gained faster than the others, but by Capt. 
Hayes' orders was signalled to go in chase of 
the Tenedos, whose character the captain could 
not make out; ® and this delayed her several 

^ Letter of Commodore Decatur, Jan. 18, 1815. 

2 Report of Court-martial, Alex. Murray presiding, 
April 20, 181 5. 

3 Decatur's letter, Jan. i8th. 
* Decatur's letter, Jan. i8th. 

5 James, vi, 529. ^ Letter of Capt. Hayes. 

' Letter of Commodore Decatur. 
® James, vi, 529. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 



139 



hours in the chase. ^ In the afternoon, the 
wind coming out light and baffling, the Endym- 
1071 left the Majestic behind,'^ and, owing to 
the Presidenfs disabled state and the amount 
of water she made in consequence of the in- 
juries received while on the bar, gained rap- 
idly on her,' although she lightened ship and 
did everything else that was possible to im- 
prove her sailing/ But a shift of wind helped 
the E?tdy?mo?iJ' and the latter was able at 
about 2.30, to begin skirmishing with her 
bow-chasers, answered by the stern-chasers 
of the President At 5.30 the Efidymion be- 
gan close action,^ within half point-blank shot 
on the Presidenfs starboard quarter,^ where 
not a gun of the latter could bear.' The 
President continued in the same course, steer- 
ing east by north, the wind being northwest, 
expecting the Endymion soon to come up 
abeam ; but the latter warily kept her position 
by yawing, so as not to close.'" So things 
continued for half an hour during which the 
Presidejtt suffered more than during all the 
remainder of the combat.'^ At 6.00 the 
President kept off, heading to the south, and 
the two adversaries ran abreast, the Amer- 
icans using the starboard and the British the 
port batteries.''^ Decatur tried to close with 

1 Log of Pofnone, published at Bermuda, Jan. 29th, 
and quoted in full in the " Naval Chronicle," xxxiii, 370. 

2 Letter of Captain Hayes. ^ Letter of Decatur. 
* Letter of Decatur. 6 Cooper, ii, 466. 

^ Log of Pomone. 

' Letter of Capt. Hayes. ^ James, vi, 1:30, 
^ Letter of Decatur. 1^ Letter of D*ecatur. 

11 Cooper, 470. 12 Log of Pomone. 



I40 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

his antagonist, but whenever he hauled nearer 
to the latter she hauled off ' and being the 
swiftest ship could of course evade him ; so 
he was reduced to the necessity of trying to 
throw her out of the combat ^ by dismantling 
her. He was completely successful in this, 
and after two hours' fighting the Endymion' s 
sails were all cut from her yards ^ and she 
dropped astern, the last shot being fired from 
the President. "" The Eiidyniio7i was now 
completely silent." Commodore Decatur did 
not board her merely because her consorts 
were too close astern ; ^ accordingly the Pres- 
ident hauled up again to try her chances at 
running, having even her royal studding-sails 
set,' and exposed her stern to the broadside 
of the E7idyi7iio7i^ but the latter did not fire a 
single gun." Three hours afterward, at 11,^" 
the Po7?io7ie caught up with the P7'eside7it, and 
luffing to port gave her the starboard broad- 
side; " the Te7iedos being two cables' length's 
distance astern, taking up a raking position. ^^ 
The Po77i07ie poured in another broadside, 
within musket shot,^' when the Preside7it sur- 
rendered and was taken possession of by 
Capt. Parker of the Te7iedos^^ A consider- 

1 Report of Court-martial. 

2 Letter of Commodore Decatur. 

3 Letter of Capt. Hayes. * Log of Pomone. 

^ Log of Pomone. ^ Report of Court-martial. 

"^ James, vi, 538. 

8 Letter of Commodore Decatur. 

^ Log of the Pomone. 

1*^ Letter of Capt. Hayes. ^^ Log of the Pomone. 
12 Decatur's letter. ^^ Log of Pomone. 

1^ James, vi, 531. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 141 

able number of the Presidenfs people were 
killed by these two last broadsides/ The 
EndymiojiyN'^'^ at this time out of sight astern.' 
She did not come up, according to one ac- 
count, for an hour and three-quarters,^ and 
according to another, for three hours ; ' and 
as she was a faster ship than the President, 
this means that she was at least two hours 
motionless repairing damages. Commodore 
Decatur delivered his sword to Capt. Hayes 
of the Majestic, who returned it, stating in his 
letter that both sides had fought with great 
gallantry/ The Preside7it\i2iVmg been taken 
by an entire squadron," the prize-money was 
divided equally among the ships.' The 
Preside?ifs crew all told consisted of 450 men,® 
none of whom were British.^ She had thus 
a hundred more men than her antagonist and 
threw about 100 pounds more shot at a broad- 
side ; but these advantages were more than 
counterbalanced by the injuries received on 
the bar, and by the fact that her powder was 
so bad that while some of the British shot 
went through both her sides, such a thing did 
not once happen to the Eiidymion,^^ when 

1 Letter of Commodore Decatur, March 6, 1815; 
deposition of Chaplain Henry Robinson before Admi- 
ralty Court at St Georges, Bermuda, Jan. 181 5. 

2 Letter of Decatur, Jan. iSth. ^ Log of Pomone. 
* Letter of Decatur, Mar. 6th. 

^ Letter of Capt. Hayes. 
^ Admiral Hotham's letter, Jan. 23d. 
' Bermuda " Royal Gazette," March 8, 18 15. 
8 Depositions of Lieut. Gallagher and the other 
officers. 

^ Deposition of Commodore Decatur. 
10 Bermuda " Royal Gazette," Jan. 6, 1818. 



142 NAVAL WAR OF i?>i2. 

fairly bulled. The President lost 24 killed 
and 55 wounded;^ the Endymion, 11 killed 
and 14 wounded." Two days afterward, on 
their way to the Bermudas, a violent easterly 
gale came on, during which both ships were 
dismasted, and the Efidymion in addition had 
to throw over all her spar-deck guns.^ 

As can be seen, almost every sentence of 
this account is taken (very nearly word for 
word) from the various official reports, relying 
especially on the log of the British frigate 
Pomoiie. I have been thus careful to have 
every point of the narrative established by 
^mimpeachable reference : first, because there 
have been quite a number of British histori- 
ans who have treated the conflict as if it were 
a victory and not a defeat for the Eiidymion ; 
and in the second place, because I regret to 
say that I do not think that the facts bear out 
the assertions, on the part of most Americaii 
authors, that Commodore Decatur "covered 
himself with glory " and showed the " utmost 
heroism." As regards the first point. Captain 
Hope himself, in his singularly short official 
letter, does little beyond detail his own loss, 
and makes no claim to having vanquished his 
opponent. Almost all the talk about its being 
a " victory " comes from James ; and in re- 
counting this, as well as all the other battles, 
nearly every subsequent British historian 
simply gives James' statements over again, 
occasionally amplifying, but more often alter- 

1 Decatur's letter. 

2 Letter of Capt. Hope, Jan. 15, 181 5. 
8 James, vi, 534. 



NAVAL WAR OF iSi2. 



143 



ing or omitting, the vituperation. The point 
at issue is simply this : could a frigate which, 
according to James himself, went out of action 
with every sail set, take another frigate which 
for two hours, according to the log of the 
Ponione^ lay motionless and unmanageable on 
the waters, without a sail ? To prove that it 
could not, of course, needs some not over- 
scrupulous manipulation of the facts. The 
intention with which James sets about his 
work can be gathered from the triumphant 
conclusion he comes to, that Decatur's name 
has been " sunk quite as low as that of Bain- 
bridge or Porter," which, comparing small 
things to great, is somewhat like saying that 
Napoleon's defeat by Wellington and Blucher 
"sunk" him to the level of Hannibal. For 
the account of the American crew and loss, 
James relies on the statements made in the 
Bermuda papers, of whose subsequent forced 
retraction he takes no notice, and of course 
largely overestimates both. On the same 
authority he states that the Preside?ifsfire. was 
"silenced," Commodore Decatur stating the 
exact reverse. The point is fortunately set- 
tled by the log of the Ponione, which distinctly 
says that the last shot was fired by the 
President. His last resort is to state that the 
loss of the President was fourfold (in reality 
threefold) that of the Endymion. Now we 
have seen that the President lost " a consider- 
able number ^' of men from the fire of the 
Pomone. Estimating these at only nineteen, 
we have a loss of sixty caused by the E?i- 
dymion, and as most of this was caused during 



144 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

the first half hour, when the Presideiit was not 
firing, it follows that while the two vessels 
weve both fighting, broadside and broadside, 
the loss inflicted was about equal ; or, the 
President, aiming at her adversary's rigging, 
succeeded in completely disabling her, and 
incidentally killed 25 men, while the En- 
dymion, did not hurt the Fresident's rigging at 
all, and, aiming at her hull, where, of course, 
the slaughter 07ight to have been far greater than 
when the fire was directed aloft, only killed 
about the same number of men. Had there 
been no other vessels in chase. Commodore 
Decatur, his adversary having been thus ren- 
dered perfectly helpless, could have simply 
taken any position he chose and compelled 
the latter to strike, without suffering any ma- 
terial additional loss himself. As in such a 
case he would neither have endured the un- 
answered fire of the E?idy7nion on his quarter 
for the first half hour, nor the subsequent 
broadsides of the Fomone, the Fresidenfs loss 
would probably have been no greater than 
that of the Constitution in taking '<i\\^ Java. It 
is difficult to see how any outsider with an 
ounce of common-sense and fair-mindedness 
can help awarding the palm to Decatur, as 
regards the action with the Endymion. But I 
regret to say that I must agree with James 
that he acted rather tamely, certainly not 
heroically, in striking to the Foinofie. There 
was, of course, not much chance of success 
in doing battle with two fresh frigates ; but 
then they only mounted eighteen-pounders, 
and, judging from the slight results of the 



NAVAL WAR OF i2>i2. 145 

cannonading from the Endymion and the two 
first (usually the most fatal) broadsides of the 
Poino7ie, it would have been rather a long time 
before they would have caused much damage. 
Meanwhile the President was pretty nearly as 
well off as ever as far as fighting and sailing 
went. A lucky shot might have disabled one 
of her opponents, and then the other would, 
in all probability, have undergone the same 
fate as the Endymion. At least it was well 
worth trying, and though Decatur could not 
be said to be disgraced, yet it is excusable to 
wish that Porter or Perry had been in his 
place. It is not very pleasant to criticise the 
actions of an American whose name is better 
known than that of almost any other single- 
ship captain of his time ; but if a man is as 
much to be praised for doing fairly, or even 
badly, as for doing excellently, then there is 
no use in bestowing praise at all. 

This is perhaps as good a place as any other 
to notice one or two of James' most common 
misstatements ; they really would not need 
refutation were it not that they had been re- 
echoed, as usual, by almost every British his- 
torian of the war for the last 60 years. In the 
first place, James puts the number of the 
President's men of 475 ; she had 450. An 
exactly parallel reduction must often be made 
when he speaks of the force of an American 
ship. Then he says there were many British 
among them, which is denied under oath by 
the American officers; this holds good also 
for the other American frigates. He says 
there were but 4 boys, there were nearly 30 ; 
10 



146 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

and on p, 120 he says the youngest was 14, 
whereas we incidentally learn from the '' Life of 
Decatur " that several were under 12. A fa- 
vorite accusation is that the American midship- 
men were chiefly masters and mates of mer- 
chant-men ; but this was hardly ever the case. 
Many of the midshipmen of the war after- 
ward became celebrated commanders, and 
most of these (a notable instance being Far- 
ragut, the greatest admiral since Nelson) were 
entirely too young in 18 12 to have had vessels 
under them, and, moreover, came largely from 
the so-called " best families." 

Again, in the first two frigate actions of 
18 1 2, the proportion of killed to wounded 
happened to be unusually large on board the 
American frigates ; accordingly James states 
(p. 146) that the returns of the wounded had 
been garbled, under-estimated, and made 
" subservient to the views of the commanders 
and their government." To support his posi- 
tion that Capt. Hull, who reported 7 killed 
and 7 wounded, had not given the list of the 
latter in full, he says that " an equal number 
of killed and wounded, as given in the Amer- 
ican account, hardly ever occurs, except in 
cases of explosion " ; and yet, on p. 519, he 
gives the loss of the British Hermes as 25 
killed and 24 wounded, disregarding the in- 
congruity involved. On p. 169, in noticing 
the loss of the Ufiited States, 5 killed and 7 
wounded, he says that *' the slightly wounded 
as in all other American cases, are omitted." 
This is untrue, and the proportion on the 
United States, 5 to 7, is just about the same 



NAVAL WAR 6>^ 1812. 147 

as that given by James himself on the Endym- 
ion, II to 14, and Nautilus^ 6 to 8. In sup- 
porting his theory, James iDrings up all the 
instances where the American wounded bore 
a larger proportion to their dead than on 
board the British ships, but passes over the 
actions with the Reindeer, Epervier, Penguin^ 
Endymion, and Boxer, where the reverse was 
the case. One of James' most common 
methods of attempting to throw discredit on 
the much vilified " Yankees " is by quoting 
newspaper accounts of their wounded. Thus 
he says (p. 562) of the Hornet, that several of 
her men told some of the Penguin^s sailors 
that she lost 10 men killed, 16 wounded, etc. 
Utterly false rumors of this kind were as 
often indulged in by the Americans as the 
British. After the capture of the President 
articles occasionally appeared in the papers 
to the effect that some American sailor had 
counted " 2;^ dead " on board the Endymion, 
that " more than 50 " of her men were 
wounded, etc. Such statements were as com- 
monly made and with as little foundation by 
one side as by the other, and it is absurd for 
a historian to take any notice of them. James 
does no worse than many of our own writers 
of the same date; but while their writings 
have passed into oblivion, his work is still 
often accepted as a standard. This must be 
my apology for devoting so much time to it. 
The severest criticism to which it can possibly 
be subjected is to compare it with the truth. 
Whenever dealing with purely American 
affairs, James' history is as utterly untrust- 



148 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

worthy as its contemporary, " Niles' Register," 
is in matters purely British, while both are 
invaluable in dealing with things relating 
strictly to their own nation ; they supplement 
each other. 

On Jan. 8th General Packenham was de- 
feated and killed by General Jackson at New 
Orleans, the Louisiana and the seamen of the 
Carolina having their full share in the glory 
of the day, and Captain Henly being among 
the very few American wounded. On the 
same day Sailing-master Johnson, with 28 
men in two boats, cut out the British- armed 
transport brig Cyprus, containing provisions 
and munitions of war, and manned by ten 
men.' On the i8th the British abandoned the 
enterprise and retreated to their ships ; and 
Mr. Thomas Shields, a purser, formerly a 
sea-officer, set off to harass them while em- 
barking. At sunset on the 20th he left with 
five boats and a gig, manned in all with 53 
men, and having under him Sailing-master 
Daily and Master's Mate Boyd.' At ten 
o'clock p. M. a large barge, containing 14 sea- 
men and 40 officers and men of the 14th Light 
Dragoons, was surprised and carried by board- 
ing after a slight struggle. The prisoners 
out-numbering their captors, the latter re- 
turned to shore, left them in a place of safety, 
and again started at 2 a. m. on the morning 
of the 22d. Numerous transports and barges 

1 Letter of Sailing-master Johnson, Jan. 9, 181 5. 

2 Letter of Thomas Shields to Com. Patterson, Jan. 
25, 1815. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1^12. 149 

of the enemy could be seen, observing very 
little order and apparently taking no pre- 
cautions against attack, which they probably 
did not apprehend. One of the American 
boats captured a transport and five men ; 
another, containing Mr. Shields himself and 
eight men, carried by boarding, after a short 
resistance, a schooner carrying ten men. The 
flotilla then re-united and captured in succes- 
sion, with no resistance, five barges contain- 
ing 70 men. By this time the alarm had 
spread and they were attacked by six boats, 
but these were repelled with some loss. 
Seven of the prisoners (who were now half as 
many again as their captors) succeeded in 
escaping in the smallest prize. Mr. Shields re- 
turned with the others, 78 in number. During 
the entire expedition he had lost but three 
men, wounded; he had taken 132 prisoners, 
and destroyed eight craft whose aggregate 
tonnage about equalled that of the five gun- 
vessels taken on Lake Borgne. 

On Jan. 30, 1815, information was received 
by Captain Dent, commanding at North 
Edisto, Ga., that a party of British officers 
and men, in four boats belonging to H. M. S. 
Hebrus, Capt. Palmer, were watering at one 
of the adjacent islands.' Lieut. Lawrence 
Kearney, with three barges containing about 
75 men, at once proceeded outside to cut them 
off, when the militia drove them away. The 
frigate was at anchor out of gunshot, but as 

1 Letter of Lawrence Kearney of Jan. 30, 181 5 (see 
in the Archives at Washington, " Captains' Letters,** 
vol. 42, No. 100). 



ISO 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 



soon as she perceived the barges began firing 
^uns as signals. The British on shore left in 
such a hurry that they deserted their launch, 
•which, containing a 12-pound boat carronade 
and six swivels, was taken by the Americans. 
The other boats — two cutters, and a large 
tender mounting one long nine and carrying 
30 men — made for the frigate ; but Ijeut. 
Kearney laid the tender aboard and captured 
her after a sharp brush. The cutters were 
only saved by the fire of the Hebrus^ which 
v/as very well directed — one of her shot taking 
off the head of a man close by Lieut. Kearney. 
The frigate got under way and intercepted 
Kearney's return, but the Lieutenant then 
made for South Edisto, whither he carried his 
prize in triumph. This was one of the most 
daring exploits of the war, and was achieved 
at very small cost. On Feb. 14th a similar 
feat was performed. Lieutenant Kearney 
had manned the captured launch with 25 men 
and the 12-pound carronade. News was re- 
ceived of another harrying expedition under- 
taken by the British, and Captain Dent, with 
seven boats, put out to attack them, but was 
unable to cross the reef. Meanwhile Kear- 
ney's barge had gotten outside, and attacked 
the schooner Bra7it, a tender to H. M. S. 
Severn^ mounting an i8-pounder, and with a 
crew of two midshipmen, and twenty-one 
marines and seamen. A running fight began, 
the Brant evidently fearing that the other 
boats might get across the reef and join in the 
attack ; suddenly she ran aground on a sand- 
bank, which accident totally demoralized her 



NAVAL WAR OF i8i2. 151 

crew. Eight of them escaped in her boat, to 
the frigate ; the remaining fifteen, after firing 
a few shot, surrendered and were taken pos- 
session of.^ 

I have had occasion from time to time to 
speak of cutting-out expeditions, successful 
and otherwise, undertaken by British boats 
against American privateers ; and twice a 
small British national cutter was captured by 
an overwhelmingly superior American op- 
ponent of this class. We now, for the only 
time, come across an engagement between a 
privateer and a regular cruiser of approxi- 
mately equal force. These privateers came 
from many different ports and varied greatly 
in size. Baltimore produced the largest num- 
ber ; but New York, Philadelphia, Boston, 
and Salem, were not far behind ; and Charles- 
ton, Bristol, and Plymouth, supplied some 
that were very famous. Many were merely 
small pilot-boats with a crew of 20 to 40 men, 
intended only to harry the West Indian trade. 
Others were large, powerful craft, unequalled 
for speed by any vessels of their size, which 
penetrated to the remotest corners of the 
ocean, from Man to the Spice Islands. When 
a privateer started she was overloaded with 

1 Letter of Captain Dent, Feb. i6th (in "Captains* 
Letters," vol. 42, No. 130). Most American authors, 
headed by Cooper, give this exploit a more vivid color- 
ing by increasing the crew of the Brant to forty men, 
omitting to mention that she was hard and fast aground, 
and making no allusion to the presence of the five other 
American boats which undoubtedly caused the Branfs 
flight in the first place. 



152 AVAL WAR OF \'^\2. 

men, to enable her to man her prizes ; a suc- 
cessful cruise would reduce her crew to a fifth 
of its original size. The favorite rig was that 
of a schooner, but there were many brigs and 
brigantines. Each was generally armed with 
a long 24 or 32 on a pivot, and a number of 
light guns in broadside, either long 9's or short 
i8's or 12's. Some had no pivot gun, others 
had nothing else. The largest of them carried 
17 guns (a pivotal 32 and 16 long 12's in 
broadside) with a crew of 150. Such a vessel 
ought to have been a match, at her own dis- 
tance, for a British brig-sloop, but w'e never 
hear of any such engagements, and there were 
several instances where privateers gave up, 
without firing a shot, to a force superior, it is 
true, but not enough so to justify the absolute 
tameness of the surrender.^ One explanation 
of this was that they were cruising as private 
ventures, and their object was purely to cap- 
ture merchantmen with as little risk as possible 
to themselves. Another reason was that they 
formed a Jcind of sea-militia, and, like their 
compeers on land, some could fight as well as 
any regulars, while most w^ould 7iot^^\. at all, 
especially if there was need of concerted action 
between two or three. The American papers 
of the day are full of " glorious victories " 
gained by privateers over packets and India- 
men ; the British papers are almost as full of 
instances where the packets and Indiamen 

1 As when the Epervier^ some little time before her 
own capture, took without resistance the Alfred^ of 
Salem, mounting 16 long nines and having 108 men 
aboard. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 153 

" heroically repulsed " the privateers. As 
neither side ever chronicles a defeat, and as 
the narration is apt to be decidedly figurative 
in character, there is very little hope of get- 
ting at the truth of such meetings ; so I have 
confined myself to the mention of those cases 
where privateers, of either side, came into 
armed collision with regular cruisers. We 
are then sure to find some authentic account. 
The privateer brig Chasseur, of Baltimore, 
Captain Thomas Boyle, carried 16 long 12's, 
and had, when she left port, 115 men aboard. 
She made 18 prizes on her last voyage, and 
her crew was thus reduced to less than 80 
men ; she was then chased by the Batvssa 
frigate, and threw overboard 10 of her long 
12's. Afterward eight 9-pound carronades 
were taken from a prize, to partially supply 
the places of the lost guns ; but as she had no 
shot of the calibre of these carronades each of 
the latter was loaded with one 4-pound and one 
6-pound ball, giving her a broadside of 76 lbs. 
On the 26th of February, two leagues from 
Havana, the Chasseur fell in witli the British 
schooner St. Lawrence, Lieut. H. C. Gordon, 
mounting twelve 12-pound carronades, and 
one long 9 ; her broadside was thus 81 lbs., 
and she had between 60 and 80 men aboard.' 

1 Letter of Captam Thomas Boyle, of March 2, 181 5 
(see Niles and Coggeshall) ; he says the schooner had 
two more carronades ; I have taken the number given 
by James (p. 539). Captain Boyle says the St. Lawrence 
had on board 89 men and several more, includmg a 
number of soldiers and marines and gentlemen of the 
navy, as passengers ; James says her crew amounted 
to 51 " exclusive of some passengers," which I suppose 



154 NAVAL WAR OF l^ii. 

The Chasseur mistook the St. Lawrence for a 
merchant-man and closed with her. The mis- 
take was discovered too late to escape, even 
had such been Captain Boyle's intention, and 
a brief but bloody action ensued. At 1.26 
p. M., the St. Lawre7ice fired the first broad- 
side, within pistol shot, to which the Chasseur 
replied with her great guns and musketry. 
The brig then tried to close, so as to board ; 
but having too much way on, shot ahead un- 
der the lee of the schooner, which put her 
helm up to wear under the Chasseur's stern. 
Boyle, however, followed his antagonist's ma- 
noeuvre, and the two vessels ran along side by 
side, the St. Lawrence drawing ahead, while 
the firing was very heavy. Then Captain 
Boyle put his helm a starboard and ran his foe 
aboard, when in the act of boarding, her colors 
were struck at 1.41 p. m., 15 minutes after the 
first shot. Of the Chasseur's crew 5 were 
killed and 8 wounded, including Captain Boyle 
slightly. Of the St. Lawrence's crew 6 were 
killed and 17 (according to James 18) 
wounded. This was a very creditable action. 
The *S'/. Lawrence had herself been an Amer- 
ican privateer, called \\i^ Atlas, and was of 241 
tons, or just 36 less than the Chasseur. The 
latter could thus fairly claim that her victory 
was gained over a regular cruiser of about her 
own force. Captain Southcombe of the Lot- 
tery^ Captain Reid of the General Armstrong, 

must mean at least nine men. So the forces were 
pretty equal ; the Chasseur may have had 20 men more 
or 10 men less than her antagonist, and she threw 
from 5 to 21 lbs. less weight of shot. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 155 

Captain Ordronaux of the Neufchatel, and 
Captain Boyle of tlie Chasseur^ deserve as 
much credit as any regularly commissioned 
sea-officers. But it is a mistake to consider 
these cases as representing the average; an 
ordinary privateer was, naturally enough, no 
match for a British regular cruiser of equal 
force. The privateers were of incalculable 
benefit to us, and inflicted enormous damage 
on the foe ; but in fighting they suffered under 
the same disadvantages as other irregular 
forces ; they were utterly unreliable. A really 
brilliant victory would be followed by a most 
extraordinary defeat. 

After the Constitution had escaped from 
Boston, as I have described, she ran to the 
Bermudas, cruised in their vicinity a short 
while, thence to Madeira, to the Bay of Biscay, 
and finally off Portugal, cruising for some time 
in sight of the Rock of Lisbon. Captain 
Stewart then ran off southwest, and on Feb. 
20th, Madeira bearing W. S. W. 60 leagues,^ 
the day being cloudy, with a light easterly 
breeze,^ at i p. m. a sail was made two points 
on the port bow ; and at 2 p. m.. Captain 
Stewart, hauling up in chase, discovered an- 
other sail. The first of these was the frigate- 
built ship corvette Cya7ie, Captain Gordon 
Thomas Falcon, and the second was the ship 
sloop Levant, Captain the Honorable George 
Douglass.* Both were standing close hauled 

^ Letter of Captain Stewart to the Secretary of the 
Navy, May 20, 181 5. 

2 Log of Constittitiofi, Feb. 20, 1815. 
8 " Naval Chronicle," xxxiii, 466. 



156 NAVAL WAR OF i8l2. 

on the starboard tack, the sloop about 10 
miles to leeward of the corvette. At 4 p. m. 
the latter began making signals to her consort 
that the strange sail was an enemy, and then 
made all sail before the wind to join the sloop. 
The Co7istitutio?i bore up in chase, setting her 
top-mast, top-gallant, and royal studding- 
sails. In half an hour she carried away her 
main royal mast, but immediately got another 
prepared, and at 5 o'clock began firing at the 
corvette with the two port-bow guns ; as the 
shot fell short the firing soon ceased. At 5.30 
the Cyane got within hail of the Levaftt, and 
the latter's gallant commander expressed to 
Captain Gordon his intention of engaging the 
American frigate. The two ships accordingly 
hauled up their courses and stood on the star- 
board tack; but immediately afterward their 
respective captains concluded to try to delay 
the action till dark, so as to get the advantage 
of manoeuvring.^ Accordingly they again set 
all sail and hauled close to the wind to en- 
deavor to weather their opponent ; but finding 
the latter coming down too fast for them to 
succeed, they again stripped to fighting can- 
vas and formed on the starboard tack in head 
and stern line, the Levant about a cable's 
length in front of her consort. The American 
now had them completely under her guns and 
showed her ensign, to which challenge the 
British ships replied by setting their colors. 
At 6.10 the Constitutioft r^iug^d up to wind- 
ward of the Cya7ie and Leva?tt, the former on 
her port quarter the latter on her port bow, 
1 " Naval Chronicle," xxxiii, 466. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 157 

both being distant about 250 yards from her ^ 
— so close that the American marines were 
constantly engaged almost from the beginning 
of the action. The fight began at once, and 
continued with great spirit for a quarter of an 
hour, the vessels all firing broadsides. It was 
now moonlight, and an immense column of 
smoke formed under the lee of the Constitu- 
tion^ shrouding from sight her foes ; and, as 
the fire of the latter had almost ceased, Cap- 
tain Stewart also ordered his men to stop, so 
as to find out the positions of the ships. In 
about three minutes the smoke cleared, dis- 
closing to the Americans the Levant dead to 
leeward on the port beam, and the Cya7ie 
luffing up for their port quarter. Giving a 
broadside to the sloop, Stewart braced aback 
his main and mizzen top-sails, with top-gallant 
sails set, shook all forward, and backed rapidly 
astern, under cover of the smoke, abreast the 
corvette, forcing the latter to fill again to 
avoid being raked. The firing was spirited 
for a few minutes, when the Cyane's almost 
died away. The Levant bore up to wear round 
and assist her consort, but the Constitution 
filled her top-sails, and, shooting ahead, gave 

1 Testimony sworn to by Lieutenant W. B. Shubrick 
and Lieutenant of Marines Archibald Henderson be- 
fore Thomas Welsh, Jr., Justice of the Peace, Suffolk 
St., Boston, July 20, 181 5. The depositions were taken 
in consequence of a report started by some of the 
British journals that the action began at a distance of 
1^ of a mile. All the American depositions were that 
all three ships began firing at once, when equidistant 
from each other about 250 yards, the marines being en- 
gaged almost the whole time. 



158 NAVAL WAR OF id,i2. 

her two stern rakes, when she at once made 
all sail to get out of the combat. The Cyane 
was now discovered wearing, when the Con- 
stitution herself at once wore and gave her in 
turn a stern rake, the former luffing to and 
firing her port broadside into the starboard 
bow of the frigate. Then, as the latter ranged 
up on her port quarter, she struck, at 6.50, 
just forty minutes after the beginning of the 
action. She was at once taken possession of, 
and Lieut. Hoffman, second of the Constitu- 
tion, was put in command. Having manned 
the prize. Captain Stewart, at 8 o'clock, filled 
away after her consort. The latter, however, 
had only gone out of the combat to refit 
Captain Douglass had no idea of retreat, and 
no sooner had he rove new braces than he 
hauled up to the wind, and came very gallantly 
back to find out his friend's condition. At 
8.50 he met the Cofistitution, and^, failing to 
weather her, the frigate and sloop passed each 
other on opposite tacks, exchanging broad- 
sides. Finding her antagonist too heavy, the 
Levant then crowded all sail to escape, but was 
soon overtaken by the Constitutio7i, and at 
about 9.30 the latter opened with her star- 
board bow-chasers, and soon afterward the 
British captain hauled down his colors. Mr. 
Ballard, first of the Constitution, was afterward 
put in command of the prize. By one o'clock 
the ships were all in order again. 

The Co7istitutio7i had been hulled eleven 
times, more often than in either of her pre- 
vious actions, but her loss was mainly due to 
the grape and musketry of the foe in the be- 



NAVAL IVAR OF 1812. 



159 



ginning of the fight/ The British certainly 
fired better than usual, especially considering 
the fact that there was much manoeuvrins". 
and that it was a night action. The Americans 
lost 3 men killed, 3 mortally, and 9 severely 
and slightly, wounded. The corvette, out of her 
crew of 180, had 12 men killed and 26 wounded, 
several mortally; the sloop, out of 140, had 
7 killed and 16 wounded. The Constitution 
had started on her cruise very full-handed, 
with over 470 men, but several being absent 
on a prize, she went into battle with about 
450.^ The prizes had suffered a good deal in 
their hulls and rigging, and had received some 
severe wounds in their masts and principal 
spars. The Cyane carried on her main deck 
twenty-two 32-pound carronades, and on her 
spar deck two long 12's and ten i8-pounder 
carronades. The Lmant carried, all on one 
deck, eighteen 32-pound carronades and two 
long 9's, together with a shifting 12-pounder. 
Thus, their broadside weight of metal was 763 
pounds, with a total of 320 men, of whom 61 
fell, against the Constitution^ s 704 pounds and 
450 men, of whom 15 were lost; or, nom- 
inally, the relative force was 100 to 91, and 
the relative loss 100 to 24. But the British 
guns were almost exclusively carronades, 
which, as already pointed out in the case of 
the Essex and in the battle off Plattsburg, are 
no match for long guns. Moreover, the scant- 

1 Deposition of her officers as before cited. 

2 410 officers and seamen, and 41 marines, by her 
muster-roll of Feb. 19th. (The muster-rolls are pre- 
served in the Treasury Department at Washington.) 



l6o NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

ling of the smaller ships was, of course, by no 
means as stout as that of the frigate, so that 
the disparity of force was much greater than 
the figures would indicate, although not enough 
to account for the difference in loss. Both 
the British ships were ably handled, their fire 
was well directed, and the Levant in especial 
was very gallantly fought. 

As regards the Co?istitufio?i, "her manoeu- 
vring was as brilliant as any recorded in naval 
annals," and it would have been simply im- 
possible to surpass the consummate skill with 
which she was handled in the smoke, always 
keeping her antagonists to leeward, and, while 
raking both of them, not being once raked 
herself. The firing was excellent, considering 
the short time the ships were actually engaged, 
and the fact that it was at night. Altogether 
the fight reflected the greatest credit on her, 
and also on her adversaries.^ 

1 There is no British ofificial account of the action. 
James states that the entire British force was only 302 
men of whom 1 2 were killed and 29 wounded. This is 
probably not based on any authority. Captain Stewart 
received on board 301 prisoners, of whom 42 were 
wounded, several mortally. Curiously enough James 
also underestimates the American loss, making it only 
12. He also says that many attempts were made by 
the Americans to induce the captured British to desert, 
while the Constitution''?, officers deny this under oath, 
before Justice Welsh, as already quoted, and state that, 
on the contrary, many of the prisoners offered to enlist 
on the frigate, but were all refused permission — as 
" the loss of the Chesapeake had taught us the danger 
of having renegades aboard." This denial, by the way, 
holds good for all the similar statements made by 
James as regards the Gtierriere, Macedonian, etc. He 
also states that a British court-martial found various 



NAVAL WAR C/^ 1812. 16 1 

The merits of this action can perhaps be 
better appreciated by comparing it with a 
similar one that took place a few years before 
between a British sloop and corvette on the 
one side, and a French frigate on the other, 
and which is given in full by both James and 
Troude. Although these authors differ some- 



\ 



6.05 P.M 








CYANE 

'^,6.05 



what in the account of it, both agree that the 
Frenchman, the Nereide^ of 44 guns, on Feb. 
14, 1810, fought a long and indecisive battle 
with the Rai7ibow of 26 and Avo7i of 18 guns, 
the British sloops being fought separately, in 
succession. The relative force was almost 
exactly as in the Constitution'' s fight. Each 

counts against the Americans for harsh treatment, but 
all of these were specifically denied by the American 
officers, under oath, as already quoted. 

I have relied chiefly on Captain Stewart's narrative ; 
but partly (as to time, etc.) on the British account in 
the " Naval Chronicle." 
II 



i62 NAVAL WAR OF iSi2. 

side claimed that the other fled. But this 
much is sure : the Cojistitution engaging the 
Cyane and Levant together, captured both ; 
while the Nereide, engaging the Rai?ibow and 
Avon separately, captured neither. 

The three ships now proceeded to the Cape 
de Verds, and on March loth anchored in the 
harbor of Porto Praya, Island of San Jago. 
Here a merchant-brig was taken as a cartel, 
and a hundred of the prisoners were landed 
to help fit her for sea. The next day the 
weather was thick and foggy, with fresh 
breezes.^ The first and second lieutenants, 
with a good part of the people, were aboard 
the two prizes. At five minutes past twelve, 
while Mr. Shubrick, the senior remaining 
lieutenant, was on the quarter-deck, the can- 
vas of a large vessel suddenly loomed up 
through the haze, her hull being com- 
pletely hidden by the fog-bank. Her char- 
acter could not be made out ; but she was 
sailing close-hauled, and evidently making for 
the roads. Mr. Shubrick at once went down 
and reported the stranger to Captain Stewart, 
when that officer coolly remarked that it was 
probably a British frigate or an Indiaman, 
and directed the lieutenant to return on deck, 
call all hands, and get ready to go out and 
attack her.^ At that moment the canvas of 
two other ships was discovered rising out of 
the fog astern of the vessel first seen. It was 
now evident that all three were heavy frigates.' 

1 Log of Constitution^ March ii, 1815. 

2 Cooper, ii, 459. 

3 Letter of Lieutenant Hoffman, April 10, 181 5. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1^12. 165 

In fact they were the Newcastle, 50, Captain 
Lord George Stewart ; Leande?', 50, Captain 
Sir Ralph Collier, K. C. B., and Acasta, 40, 
Captain Robert Kerr, standing into Porto 
Praya, close-hauled on the starboard tack, the 
wind being light northeast by north/ Capt. 
Stewart at once saw that his opponents were 
far too heavy for a fair light, and, knowing 
that the neutrality of the port would not be 
the slightest protection to him, he at once sig- 
nalled to the prizes to follow, cut his cable, 
and, in less than ten minutes from the time 
the first frigate was seen, was standing out of 
the roads, followed by Hoffman and Ballard. 
Certainly a more satisfactory proof of the 
excellent training of both officers and men 
could hardly be given than the rapidity, skill, 
and perfect order with which everything was 
done. Any indecision on the part of the 
officers or bungling on the part of the men 
would have lost everything. The prisoners 
on shore had manned a battery and. delivered 
a furious but ill-directed fire at their retreating 
conquerors. The frigate, sloop, and corvette, 
stood out of the harbor in the order indicated, 
on the port tack, passing close under the east 
point, and a gunshot to windward of the Brit- 
ish squadron, according to the American, or 
about a league, according to the British, ac- 
counts. The Americans made out the force 
of the strangers correctly, and their own force 
was equally clearly discerned by the Acasta; 
but both the Nrducastle and Leafider mistook 
the Cyane and Lei'ant for frigates, a mistake 
1 Marshall's '* Naval Biography," ii, 535. 



i64 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

similar to that once made by Commodore 
Rodgers. The Constitution now crossed her 
top-gallant yards and set the foresail, main- 
sail, spanker, flying jib, and top-gallant sails ; 
and the British ships, tacking, made all sail 
in pursuit. The Newcastle was on the Consti- 
tution's lee quarter and directly ahead of the 
Leajider, while the Acasia was on the weather- 
quarter of the Netvcastle. All six ships were 
on the port tack. The Constitution cut adrift 
the boats towing astern, and her log notes that 
at 12.50 she found she was sailing about as 
fast as the ships on her lee quarter, but that 
the ^r<7>s-/(^ was luffing into her wake and drop- 
ping astern. The log of the Acasta says : 
" We had gained on the sloops, but the frigate 
had gained on us.' At i.io the Cyane had 
fallen so far astern and to leeward that Cap- 
tain Stewart signalled to Lieutenant Hoffman 
to tack, lest he should be cut off if he did not. 
Accordingly the lieutenant put about and ran 
off toward the northwest, no notice being 
taken of him by the enemy beyond an inef- 
fectual broadside from the sternmost frig- 
ate. At 2.35 he was out of sight of all the 
ships and shaped his course for America, 
which he reached on April loth.* At 1.45 the 
Newcastle opened on the Constitution firing by 
divisions, but the shot all fell short, according 
to the American statements, about 200 yards, 
while the British accounts (as given in Mar- 
shall's " Naval Biography ") make the distance 
much greater; at any rate the vessels were so 
near that from the Constitution the officers of 
1 Letter of Lieutenant Hoffman, April 10, 1815. 



NAVAL WAR OF iSi2. 165 

the Newcastle could be seen standing on the 
hammock nettings. But, very strangely, both 
the 50-gun ships apparently still mistook the 
Levant^ though a low, flush-decked sloop like 
the Hornet^ for the " F^-esident, Congress^ or 
Macedoniafi,'^ Captain Collier believing that 
the Constitution had sailed with two other 
frigates in company/ By three o'clock the 
Levant had lagged so as to be in the same 
position from which the Cyane had just been 
rescued ; accordingly Captain Stewart sig- 
nalled to her to tack, which she did, and im- 
mediately afterward all three British ships 
tacked in pursuit. Before they did so, it must 
be remembered the Acasta had vv^eathered on 
the Constitution^ though left considerably 
astern, while the Newcastle and Leander had 
about kept their positions on her lee or star- 
board quarter ; so that if any ship had been 
detached after the Le^^ant it should have been 
the Leander^ which had least chance of over- 
taking the American frigate. The latter was 
by no means as heavily armed as either of 
the two 50's, and little heavier than the 
Acasta ; moreover, she was shorthanded, 
having manned her two prizes. The Acasta, 
at any rate, had made out the force of the 
Levant, and, even had she been a frigate, it 
was certainly carrying prudence to an extreme 
to make more than one ship tack after her. 
Had the Newcastle and Acasta kept on after 
the Constitution there was a fair chance of 
overtaking her, for the Acasta had weathered 
on her, and the chase could not bear up for 
1 Marshall, ii, 533. 



i66 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

fear of being cut off by the Newcastle. At any 
rate the pursuit should not have been given 
up so early. Marshall says there was a mistake 
in the signaling. The British captains certainly- 
bungled the affair; even James says (p. 558): 
" It is the most blundering piece of business 
recorded in these six volumes." As for 
Stewart and his men, they deserve the highest 
credit for the cool judgment and prompt, skil- 
ful seamanship they had displayed. The 
Constitution^ having shaken off her pursuers, 
sailed to Maranham, where she landed her 
prisoners. At Porto Rico she learned of the 
peace, and forthwith made sail for New York, 
reaching it about the middle of May. 

As soon as he saw Captain Stewart's signal, 
Lieutenant Ballard had tacked, and at once 
made for the anchorage at Porto Prayo, 
which he reached, though pursued by all his 
foes, and anchored within 150 yards of a 
heavy battery.^ The wisdom of Captain 
Stewart's course in not trusting to the neu- 
trality of the port, now became evident. The 
Acasta opened upon the sloop as soon as the 
latter had anchored, at 4.30.^ The Newcastle, 
as soon as she arrived, also opened, and so 
did the Leander^ while the British prisoners 
on shore fired the guns of the battery. Hav- 
ing borne this combined cannonade for 15 
minutes,3 the colors of the Levant were hauled 
down. The unskilful firing of the British 
ships certainly did not redeem the blunders 

1 Letter of Lieutenant Ballard, May 2, 181 5. 

2 Neivcastle^s log, as given by Marshall and James. 

3 Ballard's letter. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1^12. 167 

previously made by Sir George Collier, for 
the three heavy frigates during 15 minutes' 
broadside practice in smooth water against a 
stationary and unresisting foe, did her but 
little damage, and did not kill a man. The 
chief effect of the fire was to damage the 
houses of the Portuguese town. ^ 

After the capture of the President, the Pea- 
cock, Captain Warrington, the Hornet, Captain 
Biddle, and Tom Bowline, brig, still remained 
in New York harbor. On the 22d of January 
a strong northwesterly gale began to blow, 
and the American vessels, according to their 
custom, at once prepared to take advantage 
of the heavy weather and run by the block- 
aders. They passed the bar by daylight, un- 
der storm canvas, the British frigates lying to 
in the southeast being plainly visible. They 
were ignorant of the fate of the President, and 
proceeded toward Tristan d'Acunha, which 
was the appointed rendezvous. A few days 
out the Hornet parted company from the two 
others ; these last reached Tristan d'Acunha 
about March i8th, but were driven off again 
by a gale. The Hornet reached the island on 
the 23d, and at half-past ten in the morning, 
the wind being fresh S. S. W.^ when about to 
anchor off the north point, a sail was made in 
the southeast, steering west.^ This was the 
British brig-sloop Penguin, Captain James 
Dickenson. She was a new vessel, having 

1 James, vi, 551. 

2 Letter from Captain Biddle to Commodore Deca- 
tur, Mar. 25, 181 5. 



l68 NAVAL WAR OF iZj2. 

left port for the first time in September, 1814. 
While at the Cape of Good Hope she had 
received from Vice- Admiral Tyler 12 marines 
from the Medway, 74, increasing her com- 
plement to 132 ; and was then despatched on 
special service against a heavy American 
privateer, the Young Wasp, which had been 
causing great havoc among the homeward- 
bound Indiamen. 

When the strange sail was first seen Captain 
Biddle was just letting go his top-sail sheets ; 
he at once sheeted them home, and, the 
stranger being almost instantly shut out by 
the land, made all sail to the west, and again 
caught sight of her. Captain Dickenson 
now, for the first time, saw the American 
sloop, and at once bore up for her. The 
position of the two vessels was exactly the 
reverse of the Wasp and F7'olic, the English- 
man being to windward. The Hornet hove 
to, to let her antagonist close ; then she filled 
her maintop-sail and continued to yaw, wear- 
ing occasionally to prevent herself from being 
raked. At forty minutes past one the Fe7igui7i^ 
being within musket-shot, hauled to the wind 
on the starboard tack, hoisted a St. George's 
ensign and fired a gun. The Hornet luffed 
up on the same tack, hoisting American 
colors, and the action began with heavy 
broadsides. The vessels ran along thus for 
15 minutes, gradually coming closer together, 
and Captain Dickenson put his helm aweather, 
to run his adversary aboard. At this mo- 
ment the brave young officer received a mortal 
wound, and the command devolved on the 



NAVAL WAR OF jZi2. 169 

first lieutenant, Mr. jMcDonald, who endeav- 
ored very gallantly to carry out his com- 
mander's intention, and at 1.56 the Pe7igui7i's 
bowsprit came in between the Horiiet's main- 
and mizzen-rigging on the starboard side. 
The American seamen had been called away, 
and were at their posts to repel boarders, but 
as the British made no attempt to come on, 
the cutlass men began to clamber into the 
rigging to go aboard the brig. Captain Bid- 
die very coolly stopped them, " it being evi- 
dent from the beginning that our fire was 
greatly superior both in quickness and effect." 
There was a heavy sea running, and as the 
Hornet forged ahead, the Pe7iguiii's bowsprit 
carried away her mizzen shrouds, stern davits, 
and spanker boom ; and the brig then hung 
on her starboard quarter, where only small 
arms could be used on either side. An Eng- 
lish officer now called out something which 
Biddle understood, whether correctly or not 
is disputed, to be the word of surrender ; ac- 
cordingly he directed his marines to cease 
firing, and jumped on the taffrail. At that 
minute two of the marines on the Peiiguiii's 
forecastle, not 30 feet distant, fired at him, 
one of the balls inflicting a rather severe 
wound in his neck. A discharge of musketry 
from the Hornet at once killed both the ma- 
rines, and at that moment the ship drew 
ahead. As the vessels separated the Peii. 
guin's foremast went overboard, the bowsprit 
breaking short off. The Hornet at once wore,^ 
to present a fresh broadside, while the Pe?u 
guilt's disabled condition prevented her follow- 



lyo 



NAVAL WAR OF 1Z12. 



ing suit, and having lost a third of her men killed 
and wounded (14 of the former and 28 of the lat- 
ter), her hull being riddled through and through, 
her foremast gone, main-mast tottering, and 
most of the guns on the engaged side dis- 
mounted, she struck her colors at two minutes 
past two, twenty-two minutes after the first gun 
was fired. Of the Hor?iefs 150 men, 8 were ab- 
sent in a prize. By actual measurement she was 
two feet longer and slightly narrower than her 



PMMSUIlf 




^-S?2> 



2.02 »ORmT 



antagonist. Her loss was chiefly caused by- 
musketry, amounting to i marine killed, i 
seaman mortally, Lieutenant Conner very 
severely, and Captain Biddle and 7 seamen 
slightly, wounded. Not a round shot struck 
the hull, nor was a mast or spar materially 
injured, but the rigging and sails were a good 
deal cut, especially about the fore and main 
top-gallant masts. The Hornefs crew had 
been suffering much from sickness, and 9 of 
the men were unable to be at quarters, thus 



NAVAL WAR OF i8l2. 171 

reducing the vessels to an exact equality. 
Counting in these men, and excluding the 8 
absent in a prize, we get as 

COMPARATIVE FORCE. 

Weight 

Tonnage. No. Guns. Metal. Crew. Loss. 

Hornet 480 10 279 142I 11 

Pengzcin 477 10 274 132 42 

Or, the force being practically equal, the 
Hor7iet inflicted fourfold the loss and tenfold 
the damage she suffered. Hardly any action 
of the war reflected greater credit on the 
United States marine than this : for the cool, 

1 This number of men is probably too great ; I have 
not personally examined the Hornefs muster-roll for 
that period. Lieutenant Emmons in his " History," 
gives her 132 men; but perhaps he did not include the 
nine sick, which would make his statement about the 
same as mine. In response to my inquiries, I received 
a very kind letter from the Treasury Department 
(Fourth Auditor's office), which stated that the muster- 
roll of the Hornet on this voyage showed " loi officers 
and crew (marines excepted.") Adding the 20 marines 
would make but 121 in all. I think there must be some 
mistake in this, and so have considered the Hornet^ s 
crew as consisting originally of 150 men, the same as 
on her cruises in 181 2. 

The Penguin was in reality slightly larger than the 
Hornet, judging from the comparisons made in Biddle's 
letter (for the original of which see in the Naval Ar- 
chives, " Captains' Letters," vol 42, No. 112). He says 
that the Penguin, though two feet shorter on deck than 
the Hornet, had a greater length of keel, a slightly 
greater breadth of beam, stouter sides, and higher bul- 
warks, with swivels on the capstan and tops, and that 
she fought both her "long 12's " on the same side. I 
have followed James, however, as regards this ; he says 
her long guns were 6-pounders, and that but one was 
fought on a side. 



172 VAVAL WAR OF id>i2. 

skilful seamanship and excellent gunnery that 
enabled the Americans to destroy an antago- 
nist of equal force in such an exceedingly short 
time. The British displayed equal bravery, 
but were certainly very much behind their an- 
tagonists in the other qualities which go to 
make up a first-rate man-of-warsman. Even 
James says he '^ cannot offer the trifling dis- 
parity of force in this action as an excuse for 
the Fengniii's capture. The chief cause is 
* * * the immense disparity between the two 
vessels in * * * the effectiveness of their 
crews." ^ 

1 After the action but one official account, that of 
Captain Biddle, was published ; none of the letters of 
the defeated British commanders were published after 
1813. As regards this action, every British writer has 
followed James, who begins his account thus : " Had 
the vessel in sight to windward been rigged with three 
masts instead of two, and had she proved to be a 
British cruiser. Captain Biddle would have marked her 
down in his log as a ' frigate,' and have made off with 
all the canvas he could possibly spread. Had the ship 
overtaken the Hornet zx\^di been in reality a trifle superior 
in force, Captain Biddle, we have no doubt, would have 
exhausted his eloquence in lauding the blessings of 
peace before he tried a struggle for the honors of war." 
After this preface (which should be read in connection 
with the Horjiefs unaccepted challenge to the Bonne 
Citoyenne, a ship " a trifle superior in force ") it can be 
considered certain that James will both extenuate and 
also set down a good deal in malice. One instance of 
this has already been given in speaking of the Presi- 
defifs capture. Again, he says, " the Hornet received 
several round shot in her hull," which she did — a month 
after this action, from the Comwallis, 74 ; James knew 
perfectly well that not one of the Penguin^ s shot hit the 
Hornefs hull. The quotations I have given are quite 
enough to prove that nothing he says about the action 
is worth attending to. The funniest part of his ac- 



NAVAL WAR OF id>i2. 173 

The Pengjdn was so cut up by shot that she 
had to be destroyed. After the stores, etc., 
had been taken out of her, she was thoroughly 
examined (Captain Biddle, from curiosity, 
taking her measurements in comparison with 
those of the Horiiet^ Her destruction was 
hastened on account of a strange sail heaving 
in sight ; but the latter proved to be the 
Peacock^ with the Tom Bowline in company. 
The latter was now turned to account by 
being sent in to Rio de Janeiro as a cartel 
with the prisoners. The Peacock and Hornet 
remained about the Island till April 13th, and 
then, giving up all hopes of seeing the Presi- 
dent, and rightly supposing she had been 
captured, started out for the East Indies. 
On the 27th of the month, in lat. '^'^° 30' S. and 
long. 33° E.,^ the Peacock signalled a stranger 
in the S. E., and both sloops crowded sail in 
chase. The next morning they came down 
with the wind aft from the northwest, the 
studding-sails set on both sides. The new 22- 
gun sloops were not only better war-vessels, 
but faster ones too, than any other ships of 
their rate ; and the Peacock hy afternoon was 
two leagues ahead of the Hor?iet. At 2 p. m. 
the former was observed to manifest some 
hesitation about approaching the stranger, 
which instead of avoiding had rather hauled 

count is where he makes Captain Biddle get drunk, 
lose his " native cunnmg," and corroborate his (James), 
statements. He does not even hint at the authority 
for this. 

1 Letter of Captain Biddle, June loth, and extracts 
from her log. 



174 



NAVAL WAR OF iZi2. 



up toward them. All on board the Hornet 
thought her an Indiaman, and " the men 
began to wonder what they would do with the 
silks," when, a few minutes before four, the 
Peacock signalled that it was a line-of-battle 
ship, which reversed the parts with a venge- 
ance. Warrington's swift ship was soon out 
of danger, while Biddle hauled close to the 
wind on the port tack, with the Cornwallis, 
74, bearing the flag of Admiral Sir George 
Burleton, K. C. B.,' in hot pursuit, two leagues 
on his lee quarter. The 74 gained rapidly on 
the Horfiet, although she stopped to pick up 
a marine who had fallen overboard. Finding 
he had to deal with a most weatherly craft, 
as well as a swift sailer, Captain Biddle, at 9 
p. M., began to lighten the Hornet of the mass 
of stores taken from the Penguin. The Corn- 
wallis gained still, however, and at 2 a. m. on 
the 29th was ahead of the Hornefs lee or star- 
board beam, when the sloop put about and 
ran off toward the west. Daylight showed the 
74 still astern and to leeward, but having 
gained so much as to be within gunshot, and 
shortly afterward she opened fire, her shot 
passing over the Hornet. The latter had re- 
course anew to the lightening process. She 
had already hove overboard the sheet-anchor, 
several heavy spare spars, and a large quan- 
tity of shot and ballast ; the remaining an- 
chors and cables, more shot, six guns, and 
the launch now followed suit, and, thus re- 
lieved, the Hornet passed temporarily out of 
danger ; but the breeze shifted gradually 
1 James vi, 564. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 175 

round to the east, and the liner came looming 
up till at noon she was within a mile, a shorter 
range than that at which the United States 
crippled and cut up the Macedonian ; and had 
the CornwalUs^ fire been half as well aimed as 
that of the States, it would have been the last 
of the Hornet. But the 74's guns were very 
unskilfully served, and the shot passed for 
the most part away over the chase, but three 
getting home. Captain Biddle and his crew 
had no hope of ultimate escape, but no one 
thought of giving up. All the remaining 
spare spars and boats, all the guns but one, 
the shot, and in fact everything that could be 
got at, below or on deck, was thrown over- 
board. This increased the way of the Hornet, 
while the Corjiwallis lost ground by hauling 
off to give broadsides, which were as ineffect- 
ual as the fire from the chase-guns had been. 
The Hornet now had gained a little, and man- 
aged to hold her own, and shortly afterward 
the pluck and skill of her crew * were re- 
warded. The shift in the wind had been 
very much against them, but now it veered 
back again so as to bring them to windward ; 
and every minute, as it blew fresher and 
fresher, tlieir chances increased. By dark the 
Cornwallis was well astern, and during the 
night the wind kept freshening, blowing in 
squalls, which just suited the Hornet, and 

1 It is perhaps worth noting that the accounts in- 
cidentally mention the fact that almost the entire crew 
consisted of native Americans, of whom quite a number 
had served as impressed seamen on board British war: 
ships. James multiplies these threefold and sets them, 
down as British. 



176 NAVAL WAR OF 181 2. 

-when day broke the liner was hull down 
astern. Then, on the morning on the 30th, 
after nearly 48 hours' chase, she abandoned 
the pursuit. The Hornet was now of course 
no use as a cruiser, and made sail for New 
York, which she reached on June 9th. This 
chase requires almost the same comments as 
the last chase of the Constitiitio?i. In both 
cases the American captains and their crews 
deserve the very highest praise for plucky, 
skilful seamanship ; but exactly as Stewart's 
coolness and promptitude might not have 
saved the Constitution had it not been for the 
blunders made by his antagonists, so the 
Hornet would have assuredly been taken, in 
spite of Biddle's stubbornness and resource, 
if the Cor7iwallis had not shown such unskil- 
ful gunnery, which was all the more discredit- 
able since she carried an admiral's flag. 

The Peacock was thus the only one left of 
the squadron originally prepared for the East 
Indies ; however, she kept on, went round 
the Cape of Good Hope, and cruised across 
the Indian Ocean, capturing 4 great India- 
men, very valuable prizes, manned by 291 
men. Then she entered the Straits of Sunda, 
and on the 30th of June, off the fort of Anjier 
fell in with the East India Company's cruiser 
Nautilus, Lieut. Boyce, a brig of 180 (Ameri- 
can measurement over 200) tons, with a crew 
of 80 men, and 14 guns, 4 long 9's and ten 
18-pound carronades.' Captain Warrington 

1 " History of the Indian Navy," by Charles Rath- 
bone Low (late lieutenant of the Indian Navy), London, 
1877, p. 285. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1^12. lyj 

did not know of the peace ; one of the boats 
of the Nautilus, however, with her purser, 
Mr. Bartlett, boarded him. Captain Warring- 
ton declares the latter made no mention of 
the peace, while Mr. Bartlett swears that he 
did before he was sent below. As the Pea- 
cock approached, Lieut. Boyce hailed to ask 
if she knew peace had been declared. Cap- 
tain Warrington, according to his letter, re- 
garded this as a ruse to enable the brig to 
escape under the guns of the fort, and corn- 
manded the lieutenant to haul down his 
colors, which the latter refused to do, and 
very gallantly prepared for a struggle with a 
foe of more than twice his strength. Accord- 
ing to Captain Warrington, one, or, by the 
deposition of Mr. Bartlett,' two broadsides 
were then interchanged, and the brig sur- 
rendered, having lost 7 men, including her 
first lieutenant, killed and mortally wounded, 
and 8 severely or slightly wounded. Two of 
her guns and the sheet-anchor were disabled, 
the bends on the starboard side completely 
shivered from aft to the forechains, the bul- 
warks from the chess-tree aft much torn, and 
the rigging cut to pieces.'* The Peacock did 
not suffer the slightest loss or damage. Re- 
garding the affair purely as a conflict between 
vessels of nations at war with each other, the 
criticism made by Lord Howard Douglass on 
the action between the Presidcfit and Little 
Pelt applies here perfectly. " If a vessel 

1 As quoted by Low, 

2 Letter of Lieut. Boyce to Company's Marine Board, 
as quoted by Low. 

12 



178 I^AVAL WAR OF i2>i2. 

meet an enemy of even greatly superior force, 
it is due to the honor of her flag to try the 
effect of a few rounds ; but unless in this 
gallant attempt she leave marks of her skill 
upon the larger body, while she, the smaller 
body, is hit at every discharge, she does but 
salute her enemy's triumph and discredit her 
own gunnery." ^ There could not have been 
a more satisfactory exhibition of skill than 
that given by Captain Warrington ; but I re- 
gret to say that it is difficult to believe he 
acted with proper humanity. It seems im- 
possible that Mr. Bartlett did not mention 
that peace had been signed ; and when the 
opposing force was so much less than his 
own it would have been safe at least to defer 
the order " haul down your flag " for a short 
time, while he could have kept the brig with- 
in half pistol-shot, until he could have in- 
quired into the truth of the report. Through- 
out this work I have wherever possible 
avoided all references to the various accusa- 
tions and recriminations of some of the cap- 
tains about "unfairness," "cruelty," etc., as 
in most cases it is impossible to get at the 
truth, the accounts flatly contradicting one 
another. In this case, however, there cer- 
tainly seems some ground for the rather fer- 
vent denunciations of Captain Warrington 
indulged in by Lieut. Low. But it is well to 
remember that a very similar affair, with the 
parties reversed, had taken place but a few 
months before on the coast of America. This 
was on Feb. 2 2d, after the boats of the Erebus^ 
1 " Naval Gunnery," p, 3. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1Z12. 179 

20, and Primrose 18, under Captains Barthol- 
omew and Phillot, had been beaten off with 
a loss of 30 men (including both captains 
wounded), in an expedition up St. Mary's 
River, Ga. The two captains and their ves- 
sels then joined Admiral Cockburn at Cum- 
berland Island, and on the 25th of February 
were informed officially of the existence of 
peace. Three weeks afterward the American 
gunboat. No. 168, Mr. Hurlburt, sailed from 
Tybee Bar, Ga., bearing despatches for the 
British admiral.' On the same day in the 
afternoon she fell in with the Erebus, Captain 
Bartholomew. Peace having been declared, 
and having been known to exist for over 
three weeks, no effort was made to avoid the 
British vessel ; but when the gunboat neared 
the latter she was suddenlv hailed and told 
to heave to. Mr. Hurlburt answered that he 
had despatches for Admiral Cockburn, to 
which Captain Bartholomew responded, with 
many oaths, that he did not care, he would 
sink her if she did not send a boat aboard. 
When Mr. Hurlburt attempted to answer 
some muskets were discharged at him, and 
he was told to strike. He refused, and the 
Erebus immediately opened fire from her 
great guns ; the gunboat had gotten so far 
round that her pivot-gun would not bear prop- 
erly, but it was discharged across the bows 

1 Letter from Com. Campbell to Sec. of Navy, Mar. 
29, 181 5, including one from Sailing-master John H. 
Hurlburt of Mar. 18, 181 5, preserved in the Naval 
Archives, in vol. 43, No. 125, of "Captains' Letters." 
See also " Niles' Register," viii, 104, 118, etc. 



i8o NAVAL WAR OF 1^12, 

of the Erebus, and then Mr. Hurlburt struck 
his colors. Although he had lain right under 
the foes broadside, he suffered no loss or 
damage except a few ropes cut, and some 
shot holes in the sails. Afterward Captain 
Bartholomew apologized, and let the gunboat 
proceed. 

This attack was quite as wanton and un- 
provoked as Warrington's, and Bartholomew's 
foe was relatively to himself even less power- 
ful ; moreover, while the Peacock's crew 
showed great skill in handling their guns, the 
crew of the Erebus most emphatically did 
not. The intent in both cases was equally 
bad, only the British captain lacked the 
ability to carry his out. 

SUMMARY. 

The concluding operations of the war call 
for much the same comments as those of the 
preceding years. The balance of praise cer- 
tainly inclines toward the Americans. Cap- 
tain John Hayes' squadron showed great 
hardihood, perseverance and judgment, which 
were rewarded by the capture of the President ; 
and Decatur's surrender seems decidedly 
tame. But as regards the action between the 
Presidefit and Endymio?i (taking into account 
the fact that the former fought almost under 
the guns of an overwhelming force, and was 
therefore obliged to expose herself far more 
than she otherwise would have), it showed 
nearly as great superiority on the side of the 
Americans as the frigate actions of 18 12 did 



NAVAL WAR OF 1^12. 181 

— in fact, probably quite as much as in the 
case of ih&/ava. Similarly, while the Cyatie 
and Levant did well, the Coiistitutioii did bet- 
ter; and Sir George Collier's ships certainly 
did not distinguish themselves when in chase 
of Old L'oiisides. So with the Hornet in her 
two encounters ; no one can question the 
pluck with which the Penguin was fought, but 
her gunnery was as bad as that of the Corii- 
wallis subsequently proved. And though the 
skirmish between the Peacock and JSJautilus 
is not one to which an American cares to 
look back, yet, regarding it purely from a 
fighting standpoint, there is no question 
which crew was the best trained and most 
skilful. 

LIST OF SHIPS BUILT IN 1815. 



Name. 


Rate, 


Where Built. 


Cost. 


Washington 


74 


Portsmouth 


^235,861.00 


Independence 


74 


Boston 


421,810.41 


Franklin 


74 


Philadelphia 


438,149.40 


Guerriere 


44 


u 


306,158.56 


Java 


44 


Baltimore 


232,767.38 


Fulton 


30 


New York 


320,000.0a 


Torpedo 




(( 





These ships first put to sea in this year. 
For the first time in her history the United 
States possessed line-of-battle ships ; and for 
the first time in all history, the steam frigate 
appeared on the navy list of a nation. The 
Fulton, with her clumsy central wheel, con- 
cealed from shot by the double hull, with such 
thick scantling that none but heavy guns 
could harm her, and relying for offensive 
weapons not on a broadside of thirty guns of 



i82 NAVAL WAR OF 1^12. 

small calibre but on two pivotal loo-pounder 
columbiads, or, perhaps, if necessary, on 
blows from her hog snout, — the Fulton was 
the true prototype of the modern steam iron- 
clad, with its few heavy guns and ram. Almost 
as significant is the presence of the To?-pedo. 
I have not chronicled the several efforts made 
by the Americans to destroy British vessels 
with torpedoes ; some very nearly succeeded, 
and although they failed it must not be sup- 
posed that they did no good. On the con- 
trary, they made the British in many cases 
very cautious about venturing into good an- 
chorage (especially in Long Island Sound and 
the Chesapeake), and by the mere terror of 
their name prevented more than one harrying 
expedition. The Ficlton was not got into con- 
dition to be fought until just as the war ended ; 
had it continued a few months, it is more 
than probable that the deeds of the Merrimat 
and the havoc wrought by the Confederate 
torpedoes would have been forestalled by 
nearly half a century. As it was, neither of 
these engines of war attracted much attention. 
For ten or fifteen years the Fulton was the 
only war-vessel of her kind in existence, and 
then her name disappears from our lists. 
The torpedoes had been tried in the Revolu- 
tionary War, but their failure prevented much 
notice from being taken of them, and besides, 
at that time there was a strong feeling that it 
was dishonorable to blow a ship up with a 
powder-can concealed under the water, though 
highly laudable to bum her by means of a 
fire-raft floating on the water — a nice distinc- 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 183 

tion in naval ethics that has since disap- 
peared.^ 

AMERICAN VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC. 

By Ocean Cruisers. 
Name. Guns. Tonnage. Remarks. 

President 52 i>576 captured by squadron. 

52 guns. 1,576 tons. 

BRITISH VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC. 
a. — By Privateers. 



Name, 
Chasseur 


Guns. Tonnage. Remarks. 

12 240 by privateer St. Lawrence. 




b. — By Ocean Cruisers. 


Cyane 
Leva fit 
Petiguin 


34 659 by Constitution. 
20 500 retaken. 
19 477 by Hornet. 



85 guns, 1,876 tons. 

20 500 (substracting Levant). 



65 guns, 1,376 tons. 

In summing up the results of the struggle 
on the ocean it is to be noticed that very little 
was attempted, and nothing done, by the 
American Navy that could materially affect 
the result of the war. Commodore Rodgers' 
expedition after the Jamaica Plate fleet failed ; 
both the efforts to get a small squadron into 
the East Indian waters also miscarried ; and 
otherwise the whole history of the struggle on 
the ocean is, as regards the Americans, only 

1 James fairly foams at the mouth at the mere men- 
tion of torpedoes. 



i84 NAVAL WAR OF i2>i2. 

the record of individual cruises and fights. 
The material results were not very great, at 
least in their effect on Great Britain, whose 
enormous navy did not feel in the slightest 
degree the loss of a few frigates and sloops. 
But morally the result was of inestimable 
benefit to the United States. The victories 
kept up the spirits of the people, cast down 
by the defeats on land ; practically decided in 
favor of the Americans the chief question in 
dispute — Great Britain's right of search and 
impressment — and gave the navy, and there- 
by the country, a world-wide reputation. I 
doubt if ever before a nation gained so much 
honor by a few single-ship duels. For there 
can be no question which side came out of the 
war Math the greatest credit. The damage in- 
flicted by each on the other was not very un- 
equal in amount, but the balance was certainly 
in favor of the United States, as can be 
seen by the following tables, for the details of 
which reference can be made to the various 
years : 

AMERICAN LOSS. BRITISH LOSS. 



Caused : — 


Tonnage. 


Guns. 


Tonnage.^ 


Guns, 


By Ocean Cruisers 


5^984 


278 


8,451 


3 SI 


On the Lakes 


727 


37 


4,159 


212 


By the Army 


3»oo7 


116 


500 


22 


By Privateers 






402 


20 



Total, 9,718 431 13,512 605 

1 The tonnage can only be given approximately, as 
that of the vessels on Lake Champlain is not exactly 
known, although we know about what the two fleets 
tonned relatively to one another. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 185 

In addition we lost 4 revenue-cutters, mount- 
ing 24 guns, and, in the aggregate, of 387 
tons, and also 25 gunboats, with 71 guns, 
and, in the aggregate, of nearly 2,000 tons. 
This would swell our loss to 12,105 tons, and 
526 guns ;^ but the loss of the revenue-cutters 

1 This differs greatly from the figures given by James 
in his '* Naval Occurrences " (App. ccxv). He makes 
the American loss 14,844 tons, and 660 guns. His list 
includes, for example, the " Growler and Hamilton, up- 
set in carrying sail to avoid Sir James' fleet " ; it would 
be quite as reasonable to put down the loss of the Royal 
George to the credit of the French. Then he mentions 
X\iQjtilia and Growler, which were recaptured ; the Asp, 
which was also recaptured ; the " New York, 46, de- 
stroyed at Washington," which was not destroyed or 
harmed in any way, and which, moreover, was a con- 
demned hulk; the ^^ Boston ^2 (in reality 32), destroyed 
at Washington," which had been a condemned hulk 
for ten years, and had no guns or anything else in her, 
and was as much a loss to our navy as the fishing up 
and burning of an old wreck would have been ; and 8 
gunboats whose destruction was either mythical, or 
else which were not national vessels. By deducting all 
these we reduce James' total by 120 guns, and 2,600 
tons ; and a few more alterations (such as excluding 
the swivels in the Presidents tops, which he counts, 
etc.), brings his number down to that given above — 
and also affords a good idea of the value to be attached 
to his figures and tables. The British loss he gives at 
but 530 guns and 10,273 tons. He omits the 24-gun 
ship burnt by Chauncy at York, although including 
the frigate and corvette burnt by Ross at Washington ; 
if the former is excluded the two latter should be, which 
would make the balance still more in favor of the Amer- 
icans. He omits the guns of the Gloucester, because 
they had been taken out of her and placed in battery 
on the shore, but he includes those of the Adams, which 
had been served in precisely the same way. He omits 
all reference to the British 14-gun schooner burnt on 
Ontario, and to all 3 and 4-gun sloops and schooners 



i86 ATA VAL IVA/^ OF 1S12. 

and ^nboats can fairly be considered to be 
counterbalanced by the capture or destruction 
of the various British Royal Packets (all 
armed with from 2 to 10 guns), tenders, barges, 
etc., which would be in the aggregate of at 
least as great tonnage and gun force, and 
with more numerous crews. 

But the comparative material loss gives no 
idea of the comparative honor gained. The 
British navy, numbering at the outset a 
thousand cruisers, had accomplished less than 
the American, which numbered but a dozen. 
Moreover, most of the loss suffered by the 
former was in single fight, while this had been 

captured there, although iucluding the corresponding 
Arnericans vessels. The reason that he so much under- 
estimates the tonnage, especially on the lakes, I have 
elsewhere discussed. His tables of the relative loss in 
men are even more erroneous, exaggerating that of the 
American, and greatly underestimating that of the 
British ; but I have not tabulated this on account of 
the impossibility of getting fair estimates of the killed 
and wounded in the cutting-out expeditions, and the 
difficulty of enumerating the prisoners taken in de- 
scents, etc. Roughly about 2,700 Americans and 3,800 
British were captured ; the comparative loss in killed 
and wounded stood much more in our favor. 

I have excluded from the British loss the brigs I?e- 
troit and Caledonia, and schooner Nancv (asrsfrecatinsr 
10 guns and about 500 tons), destroyed on the upper 
lakes, because I hardly know whether they could be 
considered national vessels ; the schooner Highflyer^ 
of 8 guns, 40 men, and 209 tons, taken by Rodgers, be- 
cause she seems to have been merely a tender ; and 
the Dominica, 15, of 77 men, and 270 tons, because her 
captor, the privateer Decatur, though nominally an 
American, was really a French vessel. Of course 
both tables are only approximately exact ; but at any 
rate the balance of damage and loss was over 4 to 3 
in our favor. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 187 



/ 



but twice the case with the Americans, who 
had generally been overwhelmed by numbers. 
The President and Essex were both captured 
by more than double their force simply because 
they were disabled before the fight began, 
otherwise they would certainly have escaped. 
With the exceptions of the Chesapeake and 
Argus (both of which were taken fairly, 
because their antagonists, though of only 
equal force, were better fighters), the remain- 
insf loss of the Americans was due to the small 
cruisers stumbling from time to time across 
the path of some one of the innumerable 
British heavy vessels. Had Congressional 
forethought been sufficiently great to have 
allowed a few line-of-battle ships to have been 
in readiness some time previous to the war, 
results of weight might have been accom- 
plished. But the only activity ever exhibited 
by Congress in materially increasing the navy 
previous to the war, had been in partially 
carrying out President Jefferson's ideas off 
having an enormous force of very worthless ; 
gunboats — a scheme whose wisdom was. 
about on a par with some of that statesman's/ 
political and military theories. 

Of the twelve^ single-ship actions, two 

1 Not counting the last action of the Cojistitutio-n^ 
the Presiderifs action, or the capture of the Essex, oa 
account of the difficulty of fairly estimating the amount 
of credit due to each side. In both the first actions, 
however, the American ships seem to have been rather 
more ably fought than their antagonists, and, taking 
into account the overwhelming disadvantages under 
which the Essex labored, her defence displayed more 
desperate bravery than did that of any other ship dur- 



ing the war. 



i88 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

(those of the Argus and Chesapeake) undoubt- 
edly redounded most to the credit of the 
British, in two (that of the Wasp with the 
jReindeer, and that of the Enterprise with the 
Boxe?'), the honors were nearly even, and in 
the other eight the superiority of the Amer- 
icans was very manifest. In three actions 
(those with the Penguin, Frolic, and Shannon) 
the combatants w^ere about equal in strength, 
the Americans having slightly the advantage ; 
in all the others but two, the victors combined 
superiority of force with superiority of skill. 
In but two cases, those of the A7'gus and 
Epervier, could any lack of courage be im- 
puted to the vanquished. Tbe second year 
alone showed to the advantage of the British; 
the various encounters otherwise were as 
creditable to the Americans at the end as at 
the beginning of the war. This is worth at- 
tending to, because many authors speak as if 
the successes of the Americans were confined 
to the first year. It is true that no frigate 
was taken after the first year, but this was 
partly because the strictness of the blockade 
kept the American frigates more in port, 
while the sloops put out to sea at pleasure, 
and partly because after that year the British 
i8-pounder frigates either cruised in couples, 
or, when single, invariably refused, by order 
of the Board of Admiralty, an encounter with 
a 24-pounder ; and though much of the 
American success was unquestionably to be 
attributed to more men and heavier guns, yet 
much of it was not. The war itself gives us 
two instances in which defeat was owing 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 189 

solely, it may be said, to inferiority of force, 
courage and skill being equal. The Wasp was 
far heavier than the Rei7ideer^ and, there being 
nothing to choose between them in anything 
else, the damage done was about proportionate 
to this difference. It follows, as a matter of 
course, that the very much greater dispropor-. 
tion in loss in the cases of the Avofi, Epervie?', 
etc., where the disproportion in force was 
much less (they mounting 32's instead of 24's, 
and the victors being all of the same class), is 
only to be explained by the inferiority in skill 
on the part of the vanquished. These remarks 
apply just as much to the Argus, The Rein- 
deer, with her 24's, would have been almost 
exactly on a par with her, and yet would have 
taken her with even greater ease than the 
Peacock did with her 32's. In other words, 
the only effect of our superiority in metal, 
men, and tonnage was to increase somewhat 
the disparity in loss. Had the Co7igress and 
Constellatioji, instead of the United States and 
Constitution, encountered the Macedonian and 
Java, the difference in execution would have 
been less than it was, but the result would 
have been unchanged, and would have been 
precisely such as ensued when the Wasp met 
the Frolic, or the Hornet the Penguin, On the 
other hand, had the Shannofi met the Consti- 
tution there would have been a repetition of 
the fight between the Wasp and Rei?ideer; for 
it is but fair to remember that great as is the 
honor that Broke deserves, it is no more than 
that due to Manners. 

The Republic of the United States owed a. 



190 NAVAL WAR OF 18 12. 

great deal to the excellent make and arma- 
ment of its ships, but it owed still more to the 
men who were in them. The massive timbers 
and heavy guns of Old Ironsides would have 
availe 1 but little had it not been for her able 
commanders and crews. Of all the excellent 
single-ship captains, British or American, pro- 
duced by the war, the palm should be awarded 
to Hull.' The deed of no other man (except 
Macdonough) equalled his escape from 
Broke's five ships, or surpassed his half- 
hour's conflict with the Guerriere. After him, 
almost all the American captains deserve high 
praise — Decatur, Jones, Blakely, Biddle, P.yJ^ 
Bainbridge, Lawrence, Burrows, Allen, War- r^^- j 
rington, Stewart, Porter. It is no small glory 
to a country to have had such men upholding 
the honor of its flag. On a par with the best 
of them are Broke, Manners, and also Byron 
and Blythe. It must be but a poor-spirited 
American whose veins do not tingle with 
pride when he reads of the cruises and fights 
of the sea-captains, and their grim prowess, 
which kept the old Yankee flag floating over 
the waters of the Atlantic for three years, in 
the teeth of the mightiest naval power the 
world has ever seen ; but it is equally impos- 
sible not to admire Broke's chivalric challenge 
and successful fight, or the heroic death of 
the captain of the Reindeer. 

Nor can the v/ar ever be fairly understood 

1 See " Naval Tactics," by Commander J. H. Ward, 
and "Life of Commodore Tatnall," by Charles C. 
Jones, Jr. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 191 

by any one who does not bear in mind that the 
combatants were men of the same stock, who 
far more nearly resembled each other than 
either resembled any other nation. I hon- 
estly believe that the American sailor offered 
rather better material for a man-of-warsman 
than the British, because the freer institutions 
of his country (as compared with the Britain 
of the drunken Prince Regent and his dotard 
father — a very different land from the present 
free England) and the peculiar exigencies of 
his life tended to make him more intelligent 
and self-reliant ; but the difference, when there 
was any, was very small, and disappeared en- 
tirely when his opponents had been drilled 
for any length of time by men like Broke or 
Manners. The advantage consisted in the 
fact that our average commander was equal to 
the best, and higher than the average, of the 
opposing captains ; and this held good through- 
out the various grades of the officers. The 
American officers knew they had redoubtable 
foes to contend with, and made every prep- 
aration accordingly. Owing their rank to 
their own exertions, trained by practical ex- 
perience and with large liberty of action, they 
made every effort to have their crews in the 
most perfect state of skill and discipline. In 
Commodore Tatnall's biography (p. 15) it is 
mentioned that the blockaded Co7istellatioii 
had her men well trained at the guns and at 
target practice, though still lying in the river, 
so as to be at once able to meet a foe when 
she put out to sea. The British captain, often 
owing his command to his social standing or 



192 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

to favoritism, hampered by red tape/ and ac- 
customed by 20 years' almost uninterrupted 
success to regard the British arms as invinci- 
ble, was apt to laugh at all manoeuvring,^ and 
scorned to prepare too carefully for a fight, 
trusting to the old British " pluck and luck" 
to carry him through. So, gradually he for- 
got how to manoeuvre or to prepare. The 
fava had been at sea six weeks before she was 
captured, yet during that time the entire ex- 
ercise of her crew at the guns had been con- 
fined to the discharge of six broadsides of 
blank cartridges (James, vi, 184) ; the Consti- 
tution, like \\\Q Java, had shipped an entirely 
new and raw crew previous to her first cruise, 
and was at sea but five weeks before she met 
the Giierriere, and yet her men had been 
trained to perfection. This is a sufficient 
comment on the comparative merits of Cap- 
tain Hull and Captain Lambert. The Ameri- 
can prepared himself in every possible way ; 
the Briton tried to cope with courage alone 
against courage united to skill. His bad 
gunnery had not been felt in contending with 
European foes ^ as unskilful as himself. Says 
Lord Howard Douglass (p. 3) : "We entered 
with too much confidence into a war with 

1 For instance, James mentions that they were for- 
bidden to use more than so many shot in practice, and 
that Capt. Broke utterly disregarded this command. 

2 Lord Howard Douglass, " Naval Gunnery," states 
this in various places. — " Accustomed to contemn all 
manoeuvring." 

^ Lord Howard Douglass ; he seems to' think that in 
181 2 the British had fallen off absolutely, though not 
"Relatively to their European foes. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1Z12. 193 

a marine much more expert than any of 
our European enemies * * * there was 
inferiority of gunnery as well as of force," 
etc. Admiral Codrington, commenting on 
the Epervier's loss, says, as before quoted, 
that, owing to his being chosen purely for 
merit, the American captain was an over- 
match for the British, unless " he encountered 
our best officers on equal terms." 

The best criticism on the war is that given 
by Capitaine Jurien de la Graviere.^ After 
speaking of the heavier metal and greater 
number of men of the American ships, he con- 
tinues : " And yet only an enormous superi- 
ority in the precision and rapidity of their fire 
can explain the difference in the losses sus- 
tained by the combatants. * * * Nor 
was the skill of their gunners the only cause 
to which the Americans owed their success. 
Their ships were faster ; the crews, composed 
of chosen men, manoeuvred with uniformity 
and precision ; their captains had that practi- 
cal knowledge which is only to be acquired by 
long experience of the sea ; and it is not to be 
wondered at that the Constitution^ when chased 
during three days by a squadron of five Eng- 
lish frigates, succeeded in escaping, by sur- 
passing them in manoeuvring, and by availing 
herself of every ingenious resource and skilful 
expedient that maritime science could sug- 
gest. ^ * * To a marine exalted by suc- 
cess, but rendered negligent by the very habit 
of victory, the Congress only opposed the 

1 " Guerres Maritimes," ii, p. 269, 272, 274 (Paris, 
1847). 
13 



194 NAVAL WAR OF iSi2. 

best of vessels and most formidable of arma- 
ments. * * =*"' 

It is interesting to compare the results of 
this inter- Anglian warfare, waged between the 
Insular and the Continental English, with the 
results of the contest that the former were at 
the same time carrying on with their Gallo- 
Ronian neighbors across the channel. For 
this purpose I shall rely on Troude's " Batailles 
Navales," which would certainly not give the 
Eno-lish more than their due. His account of 
the comparative force in each case can be 
supplemented by the corresponding one given 
in James. Under drawn battles I include all 
such as were indecisive, in so far that neither 
combatant was captured ; in almost every case 
each captain claimed that the other ran away. 

During the years 1812 to 1815 inclusive, 
there were eight actions between French and 
English ships of approximately equal force. 
In three of these the English were victorious. 

In 1 81 2 the Victorious, 74, captured the 

Rivoli^ 74. 

COMPARATIVE FORCE. 



Broadsides, Metal, lbs. 




Troude. 


Jaxnes. 


Victorious I »oi 4 


1,060 


Rivoli 1,010 


1,085 



1 The praise should be given to the individual cap- 
tains and not to Congress, however; and none of the 
American ships had picked crews. During the war the 
Shannon had the only crew which could with any 
fairness be termed " picked," for her men had been to- 
gether seven years, and all of her " boys " must have 
been well-grown young men, much older than the boys 
on her antagonist. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1^12, 



19s 



In 18 1 4 the Tagus captured the Ceres and 
the Hehrus captured the Etoile. 

Broadsides, Metal, lbs. 

Troude, James. 

Tagus 444 467 

Ceres 428 463 

Hebrus 467 467 

Etoile 428 463 

The Ceres, when she surrendered, had but 
one man wounded, although she had suffered 
a good deal aloft. The fight between the 74's 
was murderous to an almost unexampled 
degree, 125 English and 400 French falling. 
The Hebrus lost 40 and the Etoile 120 men. 

Five actions were " drawn." 

In 1812 the Swallow fought the J^enard z.r\d 
Garland. The former threw 262, the latter 
290 lbs. of shot at a broadside. 

In 181 5 the Pilot, throwing 262 lbs., fought 
a draw with the Egerie, throwing 260. 

In 18 1 4 two frigates of the force of the 
Tagus fought a draw with two frigates of the 
force of the Ceres; and the Eurotas, with 
24-pounders, failed to capture the Chlorinde, 
which had only i8-pounders. 

In 18 1 5 the A^nelia fought a draw with the 
Arethuse, the ships throwing respectively 549 
and 463 lbs., according to the English, or 572 
and 410 lbs., according to the French ac- 
counts. In spite of being superior in force 
the English ship lost 141 men, and the French 
but 105. This was a bloodier fight than even 
that of the Chesapeake wdth the Ska?tnon ; but 
the gunnery was, nevertheless, much worse 



196 NAVAL WAR OF 1Z12. 

than that shown by the two combatants in 
the famous duel off Boston harbor, one battle 
lasting four hours and the other 15 minutes. 

There were a number of other engagements 
where the British were successful but where it 
is difficult to compare the forces. Twice a 74 
captured or destroyed two frigates, and a razee 
performed a similar feat. An i8-gun brig, 
the Weasel, fought two i6-gun brigs till one 
of them blew up. 

The loss of the two navies at each other's 
hands during the four years was : — 

English Ships. Frencli Ships. 

I i6-gun brig 3 line-of-battle ships 

I i2-gun brig 11 frigates 

I logun cutter 2 26-gun flutes 

2 i6-gun brigs 
I lo-gun brig 
many gunboats, etc. 

Or one navy lost three vessels, mounting 
38 guns, and the other 19 vessels, mounting 
830 guns. 

During the same time the English lost to 
Danes one 14-gun brig, and destroyed in 
return a frigate of 46 guns, a 6-gun schooner, 
a 4-gun cutter, two galliots and several gun- 
brigs. 

In the above lists it is to be noticed how 
many of the engagements were indecisive, 
owing chiefly to the poor gunnery of the com- 
batants. The fact that both the Eurotas and 
the Amelia, though more powerfully armed 
and manned than the Hebriis, yet failed to 
capture the sister ships of the frigate taken 
by the latter, shows that heavy metal and a 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 197 

numerous crew are not the only elements 
necessary for success ; indeed the Eurotas 
and Amelia were as superior in force to their 
antagonists as the Constitutioti was to the 
Java. 

But the chief point to be noticed is the 
overwhelming difference in the damage the 
two navies caused each other. This difference n 
was, roughly, as five to one against the Danes, '< 
and as fifty to one against the French ; while h 
it was as four to three in favor of the Amer- 7 
ican. These figures give some^ idea of the'^ 
effectiveness of the various navies. At any 
rate they show that we had found out what 
the European nations had for many years in 
vain striven to discover — a way to do more 
damage than we received in a naval contest 
with England. 



198 NAVAL WAR OF id,i2 



CHAPTER IV. 

1815. 

THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS. 

The war on land generally disastrous — British send 
expedition against New Orleans — Jackson prepares for 
the defence of the city— Night attack on the British 
advance guard— Artillery duels— Great battle of Janu- 
ary 8, 181 5 — Slaughtering repulse of the main attack — 
Rout of the Americans on the right bank of the river 
— Final retreat of the British — Observations on the 
character of the troops and commanders engaged. 

■\7[7'HILE our navy had been successful, the 
V V war on land had been for us full of 
humiliation. The United States then formed 
but a loosely knit confederacy, the sparse pop- 
ulation scattered over a great expanse of land. 
Ever since the Federalist party had gone out 
of power in 1800, the nation's ability to main- ' 
tain order at home and enforce respect abroad 
had steadily dwindled; and the twelve years'^ 
nerveless reign of the Doctrinaire Democracy ' 
had left us impotent for attack and almost as ' 
feeble for defence. Jefferson, though a man 
whose views and theories had a profound ' 
influence upon our national life, was perhaps 
the most incapable Executive that ever filled 
the presidential chair ; being almost purely a 
visionary, he was utterly unable to grapple 
with the slightest actual danger, and, not even 



NAVAL WAR OF i?>i2. 199 

excepting his successor, Madison, it would be 
difficult to imagine a man less fit to guide the 
state with honor and safety through the stormy 
times that marked the opening of the present 
century. Without the prudence to avoid war 
or the forethought to prepare for it, the Ad- 
ministration drifted helplessly into a conflict 
in which only the navy prepared by the Fed- 
eralists twelve years before, and weakened 
rather than strengthened during the interven- 
ing time, saved us from complete and shame- 
ful defeat. True to its theories, the House of 
Virginia made no preparations, and thought 
the war could be fought by "the nation in 
arms " ; the exponents of this particular idea, 
the militiamen, a partially armed mob, ran 
like sheep whenever brought into the field. 
The regulars were not much better. After 
two years of warfare, Scott records in his 
autobiography that there were but two books 
of tactics (one written in French) in the 
entire army on the Niagara frontier ; and 
officers and men were on such a dead level of 
ignorance that he had to spend a month drill- 
ing all of the former, divided into squads, in 
the school of the soldier and school of the 
company.' It is small wonder that such troops 
were utterly unable to meet the English. 
Until near the end, the generals were as bad 
as the armies they commanded, and the ad- 
ministration of the War Department continued 
to be a triumph of imbecility to the very last.^ 

1" Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Scott," -written 
by himself (2 vols., New York, 1864), i, p. 115- 

2 Monroe's biographer (see " James Monroe," by 



200 NAVAL WAR OF 1S12. 

With the exception of the brilliant and success- 
ful charge of the Kentucky mounted infantry 
at the battle of the Thames, the only bright 
spot in the war in the North was the campaign 
on the Niagara frontier during the summer 
of 1814; and even here, the chief battle, that 
of Lundy's Lane, though reflecting as much 
honor on the Americans as on the British, was 
for the former a defeat, and not a victory, as 
most of our writers seem to suppose. 

But the war had a dual aspect. It was 
partly a contest between the two branches of 
the English race, and partly a last attempt on 
the part of the Indian tribes to check the ad- 
vance of the most rapidly growing one of 
these same two branches ; and this last portion 
of the struggle, though attracting compara- 
tively little attention, was really much the 
most far-reaching in its effect upon history. 
The triumph of the British would have dis- 
tinctly meant the giving a new lease of life to 
the Indian nationalities, the hemming in, for 
a time, of the United States, and the stoppage, 
perhaps for many years, of the march of 
English civilization across the continent. 
The English of Britain were doing all they 
could to put off the day when their race would 
reach to a world-wide supremacy. 

Daniel C. Gilman, Boston, 1883, p. 123) thinks he made 
a good Secretary of War ; I think he was as much a 
failure as his predecessors, and a harsher criticism 
could not be passed on him. Like the other states- 
men of his school, he was mighty in word and w^eak in 
action ; bold to plan but weak to perform. As an in- 
stance, contrast his fiery letters to Jackson with the 
fact that he never gave him a particle of practical help. 



NAVAL WAR OF i2>i2. 201 

There was much fighting along our Western 
frontier with various Indian tribes ; and it was 
especially fierce in the campaign that a back- 
woods general of Tennessee, named Andrew 
Jackson, carried on against the powerful con- 
federacy of the Creeks, a nation that was 
thrust in like a wedge between the United 
States proper and their dependency, the 
newly acquired French province of Louisiana. 
After several slaughtering fights, the most 
noted being the battle of the Horse-shoe 
Bend, the power of the Creeks was broken 
forever; and afterward, as there was much 
question over the proper boundaries of what 
was then the Latin land of Florida, Jackson 
marched south, attacked the Spaniards and 
drove them from Pensacola. Meanwhile 
the British, having made a successful and 
ravaging summer campaign through Virginia 
and Maryland, situated in the heart of the 
country, organized the most formidable ex- 
pedition of the war for a winter campaign 
against the outlying land of Louisiana, whose 
defender Jackson of necessity became. Thus, 
in the course of events, it came about that 
Louisiana was the theatre on which the final 
and most dramatic act of the war was played. 

Amid the gloomy, semi-tropical swamps 
that cover the quaking delta thrust out into 
the blue waters of the Mexican Gulf by the 
strong torrent of the mighty Mississippi, stood 
the fair, French city of New Orleans. Its lot 
had been strange and varied. Won and lost 
once and again, in conflict with the subjects of 



202 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

the Catholic king, there was a strong Spanish 
tinge in the French blood that coursed so 
freely through the veins of its citizens ; joined 
by purchase to the great Federal Republic, it 
yet shared no feeling with the latter, save that 
of hatred to the common foe. And now an 
hour of sore need had come upon the city ; 
for against it came the red English, lords of 
fight by sea and land. A great fleet of war 
vessels — ships of the line, frigates and sloops 
— under Admiral Cochrane, was on the way to 
New Orleans, convoying a still larger fleet of 
troop ships, with aboard them some ten 
thousand fighting men, chiefly the fierce and 
hardy veterans of the Peninsula War,' who had 
been trained for seven years in the stern 
school of the Iron Duke, and who were now 
led by one of the bravest and ablest of all 
Wellington's brave and able lieutenants, Sir 
Edward Packenham. 

On the 8th of December, 1814, the foremost 
vessels, with among their number the great 
two-decker Tonnant, carrying the admiral's 
flag, anchored off the Chandeleur Islands ; "" 
and as the current of the Mississippi was too 
strong to be easily breasted, the English 
leaders determined to bring their men by boats 
through the bayous, and disembark them on 
the bank of the river ten miles below the 

1 «' The British infantry embarked at Bordeaux, some 
for America, some from England." (" History of the 
War in the Peninsula," by Major-General Sir W. F. P. 
Napier, K. C. B. New edition. New York, 1882, vol. 
V, p. 200.) For discussion of numbers, see farther on. 

2 See, ante, p 73. 



NAVAL WAR OF iZi2. 203 

wealthy city at whose capture they were 
aiming. There was but one thing to prevent 
the success of this plan, and that was the 
presence in the bayous of five American gun- 
boats, manned by a hundred and eighty men, 
and commanded by Lieutenant Comdg. Cates- 
by Jones, a very shrewd fighter. So against 
him was sent Captain Nicholas Lockyer with 
forty-five barges, and nearly a thousand sailors 
and marines, men who had grown gray durino- 
a quarter of a century of unbroken ocean war- 
fare. The gunboats were moored in a head- 
and-stern line, near the, Rigolets, with their 
boarding-nettings triced up, and everything 
ready to do desperate battle ; but the British 
rowed up with strong, swift strokes, through a 
murderous fire of great guns and musketry ; 
the vessels were grappled amid fierce resist- 
ance ; the boarding-nettings were slashed 
through and cut away ; with furious fighting 
the decks were gained ; and one by one, at 
push of pike and cutlass stroke, the gunboats 
were carried in spite of their stubborn de- 
fenders ; but not till more than one barge had 
been sunk, while the assailants had lost a 
hundred men, and the assailed about half as 
many. 

There was now nothing to hinder the landing 
of the troops ; and as the scattered transports 
arrived, the soldiers were disembarked, and 
ferried through the sluggish water of the 
bayous on small flat-bottomed craft ; and fi- 
nally, Dec. 23d, the advance guard, two thou- 
sand strong, under General Keane, emerged 
at the mouth of the canal Villere, and camped 



204 NAVAL WAR OF 1S12. 

on the bank of the river,' but nine miles be- 
low New Orleans, which now seemed a certain 
prize, almost within their grasp. 

Yet, although a mighty and cruel foe was at 
their very gates, nothing save fierce defiance 
reigned in the fiery Creole hearts of the Cres- 
cent City. For a master-spirit was in their 
midst. Andrew Jackson having utterly broken 
and destroyed the most powerful Indian con- 
federacy that had ever menaced the South- 
west, and having driven the haughty Spaniards 
from Pensacola, was now bending all the 
energies of his rugged intellect and indomi- 
table will to the one object of defending New 
Orleans. No man could have been better fit- 
ted for the task. He had hereditary wrongs 
to avenge on the British, and he hated them 
with an implacable fury that was absolutely 
devoid of fear. Born and brought up among 
the lawless characters of the frontier, and 
knowing well how to deal with them, he was 
able to establish and preserve the strictest 
martial law in the city without in the least 
quelling the spirit of the citizens. To a rest- 
less and untiring energy he united sleepless 
vigilance and genuine military genius. Prompt 
to attack whenever the chance offered itself, 
seizing with ready grasp the slightest vantage- 
ground, and never giving up a foot of earth 
that he could keep, he yet had the patience to 
play a defensive game when it so suited him, 
and with consummate skill he always followed 
out the scheme of warfare that was best 

1 Letter of Major-General John Keane, Dec. 26, 
1814. 



NAVAL WAR OF t8i2. 



205 



adapted to his wild soldiery. In after years 
he did to his country some good and more 
evil ; but no true American can think of his 
deeds at New Orleans without profound and 
unmixed thankfulness. 

He had not reached the city till December 
2d, and had therefore but three weeks in which 
to prepare the defence. The Federal Gov- ' 
ernment, throughout the campaign, did abso- 
lutely nothing for the defence of Louisiana ; • 
neither provisions nor munitions of war of any ' 
sort were sent to it, nor were any measures \ 
taken for its aid.' The inhabitants had been 
in a state of extreme despondency up to the 
time that Jackson arrived, for they had no 
one to direct them, and they were weakened 
by factional divisions ; ^ but after his coming 
there was nothing but the utmost enthusiasm 
displayed, so great was the confidence he 
inspired, and so firm his hand in keeping down 
all opposition. Under his direction earth- 
works were thrown up to defend all the im- 
portant positions, the whole population work- 
ing night and day at them ; all the available 
artillery was mounted, and every ounce of 
war material that the city contained was 
seized ; martial law was proclaimed ; and all 
general business was suspended, everything 
being rendered subordinate to the one grand 
object of defence. 

1 " Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida 
and Louisiana" (by Major A. Lacarriex Latour, trans- 
lated from the French by H. P. Nugent, Philadelphia, 
1816), p. 66. 

2 Latour, 53. 



2o6 NAVAL WAR OF iZi2. 

Jackson's forces were small. There were 
two war vessels in the river. One was the 
little schooner Carolina, manned by regular 
seamen, largely New Englanders. The other 
was the newly built ship Louisia?ia, a powerful 
corvette ; she had of course no regular crew, 
and her officers were straining every nerve to 
get one from the varied ranks of the maritime 
population of New Orleans ; long-limbed and 
hard-visaged Yankees*, Portuguese and Nor- 
wegian seamen from foreign merchantmen, 
dark-skinned Spaniards from the West Indies, 
swarthy Frenchmen who had served under the 
bold privateersman Lafitte, — all alike were 
taken, and all alike by unflagging exertions 
were got into shape for battle.^ There were 
two regiments of regulars, numbering together 
about eight hundred men, raw and not very 
well disciplined, but who were now drilled with 
great care and regularity. In addition to this 
Jackson raised somewhat over a thousand 
militiamen among the citizens. There were 
some Americans among them, but they were 
mostly French Creoles/ and one band had in 
its formation something that was curiously 
pathetic. It was composed of free men of ' 
color,^ who had gathered to defend the land 
which kept the men of their race in slavery ; ■ 
who were to shed their blood for the Flag that 
symbolized to their kind not freedom but 
bondage ; who were to die bravely as freemen, • 
only that their brethren might live on ignobly 

1 Letter of Commodore Daniel G. Patterson, Dec. 
20, 1814. 

2 Latour, no. ^ Latour, in. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 207 

as slaves. Surely there was never a stranger 
instance than this of the irony of fate. 

But if Jackson had been forced to rely only 
on these troops New Orleans could not have 
been saved. His chief hope lay in the volun- 
teers of Tennessee, who, under their Generals, 
Coffee and Carroll, were pushing their toil- 
some and weary way toward the city. Every 
effort was made to hurry their march through 
the almost impassable roads, and at last, in 
the very nick of time, on the 23d of December, 
the day on which the British troops reached 
the river bank, the vanguard of the Ten- 
nesseeans marched into New Orleans. Gaunt 
of form and grim of face ; with their powder- 
horns slung over their buckskin shirts ; carry- 
ing their long rifles on their shoulders and 
their heavy hunting-knives stuck in their belts ; 
with their coon-skin caps and fringed leggings ; 
thus came the grizzly warriors of the back- 
woods, the heroes of the Horse-Shoe Bend, 
the victors over Spaniard and Indian, eager 
to pit themselves against the trained regulars 
of Britain, and to throw down the gage of 
battle to the world-renowned infantry of the 
island English. Accustomed to the most 
lawless freedom, and to giving free rein to the 
full violence of their passions, defiant of dis- 
cipline and impatient of the slightest restraint, 
caring little for God and nothing for man, 
they were soldiers who, under an ordinary 
commander, would have been fully as danger- 
ous to themselves and their leaders as to their 
foes. But Andrew Jackson was of all men 
the one best fitted to manage such troops. 



2o8 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

Even their fierce natures quailed before the 
ungovernable fury of a spirit greater than 
their own ; and their sullen, stubborn wills 
were bent at last before his unyielding tem- 
per and iron hand. Moreover, he was one of 
themselves ; he typified their passions and 
prejudices, their faults and their virtues ; he 
shared their hardships as if he had been a 
common private, and, in turn, he always made 
them partakers of his triumphs. They ad- 
mired his personal prowess with pistol and 
rifle, his unswerving loyalty to his friends, and 
the relentless and unceasing war that he 
waged alike on the foes of himself and his 
country. As a result they loved and feared 
him as few generals have ever been loved or 
feared ; they obeyed him unhesitatingly ; they 
followed his lead without flinching or murmur- 
ing, and they ever made good on the field of 
battle the promise their courage held out to 
his judgment. 

It was noon of December 23d when Gen- 
eral Keane, with nineteen hundred men, 
halted and pitched his camp on the east bank 
of the Mississippi; and in the evening enough 
additional troops arrived to swell his force to 
over twenty-three hundred soldiers.^ Keane's 

1 James (" INIilitary Occurrences of the Late War," 
by Wm. James, London, 1818), vol. ii, p. 362, says 2,050 
rank and file ; the English returns, as already ex- 
plained, unlike the French and American, never in- 
cluded officers, sergeants, drummers artillerymen, or 
engineers, but only " sabres and bayonets " (Napier, iv, 
252). At the end of Napier's fourth volume is given 
the " morning state " of Wellington's forces on April 
ID, 1814. This shows 56,030 rank and file and 7,431 



NAVAL WAR 6)/^ 1812. 209 

encampment was in a long plain, rather thinly 
covered with fields and farmhouses, about a 
mile in breadth, and bounded on one side by 
the river, on the other by gloomy and im- 
penetrable cypress swamps; and there was no 
obstacle interposed between the British camp 
and the city it menaced. 

At two in the afternoon word was brought 
to Jackson that the foe had reached the river 
bank, and without a moment's delay the old 
backwoods fighter prepared to strike a rough 
first blow. At once, and as if by magic, the 
city started from her state of rest into one of 
fierce excitement and eager preparation. The 
alarm-guns were fired ; in every quarter the 
war-drums were beaten ; while, amid the din 
and clamor, all the regulars and marines, the 
best of the Creole militia, and the vanguard 
of the Tennesseeans, under Coffee, — forming 
a total of a little more than two thousand 
men,^ — were assembled in great haste ; and 
the gray of the winter twilight saw them, with 
Old Hickory at their head, marching steadily 

officers, sergeants, and trumpeters or drummers ; or, 
in other words, to get at the real British force in an 
action, even supposing there are no artillerymen or en- 
gineers present, 13 per cent, must be added to the 
given number, which includes only rank and file. 
Making this addition, Keane had 2,310 men. The 
Americans greatly overestimated his force, Latour 
making it 4,980. 

1 General Jackson, in his official letter, says only 
1,500; but Latour, in a detailed statement, makes it 
2,024 ; exclusive of 107 Mississippi dragoons who 
marched with the column, but being on horseback had 
to stay behind, and took no part in the action. Keane 
thought he had been attacked by 5,000 men. 

14 



2IO NAVAL WAR OF 1S12. 

along the river bank toward the camp of their 
foes. Patterson, meanwhile, in the schooner 
Carolina, dropped down with the current to 
try the effect of a flank attack. 

Meanwhile the British had spent the after- 
noon in leisurely arranging their camp, in 
posting the pickets, and in foraging among 
the farmhouses. There was no fear of at- 
tack, and as the day ended huge camp-fires 
were lit, at which the hungry soldiers cooked 
their suppers undisturbed. One division of 
the troops had bivouacked on the high 
levee that kept the waters from flooding the 
land near by ; and about half-past seven in 
the evening "their attention was drawn to a 
large schooner which had dropped noiselessly 
down, in the gathering dusk, and had come 
to anchor a short distance off shore, the force 
of the stream swinging her broadside to the 
camp/ The soldiers crowded down to the 
water's edge, and, as the schooner returned 
no answer to their hails, a couple of musket- 
shots were fired at her. As if in answer to 
this challenge, the men on shore heard plainly 
the harsh voice of her commander, as he sung 
out, " Now then, give it to them for the honor 
of America ; " and at once a storm of grape 
hurtled into their ranks. Wild confusion 
followed. The only field-pieces with Keane 
were two light 3-pounders, not able to cope 

^ I have taken my account of the night action chiefly 
from the work of an English soldier who took part in 
it ; Ensign (afterward Chaplain-General) H. R. Gleig's 
" Narrative of the Campaigns of the British Army at 
Washington, Baltimore, and New Orleans." (New 
edition, Philadelphia, 1821, pp. 286-300.) 



NAVAL WAR OF 1^12. 21 1 

with the Carol'ma's artillery ; the rocket guns 
were brought up, but were speedily silenced ; 
musketry proved quite as ineffectual ; and in 
a very few minutes the troops were driven 
helter-skelter off the levee, and were forced 
to shelter themselves behind it, not without 
having suffered severe loss/ The night was 
now as black as pitch ; the embers of the 
deserted camp-fires, beaten about and scat- 
tered by the schooner's shot, burned with a 
dull red glow ; and at short intervals the 
darkness was momentarily lit up by the flashes 
of the Carolinas guns. Crouched behind 
the levee, the British soldiers lay motionless, 
listening in painful silence to the pattering 
of the grape among the huts, and to the 
moans and shrieks of the wounded who lay 
beside them. Things continued thus till to- 
ward nine o'clock, when a straggling fire from 
the pickets gave warning of the approach of a 
more formidable foe. The American land- 
forces had reached the outer lines of the 
British camp, and the increasing din of the 
musketry, with ringing through it the whip- 
like crack of the Tennesseean rifles, called 
out the whole British army to the shock of a 
desperate and uncertain strife. The young 
moon had by this time struggled through the 
clouds, and cast on the battle-field a dim, un- 
earthly light that but partly relieved the in- 
tense darkness. All order was speedily lost. 

1 General Keane, in his letter, writes that the British 
suffered but a single casualty ; Gleig, who was present, 
says (p. 2S8) : " The deadly shower of grape swept 
down numbers in the camp." 



212 NAVAL JVAR OF iZi2. 

Each officer, American or British, as fast as 
he could gather a few soldiers round him, at- 
tacked the nearest group of foes ; the smoke 
and gloom would soon end the struggle, when^ 
if unhurt, he would rally what men he could 
and plunge once more into the fight. The 
battle soon assumed the character of a mul- 
titude of individual combats, dying out almost 
as soon as they began, because of the difficulty 
of telling friend from foe, and beginning with 
ever- increasing fury as soon as they had 
ended. The clatter of the firearms, the 
clashing of steel, the rallying cries and loud 
commands of the oilicers, the defiant shouts 
of the men, joined to the yells and groans of 
those who fell, all combined to produce so 
terrible a noise and tumult that it maddened 
the coolest brains. From one side or the 
other bands of men would penetrate into the 
heart of the enemy's lines, and would there 
be captured, or would cut their way out with 
the prisoners they had taken. There was 
never a fairer field for the fiercest personal 
prowess, for in the darkness the firearms were 
of little service, and the fighting was hand to 
hand. Many a sword, till then but a glitter- 
ing toy, was that night crusted with blood. 
The British soldiers and the American regu- 
lars made fierce play with their bayonets, and 
the Tennesseeans, with their long hunting- 
knives. I\Ian to man, in grimmest hate, they 
fought and died, some by bullet and some by 
bayonet-thrust or stroke of sword. More 
than one in his death agony slew the foe at 
whose hand he himself had received the mor- 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 



213 



tal wound ; and their bodies stiffened as they 
lay, locked in the death grip. Again the 
clouds came over the moon ; a thick fog crept 
up from the river, wrapping from sight the 
ghastly havoc of the battle-field ; and long be- 
fore midnight the fighting stopped perforce, 
for the fog and the smoke and the gloom were 
such that no one could see a yard away. By 
degrees each side drew off. ^ In sullen silence 
Jackson marched his men up the river, while 
the wearied British returned to their camp. 
The former had lost over two hundred,^ the 
latter nearly three hundred ^ men ; for the 
darkness and confusion that added to the 
horror, lessened the slaughter of the battle. 

Jackson drew back about three miles, 
where he halted and threw up a long line of 
breastworks, reaching from the river to the 
morass ; he left a body of mounted riflemen 
to watch the British. All the English troops 
reached the field on the day after the fight ; 
but the rough handling that the foremost had 
received made them cautious about advanc- 

1 Keane writes : " The enemy thought it prudent to 
retire, and did not again dare to advance. It was now 
12 o'clock, and the firing ceased on both sides"; and 
Jackson : " We should have succeeded ... in cap- 
turing the enemy, had not a thick fog, which arose 
about (?) o'clock, occasioned some confusion. . . , 
I contented myself with lying on the field that night." 
Jackson certainly failed to capture the British ; but 
equally certainly damaged them so as to arrest their 
march till he was in condition to meet and check them. 

^ 24 killed, 115 wounded, 74 missing. 

3 46 killed, 167 wounded, 64 missing. I take the 
official return for each side, as authority for the respect* 
ive force and loss. 



214 NAVAL WAR OF \'^\2. 

ing. Moreover, the left division was kept 
behind the levee all day by the Ca?vli?ia, 
which opened upon them whenever they tried 
to get away ; nor was it till dark that they 
made their escape out of range of her can- 
non. Christmas-day opened drearily enough 
for the invaders. Although they w^ere well 
inland, the schooner, by greatly elevating her 
guns, could sometimes reach them, and she 
annoyed them all through the day ; ' and as 
the Americans had cut the levee in their 
front, it at one time seemed likely that they 
would be drowned out. However, matters 
nov/ took a turn for the better. The river 
was so low that the cutting of the levee in- 
stead of flooding the plain ^ merely filled the 
shrunken bayous, and rendered it easy for the 
British to bring up their heavy guns ; and on 
the same day their trusted leader. Sir Edward 
Packenham, arrived to take command in per- 
son, and his presence gave new life to the 
whole army. A battery was thrown up dur- 
ing the two succeeding nights on the brink 
of the river opposite to where the Carolina 
lay ; and at dawn a heavy cannonade of red- 
hot shot and shell w'as opened upon her from 
eleven guns and a mortar.^ She responded 
briskly, but very soon caught fire and blew 

i " While sitting at table, a loud shriek was heard. 
. . . A shot had taken effect on the body of an 
unfortunate soldier . . . who was fairly cut in two 
at the lower portion of the belly ! " (Gleig, p. 306.) 

^ Latour, 113. 

^ Gleig, 307. The Americans thought the battery 
consisted of 5 18- and 12-pounders; Gleig says 9 field- 
pieces (9- and 6-pounders), 2 howitzers, and a mortar. 



NAVAL WAR OF \'^i2. 215 

up, to the vengeful joy of the troops whose 
bane she had been for the past few days. 
Her destruction removed the last obstacle to 
the immediate advance of the army ; but 
that night her place was partly taken by the 
mounted riflemen, who rode down to the 
British lines, shot the sentries, engaged the 
outposts, and kept the whole camp in a 
constant state of alarm/ 

In the morning Sir Edward Packenham put 
his army in motion, and marched on New 
Orleans. When he had gone nearly three 
miles he suddenly, and to his great surprise, 
stumbled on the American army. Jackson's 
men had worked like beavers, and his breast- 
works were already defended by over three 
thousand fighting men,^ and by half a dozen 
guns, and moreover were flanked by the 
corvette Louisiana, anchored in the stream. 
No sooner had the heads of the British col- 
umns appeared than they were driven back 
by the fire of the American batteries ; the 
field-pieces, mortars, and rocket guns were 
then brought up, and a sharp artillery duel 
took place. The motley crew of the Louisiana 
handled their long ship guns with particular 
effect ; the British rockets proved of but little 
service ^ ; and after a stiff fight, in which they 
had tv/o field-pieces and a light mortar dis- 
mounted,4 the British artillerymen fell back 

1 Gleig, 310. 

2 3,282 men in all, according to the Adjutant-Gen- 
eral's return for Dec. 28, 1814. ^ Latour, 121. 

* Gleig, 314. The ofificial returns show a loss of 18 
Americans and 58 British, the latter suffering much 



2l6 NAVAL WAR OF \Z\2. 

on the infantry. Then Packenham drew off 
his whole army out of cannon shot, and 
pitched his camp facing the intrenched lines 
of the Americans. For the next three days 
the British battalions lay quietly in front of 
their foe, like wolves who have brought to 
bay a gray boar, and crouch just out of reach 
of his tusks, waiting a chance to close in. 

Packenham, having once tried the strength 
of Jackson's position, made up his mind to 
breach his works and silence his guns with a 
regular battering train. Heavy cannon were 
brought up from the ships, and a battery was 
established on the bank to keep in check the 
Louisia7ia. Then, on the night of the last 
day of the year, strong parties of workmen 
were sent forward, who, shielded by the 
darkness, speedily threw up stout earthworks, 
and mounted therein fourteen heavy guns,* to 
face the thirteen "^ mounted in Jackson's lines, 

less than Jackson supposed. Lossing, in his " Field 
Book of the War of 1S12," not only greatly overesti- 
mates the British loss, but speaks as if this was a seri- 
ous attack, which it was not. Packenham's army, 
while marching, unexpectedly came upon the American 
intrenchment, and recoiled at once, after seeing that 
his field-pieces were unable to contend with the Ameri- 
can artillery. 

lie long i8s and 4 24-pound carronades (James, ii, 
368). Gleig says (p. 318), "6 batteries mounting 30 
pieces of heavy cannon." This must include the " brig- 
ade of field-pieces " of which James speaks. 9 of these, 
9- and 6-pounders, and 2 howitzers, had been used in 
the attack on the Carolina ; and there were also 2 
fi.eld-mortars and 2 3-pounders present ; and there must 
been i other field-piece with the army, to make up the 
30 of which Gleig speaks. 

2 vLz. : I long 32, 3 long 24s, I long 18, 3 long 12s, 3 



NAVAL WAR OF i8i2. 217 

which were but three hundred 3'ards dis- 
tant. 

New Year's day dawned very misty. As 
soon as the haze cleared off the British artil- 
lerymen opened with a perfect hail of balls, 
accompanied by a cloud of rockets and mor- 
tar shells. The Americans were taken by 
surprise, but promptly returned the fire, with 
equal fury and greater skill. Their guns 
were admirably handled ; some by the cool 
New England seamen lately forming the crew 
of the Ca7'oli7ia, others by the fierce creole 
privateersmen of Lafitte, and still others by 
the trained artillerymen of the regular army. 
They were all old hands, who in their time 
had done their fair share of fighting, and were 
not to be flurried by any attack, however un- 
expected. The British cannoneers plied their 
guns like fiends, and fast and thick fell their 
shot ; more slowly but with surer aim, their 
opponents answered them.^ The cotton bales 

long 6s, a 6-inch howitzer, and a small carronade (La- 
tour, 147) ; and on the same day Patterson had in his 
water-battery i long 24 and 2 long 12s (see his letter of 
Jan. 2d), making a total of 16 American guns. 

1 The British historian, Alison, says (" History of 
Europe," by Sir Archibald Alison, 9th edition, Edin- 
burgh and London, 1852, vol. xii, p. 141) : " It was soon 
found that the enemy's guns were so superior in 
weight and number, that nothing was to be expected 
from that species of attack." As shown above, at this 
time Jackson had on both sides of the river 16 guns; 
the British, according to both James and Gleig, be- 
tween 20 and 30. Jackson's long guns were i 32, 4 24s, 
I 18, 5 I2S, and 3 6s, throwing in all 224 pounds ; Pack- 
enham had 10 long i8s, 2 long 3s, and from 6 to 10 long 
9s and 6s, thus throwing between 228 and 258 pounds 
of shot ; while Jackson had but i howitzer and i car- 



2i8 NAVAL WAR OF i8i2. 

used in the American embrasures caught fire, 
and blew up two powder caissons ; while the 
sugar hogsheads of which the British bat- 
teries were partly composed were speedily 
shattered and splintered in all directions. 
Though the British champions fought with 
unflagging courage and untiring energy, and 
though they had long been versed in war, yet 
they seemed to lack the judgment to see and 
CQrrect their faults, and most of their shot 
went too high/ On the other hand, the old 
sea-dogs and trained regulars who held the 
field against them, not only fought their guns 
well and skilfully from the beginning, but all 
through the action kept coolly correcting 
their faults and making more sure their aim. 
Still, the fight was stiff and well contested. 
Two of the American guns were disabled and 
34 of their men were killed or wounded. But 
one by one the British cannon were silenced 
or dismounted, and by noon their gunners 
had all been driven away, with the loss of 
78 of their number. 

ronade to oppose 4 carronades, 2 ho%\itzers, 2 mortars, 
and a dozen rocket guns ; so in both number and 
weight of guns the British were greatly superior. 

^ In strong contrast to Alison, Admiral Codrington, 
an eye-witness, states the true reason of the British 
failure: ("Memoir of Admiral Sir Edward Codring- 
ton," by Lady Bourchier, London, 1873, '^ol. i, p. 334.) 
" On the 1st we had our batteries ready, by severe 
labor, in situation, from v/hich the artillery people were, 
as a matter of course, to destroy and silence the op- 
posing batteries, and give opportunity for a well-ar- 
ranged storm. But instead, not a gun of the enemy 
appeared to suffer, and our own firing too high was not 
discovered till " too late. " Such a failure in this 



NAVAL WAR OF i2>l2. 219 

The Louisiana herself took no part in this 
action. Patterson had previously landed 
some of her guns on the opposite bank of 
the river, placing them in a small redoubt. 
To match these the British also threw up some 
works and placed in them heavy guns, and all 
through New Year's day a brisk cannonade 
was kept up across the river between the two 
water-batteries, but with very little damage to 
either side. 

For a week after this failure the army of 
the invaders lay motionless facing the Amer- 
icans. In the morning and evening the defiant, 
rolling challenge of the English drums came 
throbbing up through the gloomy cypress 
swamps to where the grim riflemen of Ten- 
nessee were lying behind their log breast- 
works, and both day and night the stillness 
was at short intervals broken by the sullen 
boom of the great guns which, under Jack- 
son's orders, kept up a never-ending fire on 
the leaguering camp of his foes.^ Nor could 
the wearied British even sleep undisturbed ; 
all through the hours of darkness the outposts 
were engaged in a most harassing bush war- 
fare by the backwoodsmen, who shot the 
sentries, drove in the pickets, and allowed 
none of those who were on guard a moment's 
safety or freedom from alarm. ^ 

But Packenham was all the while steadily 
preparing for his last and greatest stroke. 
He had determined to make an assault in 

boasted arm was not to be expected, and I think it a 
blot on the artillery escutcheon." 

1 Gleig, 322. 2 Gleig, 323. 



220 JSTAVAL WAR OJ^ iSi2. 

force as soon as the expected reinforcements 
came up ; nor, in the light of his past expe- 
rience in conflict with foes of far greater 
miUtary repute than tliose now before him, 
was this a rash resolve. He had seen the 
greatest of Napoleon's marshals, each in turn, 
defeated once and again, and driven in head- 
long flight over the Pyrenees by the Duke of 
V\^ellington ; now he had under him the flower 
of the troops who had won those victories ; 
was it to be supposed for a moment that such 
soldiers * who, in a dozen battles, had con- 
quered the armies and captured the forts of 
the mighty French emperor, would shrink at 
last from a mud wall guarded by rough back- 
woodsmen ? That there would be loss of life 
in such an assault was certain ; but was loss 
of life to daunt men who had seen the horrible 
slaughter through which the stormers moved 
on to victory at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and 
San Sebastian ? At the battle of Toulouse an 
English army, of which Packenham's troops 
then formed part, had driven Soult from a 
stronger position than was now to be assailed, 
though he held it with a veteran infantry. Of 

^ Speaking of Soult's overthrow a few months pre- 
vious to this battle, Napier says (v, 209) : " He was 
opposed to one of the greatest generals of the world, at 
the head of unconquerable troops. For what Alex- 
ander's Macedonians were at Arbela, Hannibal's Afri- 
cans at Cannae, Csesar's Romans at Pharsalia, Napo- 
leon's Guards at Austerlitz — such were Wellington's 
British soldiers at this period. . . . Six years of 
uninterrupted success had engrafted on their natural 
strength and fierceness a confidence that made them 
invincible." 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 221 

a surety, the dashing general who had deliv- 
ered the decisive blow on the stricken field 
of Salamanca/ who had taken part in the rout 
of the ablest generals and steadiest soldiers of 
Continental Europe, was not the man to flinch 
from a motley array of volunteers, militia, and 
raw regulars, led by a grizzled old bush-fighter, 
whose name had never been heard of outside 
of his own swamps and there only as the 
savage destroyer of some scarcely more savage 
Indian tribes. 

Moreover, Packenham was planning a flank 
attack. Under his orders a canal was being 
dug from the head of the bayou up which the 
British had come, across the plain to the 
Mississippi. This was to permit the passage 
of a number of ship's boats, on which one 
division was to be ferried to the opposite bank 

1 It M'as about 5 o'clock when Packenham fell upon 
Thomieres. . . • From the chief to the lowest 
soldier, all [of the French] felt that they were lost, and 
in an instant Packenham, the most frank and gallant 
of men, commenced the battle. The British columns 
formed lines as they marched, and the P'rench gunners, 
standing up manfully for the honor of their country, 
sent showers of grape into the advancing masses, while 
a crowd of light troops poured in a fire of musketry, 
under cover of which the main body endeavored to dis- 
play a front. But, bearing onwards through the skir- 
mishes with the might of a giant, Packenham broke the 
half-formed lines into fragments, and sent the whole in 
confusion upon the advancing supports. . . . Pack- 
enham, bearing onwards with conquering violence, 
. . . formed one formidable line two miles in ad- 
vance of where Packenham had first attacked ; and that 
impetuous officer, with unmitigated strength, still 
pressed forward, spreading terror and disorder on the 
enemy's left." (Napier, iv, 57, 58, 59,) 



22 2 NA VAL IVAR OF \Z\2. 

of the river, where it was to move up, and, by 
capturing the breastworks and water-battery 
on the west side, flank Jackson's main position 
on the east side. ^ When this canal was nearly 
finished the expected reinforcements, two 
thousand strong, under General Lambert, 
arrived, and by the evening of the 7th all was 
ready for the attack, v/hich was to be made 
at daybreak on the following morning. Pack- 
enham had under him nearly 10,000 ^ fighting 
men ; 1,500 of these, under Colonel Thornton, 
were to cross the river and make the attack 

^ '* A particular feature in the assault was our cutting 
a canal into the Mississippi. . . . to convey a force 
to the right bank, which .... might surprise the 
enemy's batteries on that side. I do not know how 
far this measure was relied on by the general, but, as 
he ordered and made his assault at daylight, I imagine 
he did not place much dependence upon it." (Cod- 
rington, i, 335.) 

2 James (ii, 373) says the British " rank and file " 
amounted to 8,153 men, including 1,200 seamen and 
marines. The only other place where he speaks of the 
latter is in recounting the attacic on the right bank, 
when he says " about 200 " were with Thornton, while 
both the admirals, Cochrane and Codrington, make the 
number 300 ; so he probably underestimates their num- 
ber throughout, and at least 300 can be added, making 
1,500 sailors and marines, and a total of 8,453. This 
number is corroborated by Major McDougal, the officer 
who received Sir Edward's body in his arms when he 
waskilled; he says (as quoted in the "Memoirs of 
British Generals Distinguished During the Peninsular 
War," by John WiUiam Cole, Tondon, 1S56, vol. ii, p. 
364) that after the battle and the loss of 2,036 men, 
" we had still an effective force of 6,400," making a 
total before the attack of 8,436 rank and file. Calling 
it 8,450, and adding (see ante, note 10) 13.3 per cent, 
for the officers, sergeants, and trumpeters, we get about 
9,600 men. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1^12. 223 

on the west bank. Packenham himself was 
to superintend the main assault, on the east 
bank^ which was to be made by the British 
right under General Gibbs. while the left 
moved forward under General Keane, and 
General Lambert commanded the reserve/ 
Jackson's ^ position was held by a total of 

1 Letter of Major-General John Lambert to Ead 
Bathurst, Jan. 10, 181 5. 

2 4,698 on the east bank, accorduig to the official re- 
port of Adjutant-General Robert Butler, for the morn- 
ing of January 8th. The details are as follows ; 

At batteries 154 

Command of Col. Ross (671 regulars 

and 742 Louisiana militia) 1413 

Command of General Carrol (Tennes- 

seeans, and somewhat under 500 1562 

Kentuckians) 

General Coffee's command (Tennes- 
seeans, and about 250 Louisiana 

militia) 813 

Major Hind's dragoons 230 

Col. Slaughter's command 526 

Total, 4,608 

These figures tafly almost exactly with those given 
by Major Latour, except that he omits all reference to 
Col. Slaughter's command, thus reducing the number 
to about 4,100. Nor can I anywhere find any allusion 
to Slaughter's command as taking part in the battle ; 
and it is possible that these troops were the 500 Ken- 
tuckians ordered across the river by Jackson ; in which 
case his whole force but slightly exceeded 5,000 men. 

On the west bank there were 546 Louisiana militia 
— 260 of the First regiment, 176 of the Second, and no 
of the Sixth. Jackson had ordered 500 Kentucky 
troops to be sent to reinforce them ; only 400 started, 
of whom but 180 had arms. Seventy more received 
arms from the Naval Arsenal ; and thus a total of 250 
armed men were added to the 546 already on the west 
bank. 



224 NAVAL WAR OF 1^12. 

5,500 men.^ Having kept a constant watch 
on the British, Jackson had rightly concluded 
that they would make the main attack on the 
east bank, and had, accordingly, kept the bulk 
of his force on that side. His works consisted 
simply of a mud breastwork, with a ditch in 
front of it, which stretched in a straight line 
from the river on his right across the plain, 
and some distance into the morass that shel- 
tered his left. There was a small, unfinished 
redoubt in front of the breastworks on the 
river bank. Thirteen pieces of artillery were 
mounted on the works." On the right was 

1 Two thousand Kentucky militia had arrived, but in 
wretched plight; only 500 had arms, though pieces 
were found for about 250 more ; and thus Jackson's 
army received an addition of 750 very badly disciplined 
soldiers. 

" Hardly one third of the Kentucky troops, so long 
expected, are armed, and the arms they have are not 
fit for use." (Letter of Gen. Jackson to the Secre- 
tary of War, Jan. 3d.) 

2 Almost all British writers underestimate their own 
force and enormously magnify that of the Americans. 
Alison, for example, quadruples relative strength, 
writing: " About 6,000 combatants were on the British 
side ; a slender force to attack double their number, 
intrenched to the teeth in works bristling with bayo- 
nets and loaded with heavy artillery." Instead of 
double, he should have said half ; the bayonets only 
" bristled " metaphorically, as less than a quarter of the 
Americans were armed with them ; and the British 
breaching batteries had a heavier " load " of artillery 
than did the American lines. Gleigsays that " to come 
nearer the truth " he " v/ill choose a middle course, and 
suppose their whole force to be about 25,000 men," (p. 
325). Gleig, by the way, in speaking of the battle 
itself, mentions one most startling evolution of the 
Americans, namely, that *' without so much as lifting 
their faces above the ramparts, they swung their fire- 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 225 

posted the Seventh regular infantry, 430 
strong; then came 740 Louisiana mihtia 
(both French Creoles and men of color, and 
comprising 30 New Orleans riflemen, who 
were Americans), and 240 regulars of the 
Forty-fourth regiment ; while the rest of the 
line was formed by nearly 500 Kentuckians 
and over 1,600 Tennesseeans, under Carroll 
and Coffee, with 250 Creole militia in the 
morass on the extreme left, to guard the head 
of a bayou. In the rear were 230 dragoons, 
chiefly from Mississippi, and some other 
troops in reserve ; making in all 4,700 men 
on the east bank. The works on the west 
bank were farther down stream, and were very 
much weaker. Commodore Patterson had 
thrown up a water-battery of nine guns, three 
long 24's and six long 12's, pointing across 
the river, and intended to take in flank any 
foe attacking Jackson. This battery was pro- 
tected by some strong earthworks, mounting 
three field-pieces, which were thrown up just 
below it, and stretched from the river about 
200 yards into the plain. The line of defence 
was extended by a ditch for about a quarter 
of a mile farther, when it ended, and from 
there to the morass, half a mile distant, there 
were no defensive works at all. General 
Morgan, a very poor militia officer,^ was in 

locks by one arm over the wall and discharged them " 
at the British. If any one will try to perform this ""eat, 
with a long, heavy rifle held in one hand, and with his 
head hid behind a wall, so as not to see the object 
aimed at, he will get a good idea^ of the likelihood of 
any man in his senses attempting it. 

1 He committed every possible fault, excepting show- 

.15 



226 NAVAL WAR OF 1^12. 

command, with a force of 550 Louisiana 
militia, some of them poorly armed ; and on 
the night before the engagement he was re- 
inforced by 250 Kentuckians, poorly armed, 
undisciplined, and worn out with fatigue.^ 

All through the night of the 7th a strange, 
murmurous clangor arose from the British 
camp, and was borne on the moist air to the 
lines of their slumbering foes. The blows of 
pickaxe and spade as the ground was thrown 
up into batteries by gangs of workmen, the 
rumble of the artillery as it was placed in posi- 
tion, the measured tread of the battalions as 
they shifted their places or marched off under 
Thornton, — all these and the thousand other 
sounds of warlike preparation were softened 
and blended by the distance into one con- 
tinuous humming murmur, which struck on 
the ears of the American sentries with omi- 
nous foreboding for the morrow. By mid- 
night Jackson had risen and was getting every 

ing lack of courage. He placed his works at a very 
broad instead of at a narrow part of the plain, against 
the advice of Latour, who had Jackson's approval 
(Latour, 167). He continued his earthworks but a very 
short distance inland, making them exceedingly strong 
in front, and absolutely defenceless on account of their 
flanks being unprotected. He did not mount the 
lighter guns of the water-battery on his lines as he 
ought to have done. Having a force of 800 men, too 
weak anyhow, he promptly divided it ; and, finally, in 
the fight itself, he stationed a small number of abso- 
lutely raw troops in a thin line on the open, with their 
flank in air ; while a much larger number of older troops 
were kept to defend a much shorter line, behind a 
strong breastwork, with their flanks covered. 
^ Latour, 170. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 227 

thing in readiness to hurl back the blow thai 
he rightly judged was soon to fall on his front. 
Before the dawn broke his soldiery was all on 
the alert. The bronzed and brawny seamen 
were grouped in clusters around the great 
guns. The Creole soldiers came of a race 
whose habit it has ever been to take all phases 
of life joyously ; but that morning their gayety 
was tempered by a dark undercurrent of fierce 
anxiety. They had more at stake than any 
other men on the field. They were fighting 
for their homes ; they were fighting for their 
wives and their daughters. They well knew 
that the men they were to face were very brave 
in battle and very cruel in victory ; ^ they 
well knew the fell destruction and nameless 
woe that awaited their city should the English 
take it at the sword's point. They feared not 

1 To prove this, it is only needful to quote from the 
words of the Duke of Wellington himself; referring, 
it must be remembered, to their conduct in a friendly, 
not a hostile, country. " It is impossible to describe to 
you the irregularities and outrages committed by the 
troops. They are never out of sight of their officers, I 
might almost say, out of sight of the commanding 
officers of the regiments that outrages are not com- 
mitted. . . . There is not an outrage of any des- 
cription which has not been committed on a people 
who have uniformly received them as friends." " I 
really believe that more plunder and outrages have 
been committed by this army than by any other that 
ever was in the field." " A detachment seldom 
marches . . . that a murder, or a highway rob- 
bery, or some act of outrage is not committed by the 
British soldiers composing it. They have killed eight 
people since the arm.y returned to Portugal." "They 
really forget everything when plunder or wine is 
within reach." 



228 NAVAL WAR (9i^ 1812. 

for themselves ; but in the hearts of the bravest 
and most careless there lurked a dull terror of 
what that day might bring upon those they 
loved. ^ The Tennesseeans were troubled by 

2 That these fears were just can be seen by the fol- 
lowing quotations, from the works of a British 
officer, General Napier, who was an eye-witness of 
what he describes. It must be remembered that 
Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and San Sebastian were 
friendly towns, only the garrisons being hostile. " Now 
commenced that wild and desperate wickedness which 
tarnished the lustre of the soldiers' heroism. All, in- 
deed, were not alike, for hundreds risked and many lost 
their lives in striving to stop the violence ; but the 
madness generally prevailed, and as the worst men 
were leaders here, all the dreadful passions of human 
nature were displayed. Shameless rapacity, brutal in- 
temperance, savage lust, cruelty and murder, shrieks 
and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, 
the hissing of fires bursting from the houses, the 
crashing of doors and windows, the reports of muskets 
used in violence, resounded for two days and nights in 
the streets of Badajos. On the third, when the city 
was sacked, when the soldiers were exhausted by their 
ov.'n excesses, the tumult rather subsided than was 
quelled." (Vol. iii, yj7-) And again: "This storm 
seemed to be a signal from hell for the perpetration of 
villainy which would have shamed the most ferocious 
barbarians of antiquity. At Rodrigo intoxication and 
plunder had been the principal object ; at Badajos lust 
and murder were joined to rapine and drunkenness ; 
but at San Sebastian the direst, the most revolting 
cruelty was added to the catalogue of crimes — one 
atrocity of which a girl of seventeen was the victim, 
staggers the mind by its enormous, incredible, inde- 
scribable barbarity . . . a Portuguese adjutant, who 
endeavored to prevent some wickedness, was put to 
death in the market-place, not with sudden violence 
from a single ruffian, but deliberately, by a number of 
English soldiers .... and the disorder con- 
tinued until the flames, following the steps of the 
plunderer, put an end to his ferocity by destroying the 



NAVAL WAR OF 1S12. 



229 



no such misgivings. In saturnine, confident 
silence they lolled behind their mud walls, or, 
leaning on their long rifles, peered out into 
the gray fog with savage, reckless eyes. So, 
hour after hour, the two armies stood facing 
each other in the darkness, waiting for the 
light of day. 

At last the sun rose, and as its beams 
struggled through the morning mist they 
glinted on the sharp steel bayonets of the 
English, where their scarlet ranks were drawn 
up in battle array, but four hundred yards 
from the American breastworks. There stood 
the matchless infantry of the island king, in 
the pride of their strength and the splendor 
of their martial glory ; and as the haze cleared 

whole town." Packenham himself would have cer- 
tainly done all in his power to prevent excesses, and 
has been foully slandered by many early American 
writers. Alluding to these, Napier remarks, somewhat 
caustically : " Pre-eminently distinguished for detesta- 
tion of inhumanity and outrage, he has been, with 
astounding falsehood, represented as instigating his 
troops to the most infamous excesses ; but from a 
people holding millions of their fellow-beings in the 
most horrible slavery, while they prate and vaunt of 
liberty until all men turn in loathing from the sicken- 
ing folly, what can be expected.? (Vol. v, p. 31.) 
Napier possessed to a very eminent degree the virtue 
of being plain-spoken. Elsewhere (iii, 450), after giving 
a most admirably fair and just account of the origin of 
the Anglo-American war, he alludes, with a good deal 
of justice, to the Americans of 1812, as "a people who 
(notwithstanding the curse of black slavery which 
clings to them, adding the most horrible ferocity to the 
peculiar baseness of their mercantile spirit, and render- 
ing their republican vanity ridiculous) do, in their 
general government, uphold civil institutions which 
have startled the crazy despotisms of Europe." 



230 NAVAL WAR OF 18 12. 

away they moved forward, in stern silence, 
broken only by the angry, snarling notes of 
the brazen bugles. At once the American ar- 
tillery leaped into furious life ; and, ready and 
quick, the more numerous cannon of the in- 
vaders responded from their hot, feverish lips. 
Unshaken amid the tumult of that iron storm, 
the heavy red column moved steadily on 
toward the left of the American line, where 
the Tennesseeans were standing in motionless, 
grim expectancy. Three fourths of the open 
space was crossed, and the eager soldiers 
broke into a run. Then a fire of hell smote 
the British column. From the breastwork in 
front of them the white smoke curled thick 
into the air, as rank after rank the wild marks- 
men of the backwoods rose and fired, aiming 
low and sure. As stubble is withered by 
flame, so withered the British column under 
that deadly fire ; and, aghast at the slaughter, 
the reeling files staggered and gave back. 
Packenham, fit captain for his valorous host, 
rode to the front, and the troops, rallying 
round him, sprang forward with ringing 
cheers. But once again the pealing rifle- 
blast beat in their faces ; and the life of their 
dauntless leader went out before its scorching 
and fiery breath. With him fell the other 
general who was with the column, and all of 
the men who were leading it on ; and, as a 
last resource, Keane brought up his stalwart 
Highlanders ; but in vain the stubborn moun- 
taineers rushed on, only to die as their com- 
rades had died before them, with unconquer- 
able courage, facing the foe to the last. 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 231 

Keane himself was struck down ; and the 
shattered wrecks of the British column, quail- 
ing before certain destruction, turned and 
sought refuge beyond reach of the leaden 
death that had overwhelmed their comrades. 
Nor did it fare better with the weaker force 
that was to assail the right of the American 
line. This was led by the dashing Colonel 
Rennie, who, when the confusion caused by 
the main attack was at its height, rushed for- 
ward with impetuous bravery along the river 
bank. With such headlong fury did he make 
the assault, that the rush of his troops took 
the outlying redoubt, whose defenders, regu- 
lars and artillerymen, fought to the last with 
their bayonets and clubbed muskets, and were 
butchered to a man. Without delay Rennie 
flung his men at the breastworks behind, and, 
gallantly leading them, sword in hand, he and 
all around him fell, riddled through and 
through by the balls of the riflemen. Brave 
though they were, the British soldiers could 
not stand against the singing, leaden hail, for 
if they stood it was but to die. So in rout 
and wild dismay they fled back along the river 
bank to the main army. For some time after- 
ward the British artillery kept up its Are, but 
was gradually silenced ; the repulse was entire 
and complete along the whole line ; nor did 
the cheering news of success brought from 
the west bank give any hope to the British 
commanders, stunned by their crushing over- 
throw. * 

1 According to their official returns the British loss 
was 2,036; the American accounts, of course, make it 



232 NAVAL WAR C/^ 1812. 

Meanwhile Colonel Thornton's attack on 
the opposite side had been successful, but 
had been delayed beyond the originally in- 
tended hour. The sides of the canal by which 
the boats were to be brought through to the 
^Mississippi caved in and choked the passage/ 
so that only enough got through to take over a 
ihalf of Thornton's force. With these, seven 
hundred in number/ he crossed, but as he 
did not allow for the current, it carried him 
down about two miles below the proper 
landing-place. Meanwhile General Morgan, 
having under him eight hundred militia/ 
whom it was of the utmost importance to have 

much greater. Latour is the only trustworthy American 
contemporary historian of this war, and even he at 
times absurdly exaggerates the British force and loss, 
Most of the other American " histories " of that period 
were the most preposterously bombastic works that ever 
saw print. But as regards this battle, none of them 
are as bad as even such British historians as Alison ; 
the exact reverse being the case in many other battles, 
notably Lake Erie. The devices each author adopts 
to lessen the seeming force of his side are generally of 
much the same character. For instance, Latour says 
that 800 of Jackson's men were employed on works at 
the rear, on guard duty, etc., and deducts them ; James, 
for precisely similar reasons, deducts S53 men : by such 
means one reduces Jackson's total force to 4,000, and 
the other gives Packenham but 7,300. Only 2,000 
Americans were actually engaged on the east banks. 

^ Codrington, i, 386. 

■^ James says 298 soldiers and about 200 sailors ; but 
Admiral Cochrane in his letter (Jan. i8th) says 600 
men, half sailors ; and Admiral Codrington also (p. 
335) gives this number, 300 being sailors : adding 
13^ per cent, for the officers, sergeants, and trumpeters, 
"We get 680 men. 

2 796. (Latour, 164-172.) 



NAVAL WAR O^ 1812. 233 

kept together, promptly divided them and 
sent three hundred of the rawest and most 
poorly armed down to meet the enemy in the 
open. The inevitable result was their imme- 
diate rout and dispersion ; about one hundred 
got back to Morgan's lines. He then had six 
hundred men, all militia, to oppose to seven 
hundred regulars. So he stationed the four 
hundred best disciplined men to defend the 
two hundred yards of strong breastworks, 
mounting three guns, which covered his left, 
while the two hundred worst disciplined were 
placed to guard six hundred yards of open 
ground on his right, with their flank resting in 
air, and entirely unprotected. This truly phe- 
nomenal arrangement ensured beforehand the 
certain defeat of his troops, no matter how 
well they fought ; but, as it turned out, they 
hardly fought at all. Thornton, pushing up 
the river, first attacked the breastwork in 
front, but was checked by a hot fire ; deploy- 
ing his men, he then sent a strong force to 
march round and take Morgan on his exposed 
right flank.^ There, the already demoralized 
Kentucky militia, extended in thin order 
across an open space, outnumbered, and taken 
in flank by regular troops, were stampeded at 
at once, and after firing a single volley they 
took to their heels.3 This exposed the flank 
of the better disciplined Creoles, who were 
also put to flight, but they kept some order 

1 Report of Court of Inquiry, Maj.-Gen, Wm. Carroll 
presiding. 

2 Letter of Col. W. Thornton, Jan. 8, 1S15. 

2 Letter of Commodore Patterson, Jan. 13. 181 5 



234 NAVAL WAR OF id>i2. 

and were soon rallied/ In bitter rage Pat- 
terson spiked the guns of his water-battery 
and marched off with his sailors, unmolested. 
The American loss had 'been slight, and that 
of their opponents not heavy, though among 
their dangerously wounded was Colonel 
Thornton. 

This success, though a brilliant one, and a 
disgrace to the American arms, had no effect 
on the battle. Jackson at once sent over re- 
inforcements under the famous French gen- 
eral, Humbert, and preparations were forth- 
with made to retake the lost position. But it 
was already abandoned, and the force that 
had captured it had been recalled b}'' Lam- 
bert, when he found that the place could not 
be held without additional troops.^ The 
total British loss on both sides of the river 
amounted to over two thousand men, the vast 
majority of whom had fallen in the attack on 
the Tennesseeans, and most of the remainder 
in the attack made bv Colonel Rennie. The 
Americans had lost but seventy men, of whom 

1 Alison outdoes himself in recounting this feat. 
Having reduced the British force to 340 men, he says 
they captured the redoubt, '' though defended by 22 
guns and 1,700 men." Of course, it was physically 
impossible for the water-battery to take part in the 

' defence ; so there were but 3 guns, and by halving the 

(force on one side and trebling it on the other, he makes 

the relative strength of the Americans just sixfold what 

it was, — and is faithfully followed by other British 

writers. 

2 The British Col. Dickson, who had been sent over 
to inspect, reported that 2,000 men would be needed to 
hold the battery ; so Lambert ordered the British to 
retire. (Lambert's letter, Jan. loth.) 



NAVAL WAR OF iZi2. 235 

but thirteen fell in the main attack. On the 
east bank, neither the Creole militia nor the 
Forty-fourth regiment had taken any part in 
the combat. 

The English had thrown for high stakes 
and had lost everything, and they knew it. 
There was nothing to hope for left. Nearly a 
fourth of their fighting men had fallen ; and 
among the officers the proportion was far 
larger. Of their four generals, Packenham 
was dead, Gibbs dying, Keane disabled, and 
only Lambert left. Their leader, the ablest 
officers, and all the flower of their bravest men 
were lying, stark and dead, on the bloody 
plain before them ; and their bodies were 
doomed to crumble into mouldering dust on 
the green fields where they had fought and 
had fallen. It was useless to make another 
trial. They had learned to their bitter cost, 
that no troops, however steady, could advance 
over open ground against such a fire as came 
from Jackson's lines. Their artillerymen had 
three times tried conclusions with the Amer- 
ican gunners, and each time they had been 
forced to acknowledsie themselves worsted. 
They v/ould never have another chance to 
repeat their flank attack, for Jackson had 
greatly strengthened and enlarged the works 
on the west bank, and had seen that they were 
fully manned and ably commanded. More- 
over, no sooner had the assault failed, than 
the Americans again began their old harass- 
ing warfare. The heaviest cannon, both 
from the breastwork and the water-battery, 
played on the British camp, both night and 



236 NAVAL WAR OF id>i2. 

day, giving the army no rest, and the mounted 
riflemen kept up a trifling, but incessant and 
annoying, skirmishing with their pickets and 
outposts. 

The British could not advance, and it was 
worse than useless for them to stay where 
they were, for though they, from time to time, 
were reinforced, yet Jackson's forces aug- 
mented faster than theirs, and every day 
lessened the numerical inequality between the 
two armies. There was but one thing left to 
do, and that was to retreat. They had no 
fear of being attacked in turn. The British 
soldiers were made of too good stuff to be in 
the least cowed or cast down even by such a 
slaughtering defeat as that they had just suf- 
fered, and nothing would have given them 
keener pleasure than to have had a fair chance 
at their adversaries in the open ; but this 
chance was just what Jackson had no idea of 
giving them. His own army, though in part 
as good as an army could be, consisted also 
in part of untrained militia, while not a 
quarter of his men had bayonets ; and the 
wary old chief, for all his hardihood, had far 
too much wit to hazard such a force in fight 
with a superior number of seasoned veterans, 
thoroughly equipped, unless on his own 
ground and in his own manner. So he con- 
tented himself with keeping a sharp watch on 
Lambert ; and on the night of January i8th 
the latter deserted his position, and made a 
very skilful and rapid retreat, leaving eighty 
wounded men and fourteen pieces of cannon 



NAVAL WAR (9^ 1812. 237 

behind him.^ A few stragglers were captured 
on land, and, while the troops were embark- 
ing, a number of barges, with over a hundred 
prisoners, were cut out out by some American 
seamen in row-boats ; but the bulk of the 
army reached the transports unmolested. At 
the same time, a squadron of vessels, which 
had been unsuccessfully bombarding Fort 
Saint-Philip for a week or two, and had been 
finally driven off when the fort got a mor- 
tar large enough to reach them with, also 
returned ; and the whole fleet set sail for 
Mobile. The object was to capture Fort 
Boyer, which contained less than four hun- 
dred men, and, though formidable on its sea- 
front,^ was incapable of defence when regularly 
attacked on its land side. The British landed, 

1 Letter of General Jackson, Jan. 19th, and of Gen- 
eral Lambert, Jan. 28th. 

2 " Towards the sea its fortifications are respectable 
enough ; but on the land side it is little better than a 
block-house. The ramparts being composed of sand 
not more than three feet in thickness, and faced with 
plank, are barely cannon-proof ; while a sand hill, 
rising within pistol-shot of the ditch, completely com- 
mands it. Within, again, it is as much wanting in 
accommodation as it is in strength. There are no 
bomb-proof barracks, nor any hole or arch under which 
men might find protection from shells ; indeed, so 
deficient is it in common lodging-rooms, that great 
part of the garrison sleep in tents. • . . With the 
reduction of this trifling work all hostilities ended." 
(Gleig, 357.) 

General Jackson impliedly censures the garrison tor 
surrendering so quickly ; but in such a fort it was 
absolutely impossible to act otherwise, and not the 
slightest stain rests upon the fort's defenders. 



238 NAVAL WAR OF iS 12. 

February 8th, some 1,500 men, broke ground, 
and made approaches ; for four days the 
work went on amid a continual fire, which 
killed or wounded 11 Americans and 31 Brit- 
ish ; by that time the battering guns were in 
position and the fort capitulated, February 
T2th, the garrison marching out with the hon- 
ors of war. Immediately afterward the news 
of peace arrived and all hostilities terminated. 
In spite of the last trifling success, the 
campaign had been to the British both bloody 
and disastrous. It did not affect the results 
of the war ; and the decisive battle itself 
was a perfectly useless shedding of blood, for 
peace had been declared before it was fought. 
Nevertheless, it was not only glorious but 
profitable to the United States. Louisiana 
was saved from being severely ravaged, and 
New Orleans from possible destruction ; and 
after our humiliating defeats in trying to repel 
the invasions of A^irginia and Maryland, the 
signal victory of New Orleans was really 
almost a necessity for the preservation of 
the national honor. This campaign was the 
great event of the war, and in it was fought 
the most important battle as regards numbers 
that took place during the entire struggle ; 
and the fact that we were victorious, not only 
saved our self-respect at home, but also gave 
us a prestige abroad which we should other- 
wise have totally lacked. It could not be 
said to entirely balance the numerous defeats 
that we had elsewhere suffered on land — de- 
feats which had so far only been offset by 
Harrison's victory in 18 13 and the campaign 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 239 

in Lower Canada in 18 14 — but it at any rate 
went a long way toward making the score 
even. 

Jackson is certainly by all odds the most 
prominent figure that appeared during this 
war, and stands head and shoulders above 
any other commander, American or British, 
that it produced. It will be difficult, in all 
history, to show a parallel to the feat that he 
performed. In three weeks' fighting, with a 
force largely composed of militia, he utterly 
defeated and drove away an army twice the 
size of his own, composed of veteran troops, 
and led by one of the ablest of European gen- 
erals. During the whole campaign he only 
erred once, and that was in putting General 
Morgan, a very incompetent officer, in com.- 
mand of the forces on the west bank. He 
suited his movements admirably to the various 
exigencies that arose. The promptness and 
skill with which he attacked, as soon as he 
knew of the near approach of the British, 
undoubtedly saved the city ; for their van- 
guard was so roughly handled that, instead of 
being able to advance at once, they were 
forced to delay three days, during which time 
Jackson entrenched himself in a position from 
which he was never driven. But after this 
first attack the offensive would have been not 
only hazardous, but useless, and accordingly 
Jackson, adopting that mode of warfare 
which best suited the ground he was on and 
the troops he had under him, forced the enemy 
always to fight him where he was strongest, 
and confined himself strictly to the pure de- 



240 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

fensive — a system condemned by most Euro- 
pean authorities/ but which has at times 
succeeded to admiration in America, as wit- 
ness Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, Kenesaw 
Mountain, and Franklin. Moreover, it must 
be remembered that Jackson's success was in 
no wise owing either to chance or to the 
errors of his adversary.^ As far as fortune 

1 Thus Napier says (vol. v, p. 25) : " Soult fared as 
most generals will who seek by extensive lines to 
supply the want of numbers or of hardiness in the 
troops. Against rude commanders and undisciplined 
solders, lines may avail ; seldom against accomplished 
commanders, never when the assailants are the better 
solders." And again (p. 150), " Offensive operations 
must be the basis of a good defensive system." 

2 The reverse has been stated again and again with 
very great injustice, not only by British, but even 
by American writers (as e. g., Prof. W. G. Sumner, 
in his " Andrew Jackson as a Public Man," Boston, 
1882). The climax of absurdity is reached by Major 
McDougal, who says (as quoted by Cole in his 
" Memoirs of British Generals," ii, p. 364) : " Sir 
Edward Packenham fell, not after an utter and dis- 
astrous defeat, but at the very moment when the arms 
of victory were extended towards him " ; and by James, 
who says (ii, 388) : " The premature fall of a British 
general saved an American city." These assertions 
are just on a par with those made by American writers, 
that only the fall of Lawrence prevented the Chesapeake 
from capturing the Shamion. 

British writers have always attributed the defeat 
largely to the fact that the 44th regiment, which was 
to have led the attack with fascines and ladders, did 
not act well. I doulDt if this had any effect on the 
result. Some few of the men with ladders did reach 
the ditch, but w^ere shot down at once, and their fate 
would have been shared by any others who had been 
with them ; the bulk of the column w^as never able to 
advance through the fire up to the breast-work, and 
all the ladders and fascines in Christendom would not 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 241 

favored either side, it was that of the British ; ' 
and Packenham left nothing undone to ac- 
complish his aim, and made no movements 
that his experience in European war did not 
justify his making. There is not the slightest 
reason for supposing that any other British 
general would have accomplished more or 
have fared better than he did.^ Of course 
Jackson owed much to the nature of the 
ground on which he fought ; but the oppor- 
tunities it afforded would have been useless in 
the hands of any general less ready, hardy, 
and skilful than Old Hickory. 

A word as to the troops themselves. The 
British infantry was at that time the best in 
Europe, the French coming next. Pack- 
enham's soldiers had formed part of Welling- 
ton's magnificent Peninsular army, and they 
lost nothing of their honor at New Orleans. 
Their conduct throughout was admirable. 
Their steadiness in the night battle, their 
patience through the various hardships they 
had to undergo, their stubborn courage in 

have helped it. There will always be innumerable 
excuses offered for any defeat ; but on this occasion 
the truth is simply that the British regulars found they 
could not advance in the open against a fire more 
deadly than they ever before encountered. 

1 E. g. : The unexpected frost made the swamps firm 
for them to advance througli : the river being so low 
when the levee was cut, the bayous were filled, instead 
of the British being drowned out ; the Carolina was 
only blown up because the wind happened to fail her ; 
bad weather delayed the advance of arms and reinforce- 
ments, etc., etc. 

2 " He was the next man to look to after Lord Wel- 
lington " (Codrington, i, 339). 

16 



242 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

action, and the undaunted front they showed 
in time of disaster (for at the very end they 
were to the full as ready and eager to fight as 
at the beginning), all showed that their sol- 
dierly qualities were of the highest order. As 
much cannot be said of the British artillery, 
which, though very bravely fought was clearly 
by no means as skilfully handled as was the 
case with the American guns. The courage 
of the British officers of all arms is mournfully 
attested by the sadly large proportion they 
bore to the total on the lists of the killed and 
wounded. 

An even greater meed of praise is due to the 
American soldiers, for it must not be forgotten 
that they were raw troops opposed to veterans ; 
and indeed, nothing but Jackson's tireless 
care in drilling them could have brought them 
into shape at all. The regulars were just as 
good as the British, and no better. The 
Kentucky militia, who had only been 48 hours 
with the army and were badly armed and 
totally undisciplined, proved as useless as 
their brethren of New York and Virginia, at 
Queenstown Heights and Bladensburg, had 
previously shown themselves to be. They 
would not stand in the open at all, and even 
behind a breastwork had to be mixed with 
better men. The Louisiana militia, fighting 
in defence of their homes, and well trained, 
behaved excellently, and behind breastworks 
were as formidable as the regulars. The Ten- 
nesseeans, good men to start with, and already 
well trained in actual warfare under Jackson, 
were in their own way unsurpassable as 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 243 

soldiers. In the open field the British reg- 
ulars, owing to their greater skill in ma- 
noeuvring, and to their having bayonets, with 
which the Tennesseeans were unprovided, 
could in all likelihood have beaten them ; 
but in rough or broken ground the skill of the 
Tennesseeans, both as marksmen and woods- 
men, would probably have given them the 
advantage ; while the extreme deadliness of 
their fire made it far more dangerous to at- 
tempt to storm a breastwork guarded by these 
forest riflemen than it would have been to 
attack the same work guarded by an equal 
number of the best regular troops of Europe. 
The American soldiers deserve great credit 
for doing so well ; but greater credit still 
belongs to Andrew Jackson, who, with his 
cool head and quick eye, his stout heart and 
strong hand, stands out in history as the ablest 
general the United States produced, from the 
outbreak of the Revolution down to the 
beginning of the Great Rebellion. 



APPENDIX A. 

TONNAGE OF THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN MEN- 
OF-WAR IN 1812-15. 

According to Act of Congress (quoted in 
*'Niles' Register," iv, 64), the way of meas- 
uring double-decked or war-vessels was as 
follows : 

" Measure from fore-part of main stem to 
after-part of stern port, above the upper deck ; 
take the breadth thereof at broadest part 
above the main wales, one-half of which 
breadth shall be accounted the depth. De- 
duct from the length three-fifths of such 
breadth, multiply the remainder by the breadth 
and the product by the depth ; divide by 95 ; 
the quotient is tonnage." 

(i. e.^ If length = x, and breadth = y ; 
Tonnage = (x — | y) x y x | y.) 

95 
Niles states that the British mode, as taken 
from Steele's " Shipmaster's Assistant," was 
this : Drop plumb-line over stem of ship and 
measure distance between such line and the 
after-part of the stern port at the load water- 
mark ; then measure from top of said plumb- 
line in parallel direction with the water to 
perpendicular point immediately over the load 

245 



246 NAVAL WAR OF 18 12. 

water-mark of the fore-part of main stem ; 
subtract from such admeasurement the above 
distance ; the remainder is ship's extreme 
length, from which deduct 3 inches for every 
foot of the load-draught of water for the rake 
abaft, and also three-fifths of the ship's 
breadth for the rake forward ; remainder is 
length of keel for tonnage. Breadth shall be 
taken from outside to outside of the plank in 
broadest part of the ship either above or be- 
low the main wales, exclusive of all manner 
of sheathing or doubling. Depth is to be 
considered as one-half the length. Tonnage 
will then be the length into the depth into 
breadth, divided by 94. 

Tonnage was thus estimated in a purely 
arbitrary manner, with no regard to actual 
capacity or displacement ; and, moreover, 
what is of more importance, the British 
method differed from the American so much 
that a ship measured in the latter way would 
be nominally about 15 per cent, larger than 
if measured by British rules. This is the 
exact reverse of the statement made by the 
British naval historian, James. His mistake 
is pardonable, for great confusion existed on 
the subject at that time, even the officers not 
knowing the tonnage of their own ships. 
When the Preside7it was captured, her officers 
stated that she measured about 1,400 tons ; 
in reality she tonned 1,576, American measure. 
Still more singular was the testimony of the 
officers of the Argus^ who thought her to be of 
about35o tons, while she was of 298, by Amer- 
ican, or 244, by British measurement. These er- 



APPENDIX. 247' 

rors were the more excusable as they occurred 
also in higher quarters. The earliest notice we 
have about the three 45-gun frigates of the 
ConstitutioJi' s class, is in the letter of Secretary 
of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddart, on Dec. 24, 
1798/ where they are expressly said to be of 
1,576 tons ; and this tonnage is given them 
in every navy list that mentions it for 40 
years afterward ; yet Secretary Paul Hamil- 
ton in one of his letters incidentally alludes 
to them as of 1,444 tons. Later, I think about 
the year 1838, the method of measuring was 
changed, and their tonnage was put down as 
1,607. James takes the American tonnage 
from Secretary Hamilton's letter as 1,444, 
and states (vol. vi, p. 5), that this is equiv- 
alent to 1,533 tons, English. But in reality, 
by American measurement, the tonnage was 
1,576; so that even according to James' own 
figures the British way of measurement made 
the frigate 43 tons smaller than the American 
way did ; actually the difference was nearer 
290 tons. James' statements as to the size of 
our various ships would seem to have been 
largely mere guess-work, as he sometimes 
makes them smaller and sometimes larger 
than they were according to the official navy 
lists. Thus, the Constitution^ Freside7it^ and 
United States, each of 1,576, he puts down as 
of 1,533; the Wasp, of 450, as of 434; the 
Hornet, of 480, as of 460 ; and the Chesapeake, 
of 1,244, as of 1,135 tons. On the other 
hand the E?iterprise, of 165 tons, he states to 
be of 245 ; th.Q Argus, of 298, he considers to 
^ " American State Papers," xiv, 57. 



248 NAVAL WAR OF \'^i2. 

be of 316, and the Peacock^ Frolic^ etc., of 509 
each, as 01 539. He thus certainly adopts 
different standards of measurement, not only 
for the American as distinguished from the 
British vessels, but even among the various 
American vessels themselves. And there are 
other difficulties to be encountered ; not only 
were there different ways of casting tonnage 
from given measurements, but also there 
were different ways of getting what purported 
to be the same measurement. A ship, that, 
according to the British method of measure- 
ment was of a certain length, would, accord- 
ing to the American method, be about 5 per 
cent, longer ; and so if two vessels were the 
same size, the American would have the great- 
est nominal tonnage. For example, James in 
his " Naval Occurrences" (p. 467), gives the 
length of the Cyane' s m3.in deck as 118 feet 
2 inches. This same Cyane was carefully 
surveyed and measured, under orders from 
the United States navy department, by Lieut. 
B. F. Hoffman, and in his published report ^ 
he gives, among the other dimensions : 
*' Length of spar-deck, 124 feet 9 inches," 
and " length of gun-deck 123 feet 3 inches." 
With such a difference in the way of taking 
measurements, as well as of computing ton- 
nage from the measurements when taken, it 
is not surprising that according to the Amer- 
ican method the Cyaiie should have ranked as 
of about 659 tons, instead of 539. As James 
takes no account of any of these differences I 
hardly know how to treat his statements of com- 
2 " American State Papers," xiv, p. 417. 



APPENDIX. 



249 



parative tonnage. Thus he makes the ^^r;z^/ 
460 tons, and the Peacock and Penguin^ which 
she at different times captured, about 388 
each. As it happens both Captain Lawrence 
and Captain Biddle, who commanded the 
Hornet in her two successful actions, had their 
prizes measured. The Peacock sank so rapidly 
that Lawrence could not get very accurate 
measurements of her ; he states her to be 
four feet shorter and half a foot broader than 
the Horfief. The British naval historian, 
Brenton (vol. v, p. iii), also states that they 
were of about the same tonnage. But we 
have more satisfactory evidence from Captain 
Biddle. He stayed by his prize nearly two 
days, and had her thoroughly examined in 
every way ; and his testimony is, of course, 
final. He reports that the Peijguin was by 
actual measurement two feet shorter, and 
somewhat broader than the Horiiet^ and with 
thicker scantling. She tonned 477, compared 
to the Horjiefs 480 — a difference of about 
one-half of one per cent. This testimony is 
corroborated by that of the naval inspectors 
who examined the Epervier after she was cap- 
tured by the Peacock. Those two vessels 
were respectively of 477 and 509 tons, and as 
such they ranked on the navy lists. The 
American Peacock and her sister ships were 
very much longer than the brig sloops of the 
Epervier s class, but were no broader, the 
latter being very tubby. All the English 
sloops were broader in proportion than the 
American ones were ; thus the Levant^ which 
was to have mounted the same number of 



250 NAVAL WAR OF 1Z12. 

guns as the Peacock, had much more beam, 
and was of greater tonnage, although of 
rather less length. The Macedojiian, when 
captured, ranked on our lists as of 1,325 tons,' 
the Uiiiied States as of 1,576 ; and they thus 
continued until, as I have said before, the 
method of measurement was changed, when 
the former ranked as of 1,341, and the latter 
as of 1,607 tons. James, however, makes 
them respectively 1,081 and 1,533. Now to 
get the comparative force he ought to have 
adopted the first set of measurements given, 
or else have made them 1,081 and 1,286. 
Out of the twelve single-ship actions of the 
war, four were fought with 38-gun frigates like 
the Macedonian, and seven with 18-gun brig 
sloops of the Eperviers class ; and as the Mace- 
do7iia?i and Eperi'ierwexQ both regularly rated 
in our navy, we get a very exact idea of our 
antagonists in those eleven cases. The twelfth 
was the fight between the Enterprise and the 
Boxer, in which the latter was captured ; the 
Enterprise was apparently a little smaller 
than her foe, but had two more guns, which 
she carried in her bridle ports. 

As my purpose in giving the tonnage is to 
get it comparatively, and not absolutely, I 
have given it throughout for both sides as es- 
timated by the American method of that day. 
The tonnage of the vessels on the lakes has 
been already noticed. 

^ See the work of Lieutenant Emmons, who had 
access to all the official records. 



APPENDIX, 



251 



APPENDIX B. 

PREVIOUS HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVY. 

Very few students of naval history will deny 
that in 18 12 the average American ship was 
superior to the average British ship of the 
same strength ; and that the latter was in 
turn superior to the average French ship. 
The explanation given by the victor is in each 
case the same ; the American writer ascribes 
the success of his nation to " the aptitude of 
the American character for the sea," and the 
Briton similarly writes that " the English are 
inherently better suited for the sea than the 
French." Race characteristics may have had 
some little effect between the last pair of 
combatants (although only a little), and it is 
possible that they somewhat affected the out- 
come of the Anglo-American struggle, but 
they did not form the main cause. This can 
best be proved by examining the combats of 
two preceding periods, in which the English, 
French, and Americans were at war with one 
another. 

During the years 1 798-1800, the United 
States carried on a desultory conflict with 
France, then at war with England. Our navy 
was just built, and was rated in the most ex- 
traordinary manner ; the Chesapeake^ carrying 
18-pounders, was called a 44 ; and the Constel- 
lation, which carried 24's, a 36, while the 



252 NAVAL WAR OF y8i2. 

Washington, rating 24, was really much heavier 
than the Boston, rating 22>. On Feb. 9, 1799, 
after an hour's conflict, the Cotistellatmi cap- 
tured the French frigate Insurgente ; the 
Americans lost 3, the French 70 men, killed 
and wounded. The Co7istellatio7i carried but 
38 guns ; 28 long 24's, on the main deck, and 
10 long 12's on the quarter-deck, with a 
crew of 309 men. According to Troude (iii, 
169), rinsurge7ite carried 26 long 12's, 10 
long 6's, and 4 36-pound carronades ; the 
Americans report her number of men as near- 
ly four hundred. Thus in actual ^ (not nomi- 
nal) weight of shot the Constellation w^^s supe- 
rior by about 80 pounds, and was inferior in 
crew by from 50 to 100 men. This would 
make the vessels apparently nearly equal in 
force ; but of course the long 24's of the Coii- 
stellatio7i made it impossible that V Insurge7ite, 
armed only with long 12's, should contend 
with her. As already said, a superiority in 
number of men makes very little difference, 
provided each vessel has ample to handle the 
guns, repair damages, work the sails, etc, 
Troude goes more into details than any other 
French historian ; but I think his details are 

1 French shot was really very much heavier than the 
nominally correspondmg English shot, as the following 
table taken from Captain T. L. Simmons' work on 
" Heavy Ordnance " (London, 1837, p. 62) will show : 

Nominal French Weight Actual Weight of Same Shot in 

of Shot. English Pounds. 

36 lbs. 43 lbs. 4 oz. 

24, " 28 " 8f " 

18 " 21 " 4| " 

12 " 14 " 7' " 



APPENDIX. 253 

generally wrong. In this case he gives the 
Constellation 12's, instead of the 24's she really 
carried; and also supplies her with 10 32- 
pound carronades — of which species of ord- 
nance there was then not one piece in our 
navy. The first carronades we ever had were 
those carried by the same frigate on her next 
voyage. She had completely changed her 
armament, having 28 long i8's on the main- 
deck, ten 24-pound carronades on the quarter- 
deck ; and, I believe, 6 long 12's on the fore- 
castle, with a crew of 310 men. Thus armed, 
she encountered and fought a drawn battle 
with la Vengeance. Troude (vol. iii, pp. 201 
and 216) describes the armament of the latter 
as 26 long i8's, 10 long 8's, and 4 36-pound 
carronades. On board of her was an Ameri- 
can prisoner, James Howe, who swore she had 
52 guns and 400 men (see Cooper, i, 306). 
The French and American accounts thus radi- 
cally disagree. The point is settled definitely 
by the report of the British captain Milne, 
who, in the Seme frigate, captured la Ven- 
geance in the same year, and then reported her 
armament as being 28 long i6's, 16 long 12's, 
and 8 36-pound carronades, with 326 men. 
As the American and British accounts, writ- 
ten entirely independently of one another, tally 
almost exactly, it is evident that Troude was 
very greatly mistaken. He blunders very 
much over the Constellation'' s armament. 

Thus in this action the American frigate 
fought a draw with an antagonist nearly as 
much superior to herself as an American 44 
was to a British 38. In November, 1800, the 



254 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

" 28-gun frigate," Boston^ of 530 tons, 200 
men, carrying 24 long 9's on the main-deck, 
and on tiie spar-deck 8 long 6's (or possi- 
bly 12-pound carronades), captured, after- 
two hours' action, the French corvette Ber~ 
ceau, of 24 guns, long 8's ; the Boston was 
about the same size as her foe, with the same 
number of men, and superior in metal about 
as 10 to 9. She lost 15, and the Berceaii 40 
men. Troude (iii, p. 219) gives the Beiceau 
30 guns, 22 long 8*s and 8 12-pound car- 
ronades. If this is true she was in reality of 
equal force with the Boston, But I question 
if Troude really knew anything about the com- 
batants ; he gives the Boston (of the same size 
and build as the Cyane) 48 guns — a number 
impossible for her to carry. He continually 
makes the grossest errors ; in this same (the 
third) volume, for example, he arms a British 
50-gun ship with 72 cannon, giving her a 
broadside fifty percent, heavier than it should 
be (p. 141) ; and, still worse, states the ordi- 
nary complement of a British 32-gun frigate 
to be 384 men, instead of about 220 (p. 417). 
He is by no means as trustworthy as James, 
though less rancorous. 

The United States schooner Experiment, of 
12 guns, long 6's, and 70 men, captured the 
French man-of-war three-masted schooner La 
Diane, of 14 guns (either 4- or 6-pounders), 
with a crew of 60 men, and 30 passengers ; 
and the Enterprise, the sister vessel of the 
Experiment, captured numerous strong priva- 
teers. One of them, a much heavier vessel 
than her captor, made a most obstinate fight. 



APPENDIX. 



255 



She was the Flambeau brig of fourteen 8- 
pounders and 100 men, of whom half were 
killed or wounded. The Enterprise had 3 
killed and 7 wounded. 

Comparing these different actions, it is evi- 
dent that the Americans were superior to the 
French in fighting capacity during the years 
1799 and 1800. During the same two years 
there had been numerous single contests be- 
tween vessels of Britain and France, ending 
almost invariably in favor of the former, which 
I mention first in each couple. The 12- 
pounder frigate Doedaliis captured the 12- 
pounder frigate Prude?i/e, of equal force. The 
British i8-pounder frigate Sybille captured the 
frigate Forte^ armed with 52 guns, 30 of them 
long 24's on the main-deck ; she was formida- 
bly armed and as heavy as the Constitution. 
The Sybille lost 22 and the Forte 145 men 
killed and wounded. The i8-pounder frigate 
Clyde, with the loss of 5 men, captured the 
i2-pounder frigate F'^j'/<2/d', which lost 32. The 
cutter Courser., of twelve 4-pounders and 40 
men, captured the privateer Guerriere, of 
fourteen 4-pounders and 44 men. The cutter 
Viper, of fourteen 4-pounders and 48 men, 
captured the privateer Suret, of fourteen 4- 
pounders and 57 men. The i6-gun ship- 
sloop Peterel, with 89 men, engaged the Cerf, 
14, Lejoille, 6, and Ligurieinie, 16, with in all 
240 men, and captured the Ligurie?iiie. The 
30-gun corvette Dart captured by surprise 
the 38-gun frigate Desiree. The Gypsey, of 
ten 4-pounders and 82 men, captured the Quid- 
proguo, of 8 guns, 4- and 8-pounders, and 98 



256 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

men. The schooner Mi/b?'ook, of sixteen 18- 
pounder carronades and 47 men, fought a 
draw with the privateer Belloiie^ of 24 long 8's 
and six 36-pound carronades. Finally, six 
months after the Vengeance had escaped from 
the Constellation (or beaten her off, as the 
French say), she was captured by the British 
frigate Sei?ie, which threw a broadside about 
30 pounds more than the American did in her 
action, and had some 29 men less aboard. 
So that her commander. Captain Milne, with 
the same force as Commodore Truxton, of the 
Co7istellatiofi, accomplished what the latter 
failed to do. 

Reviewing all these actions, it seems pretty 
clear that, while the Americans were then un- 
doubtedly much superior to the French, they 
were still, at least slightly, inferior to the 
British. 

From 1777 to 1782 the state of things was 
very different. The single combats were too 
numerous for me to mention them here ; and 
besides it would be impossible to get at the 
truth without going to a great deal of trouble 
— the accounts given by Cooper, Schomberg, 
and Troude differing so widely that they can 
often hardlv be recognized as treating: of the 
same events. But it is certain that the British 
were very much superior to the Americans. 
Some of the American ships behaved most 
disgracefully, deserting their consorts and 
fleeing from much smaller foes. Generally 
the American ship was captured when opposed 
by an equal force — although there were some 
brilliant exceptions to this. With the French 



APPENDIX. 



257 



things were more equal ; their frigates were 
sunk or captured time and again, but nearly 
as often they sunk or captured their antago- 
nists. Some of the most gallant fights on rec- 
ord are recounted of French frigates of this 
period; in 1781 the 3^merve, 32, resisted the 
Courageous^ 74, till she had lost 73 men and 
had actually inflicted a loss of 17 men on her 
gigantic antagonist, and the previous year the 
Bellepoule, 32, had performed a similar feat 
with \^\^ Nonsuch^ 64, while the Capricieiise^ 32, 
had fought for five hours before surrendering 
to the Prudente and Licorne^ each of force 
equal to herself. She lost 100 men, inflicting 
a loss of 55 upon her two antagonists. Such 
instances make us feel rather ashamed when 
w^e compare them with the fight in which the 
British ship Glasgow, 20, beat off an American 
squadron of 5 ships, including two of equal 
force to herself, or with the time when the 
Ariadne, 20, and Ceres, 14, attacked and cap- 
tured without resistance the Alfred, 20, the 
latter ship being deserted in the most outrage- 
ously cowardly manner by her consort the 
Raleigh, 32. At that period the average 
American ship was certainly by no means 
equal to the average French ship of the same 
force, and the latter in turn was a little, but 
only a little, inferior to the average British 
ship of equal strength. 

Thus in 1782 the British stood first in nau- 
tical prowess, separated but by a very narrow 
interval from the French, while the Americans 
made a bad third. In 1789 the British still 
stood first, while the Americans had made a 

17 



258 NAVAL WAR (97^ 1812. 

great stride forward, coming close on their 
heels, and the French had fallen far behind 
into the third place. In 18 12 the relative 
positions of the British and French were un- 
changed, but the Americans had taken an- 
other ver}^ decided step in advance, and stood 
nearly as far ahead of the British as the latter 
were ahead of the French. 

The explanation of these changes is not 
difficult. In 1782 the American war vessels 
were in reality privateers ; the crews were un- 
practiced, the officers untrained, and they had 
none of the traditions and discipline of a 
regular service. At the same time the French 
marine was at its highest point; it was com- 
manded by offi.cers of ability and experience, 
promoted largely for merit, and with crev/s 
thoroughly trained, especially in gunnery, by a 
long course of service on the sea. In courage, 
and in skill in the management of guns, mus- 
ketry, etc., they were the full equals of their 
English antagonists ; their slight average in- 
feriority in seamanship may, it is possible, be 
fairly put down to the difference in race. (It 
seems certain that, when serving in a neutral 
vessel, for example, the Englishmen aboard 
are apt to make better sailors than the French- 
men.) In 1799 ^^^^ revolution had deprived 
the French of all their best officers, had let 
the character of the marine run down, and the 
discipline of the service become utterly dis- 
organized ; this exposed them to frightful 
reverses, and these in turn prevented the 
character of the service from recovering its 
former tone. Meanwhile the Americans had 



APPENDIX. 259 

established for the first time a regular navy, 
and, as there was excellent material to work 
with, it at once came up close to the English ; 
constant and arduous service, fine discipline, 
promotion for merit, and the most unflagging 
attention to practical seamanship and gunnery 
had in 18 12 raised it far above even the high 
English standard. During all these three 
periods the English marine, it must be re- 
membered, did not fall off, but at least kept 
its position ; the French, on the contrary, did 
fall off, while the American navy advanced by 
great strides to the first place. 



APPENDIX C. 

After my work was in press I for the first 
time came across Prof. J. Russell Soley's 
" Naval Campaign of 1812," in the " Proceed- 
ings of the United States Naval Institute," 
for October 20, 188 1. It is apparently the 
precursor of a more extended history. Had 
I known that such a writer as Professor Soley 
was engaged on a work of this kind I certainly 
should not have attempted it myself. 

In several points our accounts differ. In 
the action wdth the Guerriere his diagram 
differs from mine chiefly in his making the 
Constitutio7i steer in a more direct line, while 
I have represented her as shifting her course 
several times in order to avoid being raked, 
bringing the wind first on her port and then 
on her starboard-quarter. My account of the 



26o NAVAL WAR OF iZ\2. 

number of the crew of the Guerriere is taken 
from the Constitution' s muster-book (in the 
Treasury Department at Washington), which 
contains the names of all the British prisoners 
received aboard the Co7istitiitio7i after the fight. 
The various writers used " larboard " and 
"starboard" with such perfect indifference, 
in speaking of the closing and the loss of the 
Guerriere's mizzen-mast, that I hardlv knew 
which account to adopt ; it finally seemed to 
me that the only way to reconcile the conflict- 
ing statements was by making the mast act as 
a rudder, first to keep the ship off the wind 
until it was dead aft and then to bring her up 
into it. If this was the case, it deadened her 
speed, and prevented Dacres from keeping 
his ship yardarm and yardarm with the foe, 
though he tried to steady his course with the 
helm ; but, in this view, it rather delayed 
Hull's raking than helped him. If Professor 
Soley's account is right, I hardly know what 
to make of the statement in one of the Amer- 
ican accounts that the Constitution " luffed 
across the enemy's bow," and of Cooper's 
statement (in Putnam's Magazine) that the 
Guerriere's bowsprit pressed against the Co^i- 
stitutio7i's " lee or port quarter." 

In the action of the Wasp with the Frolic, 
I have adopted James' statement of the lat- 
ter's force ; Professor Soley follows Captain 
Jones' letter, which gives the brig three 
additional guns and i8 pounds more metal 
in broadside. My reason for following James 
was that his account of the Frolic's force 
agrees with the regular armament of her class. 



APPENDIX. 261 

Captain Jones give her two carronades on the 
topgallant forecastle, which must certainly 
be a mistake ; he makes her chase-guns long 
12's, but all the other British brigs carried 
6's ; he also gives her another gun in broad- 
side, which he calls a 12-pounder, and Lieu- 
tenant Biddle (in a letter to his father) a 32- 
pound carronade. His last gun should per- 
haps be counted in ; I excluded it because 
the two American officials differed in their 
account of it, because I did not know through 
what port it could be fought, and because 
James asserted that it was dismounted and 
lashed to the forecastle. The Wasp left port 
with 138 men ; subtracting the pilot and two 
men who were drowned, makes 135 the num- 
ber on board during the action. As the battle 
was fought, I doubt if the loss of the brig's 
main-yard had much effect on the result ; had 
it been her object to keep on the wind, or had 
the loss of her after-sails enabled her antag- 
onist to cross her stern (as in the case of the 
Argus and Pelica?i), the accident could fairly 
be said to have had a decided effect upon the 
contest. But as a short time after the fight 
began the vessels were running nearly free, 
and as the Wasp herself was greatly injured 
aloft at the time, and m.ade no effort to cross 
her foe's stern, it is difficult to see that it 
made much difference. The brig's head-sails 
were all right, and, as she was not close- 
hauled, the cause of her not being kept more 
under command was probably purely due to 
the slaughter on her decks. 

Professor Soley represents the combat of 



262 NAVAL F/AJ? OF iSi2. ^ 

the States and Macedo?iian as a plain yardarm 
and yardarm action after the first forty min- 
utes. I have followed the English authorities 
and make it a running fight throughout. If 
Professor Soley is right, the enormous dispar- 
ity in loss was due mainly to the infinitely 
greater accuracy of the American fire ; accord- 
ing to my diagram the chief cause was the in- 
competency of the Macedonian s commander. 
In one event the difference was mainly in the 
gunnery of the crews, in the other, it was 
mainly in the tactical skill of the captains. 
The question is merely as to how soon Garden, 
in his headlong, foolishly rash approach, was 
enabled to close with Decatur. I have rep- 
resented the closing as taking place later than 
Professor Soley has done ; very possibly I 
am wrong. Could my work now be rewritten 
I think I should adopt his diagram of the 
action of the Macedonia7i. 

But in the action with \h^ Java it seems to 
me that he is mistaken. He has here followed 
the British accounts ; but they are contradicted 
by the American authorities, and besides 
have a very improbable look. When the 
Co7istitiition came round for the second time, 
on the port tack, James declares the Java 
passed directly across her stern, almost touch- 
ing, but that the British crew, overcome by 
astonishment or awe, did not fire a shot ; and 
that shortly afterward the manoeuvre was re- 
peated. When this incident is said to have 
occurred the Java's crew had been hard at 
work fighting the guns for half an hour, and 
they continued for an hour and a half after- 



APPENDIX. 263 

ward ; it is impossible to believe that they 
would have forborne to fire more than one 
gun when in such a superb position for in- 
flicting damage. Even had the men been 
struck with temporary lunacy the officers alone 
would have fired some of the guns. More- 
over, if the courses of the vessels were such 
as indicated on Professor Soley's diagram the 
Java would herself have been previously ex- 
posed to a terrible raking fire, which was not 
the case. So the alleged manoeuvres have, 
per se, a decidedly apocryphal look ; and be- 
sides they are flatly contradicted by the 
American accounts which state distinctly that 
the/^7/(2 remained to windward in every por- 
tion of the fight. On this same tack Professor 
Soley represents the Java as forereaching on 
the Co7istitution ; I have reversed this. At 
this time the/<^z^^ had been much cut up in 
her rigging and aloft generally, while the 
Constitutio7i had set much additional sail, and 
in consequence the latter forged ahead and 
wore in the smoke unperceived. When the 
ships came foul Professor Soley has drawn the 
Co7istitutmi in a position in which she would 
receive a most destructive stern rake from 
her antagonist's whole broadside. The posi- 
tions could not have been as there repre- 
sented. The Java^s bowsprit came foul in 
the Constitution's mizzen rigging and as the 
latter forged ahead she pulled the former 
gradually round till when they separated the 
ships were in a head and stern line. Commo- 
dore Bainbridge, as he particularly says, at 
once " kept aw^ay to avoid being raked," while 



264 NAVAL WAR OF i2>i2. 

the loss of the headsails aboard the Java 
would cause the latter to come up in the 
wind, and the two ships would again be run- 
ning parallel, with the American to leeward. 
I have already discussed fully the reasons 
for rejecting in this instance the British 
report of their own force and loss. This 
was the last defeat that the British ofhcially 
reported ; the admiralty were smarting with 
the sting of successive disasters and anxious 
at all costs to put the best possible face on 
affairs (as witness Mr. Croker's response to 
Lord Dundonald's speech in the House). 
There is every reason for believing that in 
this case the reports were garbled ; exactly as 
at a later date the official correspondence pre- 
ceding the terrible disasters at Cabul was tam- 
pered with before being put before the public 
(see McCarthy's " History of our Own 
Times ''). 

It is difficult to draw a diagram of the 
action between the Hornet and Peacock^ 
although it was so short, the accounts con- 
tradicting one another as to which ship was 
to windward and which on the " larboard 
tack ; " and I do not know if I have correctly 
represented the position of the combatants at 
the close of the engagement. Lieutenant Con- 
ner reported the number of men aboard the 
Hornet fit for duty as 135 ; Lawrence says she 
had 8 absent in a prize and 7 too sick to be 
at quarters. This would make an original 
complement of 150, and tallies exactly with 
the number of men left on the Hornet after 
the action was over, as mentioned by Law- 



APPENDIX. 265 

rence in his account of the total number of 
souls aboard. The logbook of the Hornet 
just before starting on her cruise, states her 
entire complement as 158; but 4 of these 
were sick and left behind. There is still a 
discrepancy of 4 men, but during the course 
of the cruise nothing would be more likely 
than that four men should be gotten rid of, 
either by sickness, desertion, or dismissal. 
At any rate the discrepancy is very trivial. 
In her last cruise as I have elsewhere said, I 
have probably overestimated the number of 
the Hornefs crew ; this seems especially 
likely when it is remembered that toward the 
close of the war our vessels left port with 
fewer supernumeraries aboard than earlier in 
the contest. If such is the case, the Ho7'net 
and Fe7igum Vv^ere of almost exactly equal 
force. 

My own comments upon the causes of our 
success, upon the various historians of the 
war, etc., are so similar to those of Professor 
Soley, that I almost feel as if I had been 
guilty of plagiarism ; yet I never saw his writ- 
ings till half an hour ago. But in comment- 
ing on the actions of 1812, I think the Pro- 
fessor has laid too much stress on the differ- 
ence in "dash" between the combatants. 
The Wasp bore down with perfect confidence 
to engage an equal foe ; and the Horjiet could 
not tell till the Peacock opened fire that the 
latter was inferior in force, and moreover 
fought in sight of another hostile vessel. In 
the action with the Guerrih-e it was Hull and 
not Dacres who acted boldly, the Englishman 



2 66 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 

delaying the combat and trying to keep it at 
long range for some time. In this fight it 
must be remembered that neither foe knew 
the exact force of the other until the close 
work began ; then, it is true, Dacres fought 
most bravelv. So with the Macedoniaii ; 
James particularly says that she did not know 
the force of her foe, and was confident of 
victory. The Java, however, must have 
known that she Vk^as to engage a superior 
force. In neither of the first two frigate ac- 
tions did the Americans have a chance to 
display any courage in the actual fighting, 
the victory was won with such ease. But in 
each case they entered as bravely, although 
by no means as rashly or foolishly, into the 
fight as their antagonists did. It must always 
be remembered that until this time it was by 
no means proved that 24-pounders were better 
guns than i8's to put on frigates ; exactly as 
at a little later date it was vigorously contended 
that 42-pounders were no more effective guns 
for two-deckers than 32-pounders were. Till 
1812 there had been no experience to justify 
the theory that the 24-pounder was the better 
gun. So that in the first five actions it cannot 
be said that the British showed any especial 
courage in begi7ini7ig the fight ,• it was more 
properly to be called ignorance. After the 
fight was once begun they certainly acted 
very bravely, and, in particular, the desperate 
nature of the F?'oIic's defence has never been 
surpassed. 

But admitting this is a very different thing 
from admitting that the British fought more 



APPENDIX. 267 

bravel}^ than their foes ; the combatants were 
about on a par in this respect. The Amer- 
icans, it seems to me, were always to the full 
as ready to engage as their antagonists were ; 
on each side there were few over-cautious 
men, such as Commodore Rodgers and Sir 
George Collier, the opposing captains on Lake 
Ontario, the commander of the Boiiiie Citoy- 
enne, and perhaps Commodore Decatur, but as 
a rule either side jumped at the chance of a 
fight. The difference in tactics was one of 
skill and common sense, not one of timidity. 
The United States did not " avoid close 
action " from over-caution, but simply to take 
advantage of her opponent's rashness. Hull's 
approach was as bold as it was skilful ; had 
the opponent to leeward been the Endymioii 
instead of the Guen'iere, her 24-pounders 
would not have saved her from the fate that 
overtook the latter. Throughout the war I 
think that the Americans were as bold in 
beginning action, and as stubborn in con- 
tinuing it, as were their foes — although no 
more so. Neither side can claim any supe- 
riority on the average, though each can in 
individual cases, as regards courage. Fool- 
hardiness does not imply bravery. A prize- 
fighter who refused to use his guard would be 
looked upon as exceptionally brainless, not as 
exceptionally brave ; yet such a case is almost 
exactly parallel to that of the captain of the 
Macedonian, 



268 NAVAL WAR OF \'^\2, 



APPENDIX D. 

In the *' Historical Register of the United 
States'' (Edited by T. H. Palmer, Philadel- 
phia, 1814), vol. I, p. 105 (State Papers), is 
a letter from Lieut. L. H. Babbitt to Master- 
commandant Wm. U. Crane, both of the 
Nautilus^ dated Sept. 13, 18 12, in which he 
says that of the six men imprisoned by the 
British on suspicion of being of English birth, 
four were native-born Americans, and two 
naturalized citizens. He also gives a list of 
six men who deserted, and entered on the 
S/ian?w?i, of w^hom two were American born 
— the birthplaces of the four others not being 
given. Adding these last, we still have but 
six men as the number of British aboard the 
Nautilus. It is thus seen that the crack 
frigate Sha7mon had American deserters 
aboard her — although these probably formed 
a merely trifling faction of her crew, as did 
the British deserters aboard the crack frigate 
Constitiitio7i. 

On p. 108, is a letter of Dec. 17, 1812, from 
Geo. S. Wise, purser of the Wasp., stating that 
twelve of that ship's crew had been detained 
" under the pretence of their being British 
subjects " ; so that nine per cent, of her crew 
may have been British — or the proportion may 
have been very much smaller. 

On p. 117, is a letter of Jan. 14, 1813, from 
Commodore J. Rodgers, in which he states 



APPENDIX. 



209 



that he encloses the muster-rolls of H. B. M. 
ships, Moselle and Sappho, taken out of the 
captured packet Swallow ; and that these mus- 
ter-rolls show that in August, 18 12, one-eighth 
of the crews of the Moselle and Sappho, was 
composed of Americans. 

These various letters thus support strongly 
the conclusions reached on a former page as 
to the proportion of British deserters on 
American vessels. 

In " A Biographical Memoir of the late 
Commodore Joshua Barney, from Autograph- 
ical Notes and Journals " (Edited by Mary 
Barney, Boston, 1832), on pages 263 and 
315, are descriptions of the flotilla destroyed 
in the Patuxent. It consisted of one gun- 
boat, carrying a long 24; one cutter, carrying 
a long 18, a columbiad 18, and four 9-pound 
carronades, and thirteen row barges, each 
carrying a long 18 or 12 in the bow, with a 
32-pound or 18-pound carronade in the stern. 
On p. 256, Barney's force in St. Leonard's 
creek, is described as consisting of one sloop, 
two gunboats, and thirteen barges, with in all 
somewhat over 500 men ; and it is claimed 
that the flotilla drove away the blockading 
frigates, entirely unaided ; the infantry force 
on shore rendering no assistance. The work 
is of some value, as showing that James had 
more than doubled the size, and almost 
doubled the strength, of Barney's various gun- 
boats. 

It may be mentioned that on p. 108, Com- 
modore Barney describes the Dutch- American 
frigate South Carolina^ which carried a crew 



270 NAVAL WAR C?/' i8i2. 

of 550 men, and was armed with 28 long 42's 
on the maindeck, and 12 long 12's on the 
spardeck. She was far heavier than any of 
our 44-gun frigates of 1812, and an overmatch 
for anything under the rank of a 74, ' This 
gives further emphasis to what I have already 
stated — that the distinguishing feature of the 
war of 18 1 2, is not the introduction of the 
heavy frigate, for heavy frigates had been in 
use among various nations for thirty years 
previously, but the fact that for the first time 
the heavy frigate was used to the best pos- 
sible advantage. 



APPENDIX E. 

In the last edition of James' '• Naval His- 
tory of Great Britain," published in London, in 
1886, by Richard Bentley & Son, there is an 
appendix by Mr. H. T. Powell, devoted to the 
war of 1 8 12, mainly to my account thereof. 

Mr. Powell begins by stating with naif 
solemnity that " most British readers will be 
surprised to learn that, notwithstanding the 
infinite pains taken by William James to 
render his history a monument of accuracy, 
and notwithstanding the exposure he brought 
upon contemporary misstatements, yet to this 
day the Americans still dispute his facts." It 
is difficult to discuss seriousl}'' any question 
with a man capable of writing down in good 
faith such a sentence as the above. James 
(unlike Brenton and Cooper) knew perfectly 
well how to be accurate ; but if Mr. Powell 



APPENDIX. 271 

will read the comments on his accounts which 
1 have appended to the description of almost 
every battle, he will see that James stands 
convicted beyond possibility of doubt, not 
merely of occasional inaccuracies or errors, 
but of the systematic, malicious, and con- 
tmuous practise of every known form of wilful 
misstatement, from the suppression of the 
truth and the suggestion of the false to the 
lie direct. To a man of his character the 
temptation was irresistible ; for when he came 
to our naval war, he had to appear as the 
champion of the beaten side, and to explain 
away defeat instead of chronicling victory. 
The contemporary American writers were 
quite as boastful and untruthful. No honor- 
able American should at this day endorse 
their statements; and similarly, no reputable 
Englishman should permit his name to be as- 
sociated in any way with James' book without 
explicitly disclaiming all share in, or sympathy 
with, its scurrilous mendacity. 

Mr. Powell's efforts to controvert my state- 
ments can be disposed of in short order. He 
first endeavors to prove that James was right 
about the tonnage of the ships ; but all that 
he does is to show that his author gave for 
the English frigates and sloops the correct 
tonnage by English and French rules. This I 
never for a moment disputed. What I said 
was that the coinpa7'ative tonnage of the various 
pairs of combatants as given by James was 
all wrong ; and this Mr. Powell does not even 
discuss. James applied one system correctly 
to the English vessels ; but he applied quite 



272 NAVAL WAR (9/^ 1812. 

another to the American (especially on the 
lakes). Mr. Powell actually quotes Admiral 
Chads as a witness, because he says that his 
father considered James' account of X\\^ Java's 
fight accurate ; if he wishes such testimony, I 
can produce many relatives of the Perrys, 
Porters, and Rodgers of 1812, who insist that 
I have done much less than justice to the 
American side. He says I passed over silent- 
ly James' schedule of dimensions of the frig- 
ates and sloops. This is a mistake ; I 
showed by the testimony of Captains Piddle 
and Warrington and Lieutenant Hoffman that 
his comparative measurements (the absolute 
measurements being of no consequence) for 
the American and Pritish sloops are all wrong; 
and the same holds true of the frigates. 

Mr. Powell deals with the weight of shot ex- 
actly as he does Vv^ith the tonnage — that is, he 
seeks to show what the absolute weight of the 
Pritish shot was ; but he does not touch upon 
the point at issue, the coviparative weight of 
the Pritish and American shot. 

When he comes to the lake actions, Mr. 
Powell is driven to conclude that what I aver 
must be accurate, because he thinks the 
Confia7ice was the size of the General Pike 
(instead of half as large again ; she mounted 
30 guns in battery on her main deck, as 
against the Pikes 26, and stood to the latter 
as the Co7istellation did to the Essex)^ and 
because an American writer (very properly) 
expresses dissatisfaction v/ith Commodore 
Chauncy ! W^hat Mr. Powell thinks this last 
statement tends to prove would be difficult to 



APPENDIX. 273 

say. In the body of my work I go into the 
minute details of the strength of the com- 
batants in the lake action ; I clearly show 
that James was guilty of gross and wilful fal- 
sification of the truth ; and no material 
statement I make can be successfully con- 
troverted. 

So much for Mr. Powell But a much 
higher authority, Mr. Frank Chiswell, has 
recently published some articles which tend 
to show that my conclusions as to the tonnage 
of the sea vessels (not as to the lake vessels, 
which are taken from different sources) are 
open to question. In the appendix to my 
first edition I myself showed that it was quite 
impossible to reconcile all the different state- 
ments ; that the most that could be done was 
to take one method and apply it all through, 
admitting that even in this way it would be 
impossible to make all the cases square with 
one another. 

Mr. Chiswell states that " the American 
tonnage measurements, properly taken, never 
could give results for frigates varying largely 
from the English tonnage." But a statement 
like this is idle; for the answer to the "never 
could " is that they did. If Mr. Chiswell will 
turn to James' "Naval Occurrences," he will 
find the Chesapeake set down as 1,135 tons, 
and the Macedo?iia?i as of i,oSi ; but in the 
American Navy lists, v;hich are those I fol- 
fowed, the Chesapeake is put down as of 1,244 
tons. A simple application of the rule of 
three shows that even if I accepted James' 
figures, I would be obliged to consider the 
18 



274 A'AVAL WAR OF 1^12. 

Macedonia?! as of about 1,185 tons, to make 
her correspond with the system I had adopted 
for the American ships. 

But this is not all. James gives the length 
of the Macedo7iian as 154 ft. 6 in. In the 
[N'avy Department at Washington are two 
plans of the Macedoniati. One is dated 1817, 
and gives her length as 157 ft. 3 in. This 
difference in measurement would make a dif- 
ference of 20 odd tons ; so that by the Amer- 
ican mode she must certainly have been over 
1,200 tons, instead of under 1,100, as by the 
British rules. The second plan in the Navy 
Department, much more elaborate than the 
first, is dated 1829, and gives the length as 
164 ft. ; it is probably this that Emmons and 
the United States Navy lists have followed — 
as I did myself in calling the tonnage of the 
Macedonian 1,325. Since finding the plan of 
1817, however, I think it possible that the 
other refers to the second vessel of the name, 
which was built in 1832. If this is true, then 
the Macedonia?! (as well as the Guerrih'e and 
Java) should be put down as about 120 tons 
less than the measurements given by Emmons 
and adopted by me ; but even if this is so, 
she must be considered as tonning over 1,200, 
using the method I have applied to the Chesa- 
peake. Therefore, adopting the same system 
that I apply to the American 38-gun frigates, 
the British 38-gun frigates were of over 1,200 
not under 1,100, tons. 

As for the Cya7ie, James makes her but 118 
ft. and 2 in. long, while the American Peacock 
he puts at 119 ft. 5 in. But Lieut. Hoffman's 



APPENDIX. 275 

official report makes the former 123 ft. 3 in., 
and the plans in the State Department at 
Washington make the latter 117 ft. 11 in. in 
length. I care nothing for the different 
methods of measuring different vessels ; what 
I wish to get at is the comparative measure- 
ment, and this stands as above. The com- 
parative tonnage is thus the very reverse of 
that indicated by James' figures. 

Finally, as to the brigs, James makes them 
some ten feet shorter than the American ship- 
sloops. In the Washington archives I can 
find no plan on record of the measurements 
of the captured Epervier ; but in the Navy 
Department, volume 10, of the "Letters of 
Master Commandants, 1814," under date of 
May 1 2th, is the statement of the Surveyor of 
the Port of Charleston that she measured 467 
tons (in another place it is given as 477). 
James makes her 388 ; but as he makes the 
American IVasp 434, whereas she stands on 
our list as of 450, the application of the same 
rule as with the frigates give us, even taking 
his own figures, 400 as her tonnage, when 
measured as our ships were. But the meas- 
urements of the Surveyor of the Port who 
examined the Epervier are corroborated by 
the statements of Captain Biddle, who cap- 
tured her sister brig, the Penguin. Biddle 
reported that the latter was two feet shorter 
and a little broader than his own ship, the 
Hornet^ which was of 480 tons. This would 
correspond almost exactly with the Surveyor's 
estimate. 

It still seems impossible to reconcile all 



276 NAVAL WAR OF 1Z12. 

these conflicting statements ; but I am in- 
clined to think that, on the wliole, in the sea 
(not the lake) vessels I have put the British 
tonnage too high. On the scale I have 
adopted for the American 44-gun and 38-gun 
frigates and i8-gun sloops like th.Q Hornet dcud 
Wasp, the British 38-gun frigates ought to be 
put down as of a little over 1,200, and the 
British i8-gun sloops as of between 400 and 
450, tons. In other words, of the twelve 
single-ship actions of the war five, those of 
the Chesapeake and Shan?ion, Efiterprise and 
Boxer, Wasp and Frolic, Hornet and Peacock, 
Hornet and PeJiguin, were between vessels of 
nearly equal size ; in six the American was the 
superior about in the proportion of five to 
four (rather more in the case of the frigates, 
rather less in the case of the brigs) ; and in 
one, that of the Argus and Pelican, the British 
sloop was the bigger, in a somewhat similar 
ratio. 

This correction would be in favor of the 
British. But in a more important particular 
I think I have done injustice to the Amer- 
icans. I should have allowed for the short 
weight of American metal on the lakes, taking 
off seven per cent, from the nominal broad- 
sides of Perry and Macdonough ; for the 
American ordnance was of exactly the same 
quality as that on the ocean vessels, while the 
British was brought over from England, and 
must have shown the same superiority that 
obtained on the sea-going ships. 

Moreover, I am now inclined to believe that 
both the Guerriere and ihe/ava, which were 



APPENDIX. 



277 



originally French ships, still carried French 
i8's on their main-deck, and that, therefore, 
about 20 pounds should be added to the 
broadside weight of metal of each. The 
American accounts stated this to be the case 
in both instances ; but I paid no heed to 
them until my attention was called to the 
fact that the English had captured enormous 
quantities of French cannon and shot and 
certainly used the captured ordnance on some 
of their ships. 

In writing my history I have had to deal 
with a mass of confused and contradictory 
testimony, which it has sometimes been quite 
impossible to reconcile, the difficulty being 
greatly enhanced by the calculated mendacity 
of James and some others of the earlier writers, 
both American and British. Often I have 
had simply to balance probabilities, and 
choose between two sets of figures, aware 
that, whichever I chose, much could be said 
against the choice. It has, therefore, been 
quite impossible to avoid errors; but I am 
confident they have been as much in favor of 
the British as the Americans ; and in all im- 
portant points my statements are substantially 
accurate. 

I do not believe that my final conclusions 
on the different fights can be disputed. James 
asserts that the American ships were officered 
by cunning cowards, and manned to the extent 
of half their force in point of effectiveness by 
renegade British. I show that the percentage 
of non-American seamen aboard the Amer- 
ican ships was probably but little greater than 



278 NAVAL WAR OF id>i2. 

the percentage of non-British seamen aboard 
the British ships ; and as for the charges of cow- 
ardice, there were but two instances in which 
it could be fairly urged against a beaten crew 
— that of the British Epervier and that of the 
American Argics (for the cases of Sir George 
Collier, Commodore Rodgers^ Chauncy, Yeo, 
the commander of the Boime Citoyenne, etc., 
etc., cannot be considered as coming under 
this head). James states that there was 
usually a great superiority of force on the side 
of the Americans ; this is true ; but I show 
that it was not nearly as great as he makes it, 
and that in dealing with the lake flotillas his 
figures are absolutely false, to the extent of 
even reversing the relative strength of the 
combatants on Lake Champlain, where the 
Americans won, although with an inferior 
force. In the one noteworthy British victory, 
that of the Shannon,, all British authors fail to 
make any allowance for the vital fact that the 
Shannon''s crew had been drilled for seven 
years, whereas the Chesapeake had an abso- 
lutely new crew, and had been out of port just 
eight hours ; yet such a difference in length 
of drill is more important than disparity in 
wei2:ht of metal. 

As a whole, it must be said that both sides 
showed equal courage and resolution ; that 
the Americans usually possessed the advan- 
tage in material force ; and that they also 
showed a decided superiority in fighting skill, 
notably in marksmanship. 



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Grant Allen. With 98 illustrations by 
Gordon Browne. 

12% ^1.50 

"Mr. Allen's text, as in all his writings, is singularly pictur- 
esque and captivating. There are no commonplaces and although 
the outcome is perfectly evident early in the story, the reader will 
find his attention chained. . . . It is one of the best of the 
summer books, and as an artistic bit of light reading ranks high. 
It is a pity that such a vivid imagination and high-bred style of 
discourse are no longer in the land of the living to entertain us 
with further stories of adventure," — Boston Times. 

The Angel of Clay 

By William Ordway Partridge, author of 
" The Song Life of a Sculptor," etc. 
With illustrations by A. B. Wenzell. 
12°, $1.25 

" a story of the studio order, free from the grosser elements 
which frequently mar such novels, and stronger in situations, 
thought, and action than are most. The central figure is that of 
the true man and artist, and this character is splendidly por- 
trayed. The style and story both invite perusal. — Portland 
Tra7iscript, 

Q. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 
New York and London 



Works on the Civil War 

The Story of the Civil War. A Concise Account 
of the War in the United States of America between 
1861 and 1865. By John Codman Ropes, Member 
of the Massachusetts Historical Society, The Mili- 
tary Historical Society of Massachusetts, Fellow of 
the Royal Historical Society. Author of " The 
Army Under Pope," " The First Napoleon," " The 
Campaign of Waterloo," etc. To be complete in 
four parts, with comprehensive maps and battle plans. 
Each part will be complete in itself, and will be sold 
separately. 

Part I. Narrative of Events to the Opening of the 
Campaign of 1862. With 5 maps. 8vo , $I 50 
Part II. The Campaigns of 1862. With 13 maps. 
8vo 2 50 

Slavery and Four Years of War. A Political 
History of Slavery in the United States, together 
with a narrative of the Campaigns and Battles of the 
Civil War in which the author took part. By JOSEPH 
Warren Keifer, Brevet Major-General of Volun- 
teers, ex-Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
U.S.A., and Major-General of Volunteers, Spanish 
War. 
Two vols., illustrated. 8°, 336, 340 pages, $6 00 

Ulysses S. Grant, and the Period of National 
Preservation and Reconstruction. 1822- 
1885. By William Conant Church, late Lieut. - 
Colonel, U.S.A., author of " Life of John Ericsson." 
No. 21 in the " Heroes of the Nations Series." Fully 
illustrated Large 12°, cloth, $i 50 ; half leather, 
gilt top . . . . . . • $1 75 

Robert E. Lee, and the Southern Confed= 
eracy. 1 807-1 870. By Prof. Henry Alex- 
ander White, of Washington and Lee University. 
No. 22 in the " Heroes of the Nations Series." 
Fully illustrated. Large 12°, cloth, $1 50; half 
leather, gilt top * « . . . . $1 75 

G. P. PUTNAAl'S SONS 
New York and London 



THE COMPLETE WORKS OF 

JAMES FENmORE COOPER 

MOHAWK EDITION 



To be completed in 32 volume-s, large 
T2mo, handsomely printed, with illustratioos, 
and substantially bound. 

The Mohawk Edition will range in ap- 
pearance with the Hudson Edition of Irving's 
Works, and the volumes will be sold either 
separately or in sets. Broken sets can, there- 
fore, always be made good. 

Price, per Volume, $1.25. 

The Mohawk Edition will comprise the 
complete works as follows ; 

Section IL Comprises s 

The Pilot 
Red Rover 
Wing and W^ing 
The Water-Witch 
The Two Admirals 
The Sea-Lions 



Comprises ; 



Section I. 

The Deerslayer 
Last of the Mohicans 
The Pathfinder 
The Pioneers 
The Prairie 
, The Spy 



Section IIL Comprises: 

Homeward Bound 
Home as Found 
The Crater 
Afloat and Ashore 
Miles Wallingford 
Jack Tier 



Section IV. Comprises : 
'Precaution 

Lionel Lincoln 

■Wyandotte 

WeptofWish-ton-Wish - 

The Bravo 

The Ways of the Hour 
^The Redskins 



Section V. Comprises : 
Mercedes of Castile 
The Chainbearer 
Satanstoe 
The Heidenmauer 
The Headsman 
The Monikins 
Oak Openings 



<j. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, New York and Londoa 



XLbvcc IRotable Boc^s 

BY ROBERT W. CHAMBERS. 

The Maker of Moons. Large i2% gilt 
top, $1.50. 

^ " Mr. Chambers has an original creative imagina- 
tion of great power, and has a dramatic faculty which 
enables him easily and artistically to shape his stories 
so that there is no lagging of interest . . . he is a 
master of natural dialogue, a strong picturesque de- 
scriptive writer, and the possessor of a keen sense of 
humor."— iV; V. Press. 

A King and a Few Dukes. A Romance. 
StxfA Edition. Large 12°, $1.25. 

" No superior fiction has appeared in months. 
. . . It is a charming love storj', attractively told 
in a way that is essentially Mr. Chambers' own." — 
N. Y. Times. 

"A more charming, wholly delightful story, it 
would be difScult to name in the whole range of Eng- 
lish fiction. That is saying much, but not one bit 
more than the book deserves. . . . The charac- 
ters are wonderfully well drawn." — N. Y. World. 

" This latest of Mr. Chambers' stories is written in 
a verj?^ charming manner, and with all the grace and 
finish that have made the writings of the ai'«-hor so 
popular during the past." — Albany Union. 

The Red Republic. A Romance of the 
Commune. Ninth Edition. Large 12°, 
$1.25. 

"With all its rush and excitement there is a solid 
basis of painstaking and thoughtf ulness in ' The Red 
Republic' Mr. Chambers is wholly free from self- 
consciousness ; indeed his gifts seem to be little short 
of genius. Wonderfully vivid and graphic." — N. Y. 
JPress. 

"Mr. Chambers shows great familiarity with the 
many dreadful days of 1871, and Mr. Thiers' policy is 
critically examined. ' The Red Republic ' abounds 
in action." — N. Y. Tijnes. 

" The book will commend itself not only for its 
strength and vividness, but for imagination and 
fancy. . . . Glows with gentle beauty and ro- 
mance, putting in striking contrast the barbarity o£ 
war."— Droch in N. Y. Life. 

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 

NEW YORK AND LONDON 



3 1902 



